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Abstract 
Almost a decade since the first case of plea bargaining received publicity in Nigeria, there is 
still uncertainty about the nature and impact of this system on criminal justice 
administration. There is also a lack of clear understanding of how the process is conducted 
and fulfilled, as most of the activities are done behind the closed doors of the prosecutor’s 
office. What is even more significant is the degree of apprehension about the legality of the 
system, and the allegation that the process neither serves the purpose which it claims to 
address nor promotes the justice system’s main objectives of retribution and deterrence. 
These controversies have resulted in enormous criticism and arguments on whether the 
concept of plea bargaining is a suitable and sincere reform or whether it is a transplant that 
encourages compromise the kind of compromise that breeds corruption in the legal system. 
 
This study explores the development of plea bargaining in Nigeria as well as the polemics 
that surrounds its application. It begins by tracing some of the significant institutional 
changes that have continued to reshape criminal justice policies and practices all over the 
world, and how these multifactorial elements in social, political and legal parlance have 
influenced the transition from adversarial and inquisitorial systems to one that promotes 
consensual justice in form of negotiating with a criminal offender. An understanding of 
these trajectories has helped to reveal the inherent conflict of ideas as to whether or not to 
preserve the orthodox values of criminal justice from the compelling incentives that plea 
bargaining presents or to tolerate a system that offers various alternatives that are 
pragmatic in nature. Although this debate is filled with strong utilitarian arguments for plea 
bargaining, it also presents an overwhelming opposition from right based scholarship. 
 
While this research does not reject plea bargaining in its entirety, it was able to 
demonstrate the importance of maintaining a system of criminal justice that is consistent in 
promoting the rule of law, as it reveals the dangers of drifting towards practices that 
potentially threaten the legitimate interest of the various parties in criminal justice. To 
explore the different arguments on this subject matter, this study draws upon critical 
analysis of the global transition from a trial based criminal justice to the contingencies that 
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prompted the rise and expansion of plea bargaining in different parts of the world. The 
study then evluates the complexity of this transition as it applies to Nigeria.   
 
The empirical aspect of this thesis takes a deep and critical assessment of these aspects 
through the eyes of legal practitioners and legal scholars in Nigeria. This leads to an analysis 
of the long standing polemics on legality, suitability, and the advantages and disadvantages 
of plea bargaining in Nigeria, through which some of the distinctive characteristics of the 
Nigerian plea bargaining system was examined in ways not previously done. It also assesses 
the impact of this acclaimed legal reform as it continues to generate widespread 
accusations of partiality and inconsistency. In contrast to previous works, this study was also 
able to explain the practical application of plea bargaining in Nigeria along the line of the 
different technicalities used to fulfill different priorities. It also observes and explains how 
these processes conflict with other existing criminal laws and the extent to which it has 
resulted in the hybridization of the criminal justice system. These findings are in fact the first 
in-depth empirical analysis of the different procedural imports, legal challenges, divisiveness 
and the constitutional problems surrounding the application of plea bargaining in Nigeria.  
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Chapter One 
General introduction. 
1.0 Background 
Overcrowded courts (Hatlestad, 1997), rising prison populations (Hough and Jacobson, 
2003), recidivism (Langan and Levin, 2002), and penal populism are among the major factors 
placing unsustainable pressure on criminal justice systems in many regimes across the world 
(Langer, 2004; McConville and Mirsky, 2005; Thaman, 2010). This challenge has made 
criminal justice administration so cumbersome that legal professionals and legislators across 
the world have continued to identify and employ new methods to make the system more 
efficient. This has resulted in a paradigm shift towards different forms of unconventional 
procedure that appear to offer a remedy to these threats to the effectiveness of criminal 
justice administration. 
 
Far-reaching legal reforms have continued to emerge to the extent described by Langer 
(2004) in his essay on ‘Legal transplants’, that even the parallel adversarial and inquisitorial 
system are witnessing hybridization. A phenomenal aspect in this legal development is how 
systems around the world are utilising consensual procedure through plea bargaining to 
address even the most serious crime allegations. This method of negotiation between legal 
parties that has its roots in the Anglo-American justice system, and has now spread from its 
traditional adversarial homelands into even the most unlikely jurisdictions, such as Russia 
and China. 
 
Within Africa, the Nigerian criminal justice system (the largest in this continent) is one that 
derives its procedural character from the common law adversarial system (Obilade, 1979). 
This means that, as with other common law jurisdictions, criminal trials are adversarial 
contests. This is a tradition that has continued to this day, and has resulted in cases being 
protracted in courts due to legal technicalities and elongated processes of both trials and 
appeals. The law also allows for an interlocutory procedure where trials are stalled, to deal 
with technical questions of law, this being a common method employed by defence 
attorneys, which often halts the progress of trials. Other challenges include judicial transfers 
or retirement, which also drags back on-going cases to the very beginning i.e., the principle 
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of de-novo trial (Alemika, 1986; 1990). Such procedural practices, amongst others, have 
contributed to the slow pace of criminal trials in Nigeria with the result that courts are 
sometimes forced to terminate cases due to the disappearance of evidence or of witnesses. 
Most controversial have been those cases involving influential and wealthy defendants who 
have been difficult to convict due to long periods of litigation where evidence has 
disappeared and where prosecutors have been accused of corruptly compromising the case 
(Oko, 2001: 399).  
 
These inefficiencies and improprieties in the system have led to a series of calls for reform 
(Oko, 2003; Ogundiya, 2009; Achua, 2011). One of the most disconcerting problems has 
been the inability of the Nigerian criminal justice system to deal effectively with cases that 
involve white-collar crimes and public corruption. Many high profile offenders have had 
access to resources and political influence that gives them leverage over a system which is 
profoundly compromised by officials or witnesses that are willing to distort their testimony 
(Oko, 2001: 399). This procedural challenge has continued through the decades and was 
further exacerbated by the nearly two decades of military dictatorship in which the 
constitution was suspended and the justice system made even more compliant to decrees 
(Sanda et al., 1987).  
 
With the return of democracy in 1999 (Edozie, 2002: 41), a policy framework was drawn up 
focusing particularly on how to effectively prosecute offences that involve corruption, which 
culminated in the establishment of the two most historic anti-graft commissions, i.e. The 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) in 2000, and the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002. Most people saw the establishment of two key anti-graft 
commissions as the beginning of plea bargaining in the Nigerian criminal justice system 
(Adeleke, 2012; Adekunle, 2013; Oluwagbohunmi, 2015). Through their powers of 
investigation and prosecution, they have continued to prosecute some of the most 
controversial cases of public corruption and fraud seen in Nigeria’s history (Adekunle, 2013: 
15). But the desire to recover proceeds and crime and secure swift convictions has come at 
a cost. In particular, the commissions have been obliged to adopt unconventional 
approaches, largely through the use of plea bargaining as a way to ensure speedy disposal of 
cases, and because plea bargaining allows for the conviction of major offenders through 
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deals with minor offenders.  What at first appeared to be a simple, liberal and isolated case 
of plea bargaining suddenly became a national debate prompting unprecedented 
controversy about its use within criminal trials in Nigeria (Iwuchukwu, 2014; Inyang, 2014; 
Oluwagbohunmi, 2015) 
 
The challenge and criticism of plea bargaining came swiftly from a population that is used to 
a legal system that has traditionally been based on adversariality.1 Legal professionals 
condemned the process as one that lacked legal justification, as there was no clear statutory 
provision or procedural guidelines to inform the practice (Adekunle, 2013). Although these 
criticisms have not stopped the growing application of plea bargaining, the debate has 
continued on several fronts; from the questions of law and jurisprudence to the suitability 
of negotiating with selected high profile offenders and its incongruence with the rule of law.  
The application of plea bargaining has undoubtedly opened a new chapter in Nigeria’s 
criminal justice history, and for a decade, it has raised questions about how the system 
affects the Nigerian socio-political priorities of fighting corruption and how it affects the 
legal system more generally.  
 
Commentators, scholars and legal professionals have maintained a continuous debate on 
the advantages, challenges, and drawbacks of what is, to many in Nigerians, an unfamiliar 
judicial process (see, e.g., Obayelu, 2007; Egwemi, 2012; Olokooba and Adebayo, 2014; 
Iwuchukwu, 2014; Oluwagbohunmi, 2015). Beyond these headline debates, there has been 
a distinct lack of empirical studyon the application of the practice, its pervasiveness within 
the criminal justice system, and the trajectories that define the attitude and choices of 
practitioners in the course of negotiating with offenders. This is a critical gap in scholarship. 
Most scholars have tended to focus on the history and utility of plea bargaining while public 
commentators continue to emphasise other issues surrounding the cause and effect of this 
new legal transplant. While some see it as a response to a global trend in consensual justice 
procedure, others think it is an abrupt and phenomenal departure from the orthodox 
culture of the adversarial trial (Adegbulu, 2010; Adeleke, 2012). Proponents, on the other 
hand, are of the view that plea bargaining has been part of the Nigeria legal system long 
                                                 
1
 Sahara reporters, 5 February 2013 
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before the establishment of the two commissions in the early 2000s (Esoimeme, 2014: 12; 
Danjuma and Chuan, 2015: 492). 
 
At the crisis of these debates and this controversy, Ayoola, a Justice of the Supreme Court, 
asserted that there was no law setting out any modality for plea bargaining, and, as such, it 
is a topic gaining prominence which has no legitimacy in law (Danlami, 2015: 4). This 
assertion was, however, less far-reaching than the words of the Chief Justice of Nigeria, 
Justice Dahiru Mustapha who in his paper at the 5th Annual Conference of the Nigerian Bar 
Association in November 2011 struck at the very foundation of plea bargaining in Nigeria, 
calling it a: “(n)ovel concept of dubious origin invented to provide soft landing to high profile 
criminals who loot the treasury entrusted to them.” His emphatic statement was supported 
by the assertion that plea-bargain was introduced through “sneaky motives” and is now 
“eating away the modest gains that we seem to be making in reforming both the 
infrastructure and the overall judicial template of the Nigerian Judiciary”. According to 
Justice Dahiru Mustapha, plea bargaining is, “not only a flagrant subordination of the 
public’s interest to the interest of ‘criminal justice administration’, but worst of all, the 
concept generally promotes a cynical view of the entire legal system.” He concluded his 
criticism by saying that the system has no place in Nigeria’s substantive or procedural laws, 
“it is an obstacle to our fight against corruption, it should never again be mentioned in our 
jurisprudence” (cited in Esoimeme, 2014: 10). Again in 2012, a prominent jurist and retired 
justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria stated in an interview: 
They bargain with the judge, bargain with the accused person…there is no plea 
bargain in our law… The importation is wrong…To me, it is corruption to bring plea 
bargain into the law of Nigeria…And they come around and say it is done in other 
countries, Nigeria is not any other country. Nigeria is not just any other country. In 
other countries, it may be right for them to have plea bargain. We never had plea 
bargain...It is corruption for anybody who imports plea bargain into our law (Ogunye, 
2013).  
Little did the retired Judges suspect that years after making this argument, plea bargaining 
would be growing in practice and even find its way into legislation.  
The fight against corruption is a dominant topic in political conversations in Nigeria. This is 
mainly because of the strong sentiment that the impunity and recklessness with which 
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corruption persists is the major factor for the country’s economic problems. Hence, in this 
effort to combat what appears a calamitous situation, legal practitioners are seen as 
stakeholders and important actors. Like the chief Judge, the president of Nigeria, 
Muhammad Buhari while addressing the opening of the 2015 Conference of the Nigerian 
Bar Association in August, called on lawyers across the country to shun anything that would 
be tantamount to helping corrupt officials escape the law. He described corruption as the 
major reason why people cannot go to school; why they cannot be gainfully employed.2 This 
he said is the state of the nation where “public resources meant for millions were diverted 
into the private pockets of a greedy few, thereby causing a lot of suffering, deprivation and 
death.” He continued by emphasising, “there can be no greater violation of human rights 
than corruption, “I think we can all fully appreciate the gravity of this oppressive and 
destructive evil. This should rouse us to fight it with the same zeal and doggedness as we 
deploy in the defence of fundamental rights” (Premium Times, 23 August 2015). The 
constant denunciation of plea bargaining is mainly based on the perception that negotiating 
with criminals is also corruption. Yet, it is important also to note that there is a widespread 
lack of understanding of what plea bargaining is and how the process is applied.  
As we shall see throughout this thesis, there are many arguments and theories underpinning 
the widespread application of plea bargaining. I introduce very briefly some of these 
theories here. Some see plea bargaining from a ‘functionalist’ perspective and the 
‘professionalisation’ theory, which views plea bargaining as a development that was 
promoted by the rise of professionalism in investigation and forensics, which makes 
evidence more accurate and therefore gives little room for denial of criminal culpability 
(Mather, 1979; McConville et al., 2005). Others base their endorsement of plea bargaining 
on the ‘workload’ argument, which as we will see is supported by utilitarian theorists, who 
suggest that with an overcrowded docket, criminal justice is at risk of total collapse unless 
reforms are geared towards expediting process through some form of summary procedures, 
as against the idea of a full trial for every criminal case (Fisher, 2004; Howe, 2005; Kramer et 
al., 2007). Another school of thought views plea bargaining from a more complex 
perspective that includes the rise of punitivism where historically simple civil offences were 
                                                 
2
 Premium Times, 23 August 2015. 
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redefined as crimes, essentially changing the nature and narratives of substantive laws and 
penal policies (Maffei, 2004: 1051). 
 
Another debate, closely related to the Nigerian context is the argument of Alkon who 
maintains that financial crimes have become very complex to prosecute forcing the justice 
system to subject itself to some form of negotiation, and even the use of cooperating 
accomplices in order to obtain a conviction (2009: 41). Other scholars have also given insight 
into how this approach has proved very successful in criminal justice administration (Vogler 
and Jokhadze, 2011: 7-8). For example, they have shown how countries in Eastern Europe, 
particularly Georgia, which in the aftermath of the “Rose Revolution” introduced plea 
bargaining as an urgent response to the growing cases of corruption and organised crime 
ravaging the countries. The system was successfully used to not only convict offenders but 
also to recover proceeds of crime (ibid).  
 
Depending on a number of socio-political variables, plea bargaining is a system that 
produces different results in different societies. What may translate into a significant legal 
of accomplishment in Western democracies may not necessarily represent or promote the 
aspirations of other countries around the world, including those in Africa. It is, therefore, 
safe the influence of plea bargaining in the way criminal cases are conducted, has the 
potential of having different impacts across different legal regimes. Likewise, the fact that it 
reconfigures the traditional mode of criminal justice administration will always provoke 
strong sentiment among the public who may see it as a good reform or a compromise of the 
traditional values of criminal justice.  
 
It is unsurprising that plea bargaining, as a concept, has attracted a great deal of criticism 
amongst public policy makers and scholars alike (see e.g. Alschuler, 1981; Easterbrook, 
1992; Stuntz, 2004). Nonetheless, the introduction of such practices can become 
unavoidable, indeed as Jung notes the entire development of criminal justice has been a 
history of “reform and reaction” (2004: 5). If we take a closer look at contemporary 
developments in criminal justice around the world, we begin to see a broader realignment 
of systems. The effect of modern-day social and political processes have redefined and 
reoriented the functions, objectives and practice of criminal justice administration in ways 
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that depart radically from the trajectories of the past (Garland, 2001: 54). For example, the 
challenge brought about by the complexity of a 'new generation' of criminal cases, has 
added to the predicament of an already overstretched criminal justice system (Jung, 1997). 
Other scholars claim that the changes in the relationship between the state and the citizen 
are among the major factors that are permitting consensual justice through plea negotiation 
(Thaman, 2010). What has become apparent in this fluid and multifaceted transition is the 
decline of a fully adjudicative process (Damaska, 2006: Thaman, 2010). 
The advent of plea bargaining as part of a rapidly evolving global criminal practice can be 
viewed as an almost inevitable response to contemporary challenges to the administration 
of 21st-century criminal justice. Its exponential growth in jurisdictions, including Nigeria, 
therefore, reflects the need for overarching reforms in the new order of criminal justice 
administration.  
1.1 Purpose 
This study is located within the growing scholarly interest in understanding the 
development and application of plea bargaining and how its expansion is changing the 
administration of criminal justice across the world. Essentially, the study explains, through 
literature and empirical work, how plea bargaining works and what it represents in the 
context of legal reform and institutional priorities. Linking the global rise of plea bargaining 
to its emergence in Nigeria, it examines the growing debate on what this new method of 
criminal justice administration has brought into the system and what is was intended to 
achieve.  
As this is the first in-depth empirical examination of plea bargaining in Nigeria, this research 
involves different categories of participants who have a stake in the application of plea 
bargaining and in criminal justice policies and reforms. They include prosecutors, defence 
attorneys, judges, and academics. Participants in the study are among a group of 
professional who are well acquainted with the Nigerian legal system and who have first-
hand knowledge and experience of the institution of plea bargaining in Nigeria.   
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1.2 Research questions 
After more than a decade of controversy over the legality and application of plea bargaining 
in Nigeria, this study is aimed at the following: 
a. The primary aim of this thesis is to provide a critical analysis of the emergence, 
development and application of plea bargaining in Nigeria.  
b. The second aim is to determine the legal and procedural constraints surrounding the 
process of plea bargaining in Nigeria. This discussion shall be based on empirical 
findings.  
c. The third aim is to review recent developments in criminal justice reform in Nigeria 
and to examine their implication on the practice of plea bargaining. 
 
The above aims shall be pursued with the help of the following mechanics: 
i. By examining the transition in criminal justice across the world and how 
negotiation with criminal offenders came to replace the idea of 
adversariality/inquisitoriality. 
ii. By making a comparative analysis of the emergence of plea bargaining in other 
regimes across the world as well as the challenges the system faced; the 
opportunities it presented and the way it was structured to achieve different 
objectives.  
iii. By critically analysing the various advantages, disadvantages and implications of 
subjecting criminal cases to negotiated settlements. 
 
The purpose of using these mechanisms is because this research is first set to examine the 
globalization of plea bargaining by looking at its growth and development across the world. 
This theoretical foundation is significant for understanding why it appeared and was 
promoted in Nigeria. The second aspect in which these mechanisms become relevant is in 
developing a framework that gives a robust understanding of the challenges and 
opportunities that plea bargaining presents in different kinds of legal settings. As will be 
seen in chapter four of this study, there was an attempt to explain different models of plea 
bargaining as they operate in different kinds of legal system; from adversarial to civil law 
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regimes of continental Europe and to regimes with deep communist legal culture such as 
Russia and China.  
Hence, by using these mechanisms, the research lays a strong scholarly foundation on the 
globalization of plea bargaining and on the comparative perspective of this emerging yet 
controversial legal reform that is gaining momentum across the world. In the end, these 
literary explanations are placed alongside empirical evidence in order to be able to build a 
comprehensive analysis and understanding of the different aspects; challenges, criticisms 
and opportunities that plea bargaining brings into the administration of criminal justice in 
Nigeria. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
The methodology of this research is a combination of doctrinal and empirical work. The 
doctrinal part involved mostly secondary text analysis of the various scholarly works on 
criminal justice and its sub-branch of plea bargaining. This gave an insight into the different 
variables that define plea bargaining in both its theoretical and practical sense.  These 
arguments and viewpoints are then supported by the collation of primary data that was 
obtained through elite interviews carried over a period of four months. Respondents for the 
interviews were chosen mainly from elites/professionals working within the Nigeria criminal 
justice institutions. The main targets as a source of data were legal practitioners with 
experience of at least eight years of professional legal practice. This included Judges of 
higher courts, Magistrates, private lawyers and public attorneys. Prosecutors of the two 
famous anti-graft Commissions, i.e., the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) were 
also interviewed. Furthermore, a few people outside the legal profession but relevant to this 
study were also interviewed. This included police prosecutors, members of academia and 
those of civil right groups. Most of these interviews took place face-to-face while the rest 
were conducted over the telephone. With the exception of one person, all the others were 
recorded using a digital voice recorder for face-to-face interviews and a mobile phone 
application for telephone interviews. All the interviews were transcribed and later analysed 
(see section below). 
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The better equation of those interviewed were from the legal profession i.e., prosecutors, 
defence attorneys and judges. And in all, the interviewees were chosen from those that 
have spent at least eight years or more as practitioners. The reason for this is because it was 
in the last Ten years that the debate on plea bargaining became much heated in Nigeria and 
the focus of this study is to have people with good insight and experience of the 
development of plea bargaining and also the nature of criminal justice process in Nigeria. 
This crop of professionals and practitioners are in better position to give informed narratives 
on the various questions of this research, including the controversies surrounded plea 
bargaining since it first emerged in Nigeria. 
 
The pool in which the interviewees were chosen is big enough to represent those that have 
a stake in the administration of criminal justice and in understanding the nature and 
implication of such reforms as plea bargaining in the present economic, legal and political 
atmosphere in Nigeria. Essentially, the pool includes prosecutors of the EFCC and the ICPC, 
State counsels from the office of the Attorney generals of State and the federation, Private 
attorneys, Members of civil society groups, Magistrates and High Court Judges and 
members of the academia. This includes, 4 police prosecutors, 12 lawyers from the private 
Bar and the Attorney General’s Chambers, 3 prosecutors of the EFCC, 2 prosecutors of the 
ICPC, 2 academics, 2 civil society group leaders and 6 Judges from both Magistrate and High 
courts. 
 
The choice of professionals to answer questions relating to institutional routines and policy 
reforms is often a viable method for social science research, capable of generating reliable 
data (Jewel, 1982; Reeher, 1996). It is also cost effective when employed for the purpose 
investigation and research (Dexter, 1970). Another reason for choosing this method was 
because Elites generally have more knowledge and assume more relevant positions on 
policy decisions and institutional reform than other members of the society (Odendahl and 
Shaw, 2002). In this regard, their opinions and views are more significant in determining the 
nature and practical operation of institutions. Using the ‘open interview’ method, this 
research was able to generate in-depth information surrounding the emergence, 
application, and challenges of plea bargaining in Nigeria.   
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From the onset, a ‘purposive sampling’ method was used carefully to select participants 
with good knowledge and experience of law and its application (Bachman and Schutt, 2007: 
124), particularly in aspects of criminal justice administration in Nigeria. A total of 42 people 
were contacted for an interview. Out of this number, 31 participants responded positively. 
These individuals were then sent a document containing a general overview of the types of 
questions that would be asked in order for them to prepare for the interview. This approach 
allowed the interviewees to spend at least some time considering how plea bargaining is 
used within the area they practiced while also enabling me to ask a variety of questions 
during the interview that they might have not contemplated beforehand.  
 
The respondents were selected from all parts of the country, with a special focus on places 
where there is greater level of legal and political activity and information. This ‘Multi-state’ 
selection of interviewees from various regions of the country ensured that the data 
generated reflected the diversity of legal practice in Nigeria. Attention was also given to 
ensuring that the interviewees included practitioners from the four of the major cities in 
Nigeria (Lagos, Kano, Abuja and Port Harcourt). Other regions included Bauchi, Yobe, Borno, 
Nasarawa, Delta, Gombe, Jigawa, Benue, Niger and Adamawa. Such an approach allowed 
me to reflect upon both commonalities and differences across states/jurisdictions.  
 
Although challenges arise in reaching out to elites and securing a convenient time to meet, 
in line with the observation of Hill-Collins (1990), one of the advantages I had was my own 
internal access capabilities based on the fact that I had worked in the criminal justice 
administration as a Magistrate for three years. This previous work and experience in the 
Nigerian judiciary provided me with the leverage of having easy and better access as well as 
the desired rapport to reach most of my target respondents, who showed a willingness to 
openly and comfortably discuss the questions of this research. Hence, this study was able to 
gather adequate data on plea bargaining, criminal justice reform, the general practices of 
courts and other important issues relevant to this research. 
 
Moreover, being that there are ethical issues especially with the confidentiality in the 
statements made by judges and staff of the EFCC and the ICPC, the analysis of the data 
ensures anonymity of the respondents by excluding their names from the main thesis. 
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Instead, each of the interviewees is identified either by the nature of his job and a number. 
The transcript of the interviews was also sent to each of the interviewees for approval 
before including them in the body of this thesis. 
 
1.3.1 Data analysis 
Thematic analysis was used to examine the data (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2008). From 
the data collected, themes emerged that were subsequently categorized (Joffe and Yardley, 
2004). This approach informed the various sub-topics of this thesis, especially in part B 
where the bulk of empirical data was used. Based on their contents, these themes allow for 
analysing and determining the various questions surrounding this study. They were used to 
explain aspects relating to the emergence of plea bargaining in Nigeria, the nature, and 
extent of its application, legal and jurisprudential contingencies, the role of parties as well 
the views and opinions of both supporters and opponents. While some of the responses are 
embedded in the discussion, many were worded quotes of the respondents. This was done 
mostly to give a better insight into the perspectives through which plea bargaining is 
appreciated or debunked.   
 
The reason for using this method is to be able to capture the main arguments and issues 
that are commonly referred to by most people. Essentially, the themes are a reflection of 
the most important issues that have added enormously to the general debate about the 
genesis and practice of plea bargaining. This has helped in focusing the research on the 
areas that are most significant regarding the contention and consensus over plea 
bargaining. Each of these central themes provided insight into different aspects of plea 
bargaining in Nigeria. They also give a holistic narrative based mainly on the responses of 
different respondents who took part in the research as well as what is contained in different 
texts regarding plea bargaining in Nigeria.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This research is presented in two parts, Parts A, and B.  
Part A is a doctrinal discussion of plea bargaining that explores the sociological, political and 
legal theories that are relevant to this study.  Consisting of chapters two to five, this part of 
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the thesis is a critique of the literature that highlights the general debate surrounding the 
changes and reform in criminal justice and its sub branch of plea bargaining. The chapters, 
which began with a reflection on the effect and influence of complex socio-political and 
economic elements on the institution of criminal justice, led to discussions on the 
globalisation of plea bargaining and the theories that explain the transition from other 
forms of summary procedures in criminal justice to what is today a system that allows for 
open negotiations with the offender. It also goes further to explore the challenges and 
controversies that this system of criminal procedure has generated across the world. 
Although this research is mainly focused on Nigeria, it is also one that takes a legal 
comparative approach to study both Nigeria and other countries around the world. The 
reason for exploring other legal regimes is because the subject of plea bargaining is not only 
a global phenomenon; it has also changed the nature of criminal justice administration in 
most of the jurisdictions where it is practiced. That being the case, any comprehensive 
scholarship on plea bargaining cannot ignore these aspects as they relate to the 
globalization and internationalization of new ideas in criminal justice. It also cannot dismiss 
the interconnectivity of nations in both the fight against crime and indeed in the sharing of 
new ideas on criminal justice reform.  
 
Part B of this thesis makes up chapters six to nine and focuses mainly on the empirical data 
collected as part of this thesis. The study looks primarily at the emergence and the practical 
application of plea bargaining in Nigeria. While discussing the contentions surrounding the 
introduction of plea bargaining in Nigeria, it also discusses how legal reform has always 
proven to be an aspect that slowly but surely finds its way beyond the borders where it first 
emerged. This led to the discussion and exploration of the polemics of plea bargaining that 
became widespread in the last decade.  The data obtained and analysed in this part allowed 
me to have a better understanding and to explain plea bargaining in Nigeria.  
 
It is important to state at this point that, even though this research touches on several 
jurisdictions, it is not mainly intended as a comparative study. Rather, the literature 
reviewed for this thesis, especially in chapter four, offers an overview of the ways in which 
plea bargaining has been utilized in different legal regimes around the world. This 
background analysis is essential because legal reforms have a history of transcending their 
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traditional places of origin. Hence, the exploration of international perspectives helped to 
highlight the development of common procedural and substantive changes that are 
occurring globally. This also allowed for the identification of what challenges these reforms 
present and what they represent across different socio-legal environments. 
1.5 Content of chapters 
Chapter Two examines the various trajectories surrounding the many contentious reforms 
to criminal justice process in recent times. It brings to the fore the broader interrelationship 
between law, managerialism and other socio-economic factors that are increasingly 
redefining criminal justice policies. The chapter looks holistically at the various stimulus 
driving these unprecedented changes in the midst of which the world sees the proliferation 
of the idea of consensual justice in the form of plea bargaining.  
 
Chapter Three looks at two of the most important theories underpinning the use of plea 
bargaining.  It begins with a critique of the utilitarian theory, which explains the advantage 
of plea bargaining as a means to remedy the traditionally slow and deliberate criminal 
justice processes. The chapter then examines the second theory, i.e., the ‘decision theory’, 
which explains the factors that define and influence the choices and decisions that parties 
make during plea negotiations. More generally, this chapter explores the two theories as 
they support or oppose the use of plea bargaining, as well as the individual trajectories that 
explain the different drivers of plea bargaining. 
 
Chapter Four provides a discussion on the globalisation of plea bargaining. This chapter 
looks at different jurisdictions and different legal systems that use plea bargaining across 
the world. It examines, in the main, the development of plea bargaining in the United States 
where the practice is used extensively. The chapter also investigates its lesser use in the 
United Kingdom and Wales. Beyond the two common law regimes, the chapter explores the 
development and nature of the application of plea bargaining in civil law jurisdictions 
including, Germany, Italy, as well as those jurisdictions where plea bargaining is least 
expected such as Russia and China.  
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Chapter Five delves deeper into the theoretical critiques of plea bargaining that have been 
developed amongst legal scholars across the world. The chapter looks at the variety of 
scholarly arguments and empirical evidence that support or resist the practice of plea 
bargaining. Through this, the study is able to establish an understanding of the various 
reasons why plea bargaining is supported or opposed among scholars in different 
jurisdictions.  
 
Chapter Six explores the use of plea bargaining in the Nigerian context. It looks at the 
historical development of plea bargaining by situating it within the general workings of the 
Nigerian legal system. Of particular importance is the examination of the establishment of 
the two prominent Anti-graft agencies, who were the first agencies to use plea bargaining in 
Nigeria. 
 
Chapter Seven assesses the model of plea bargaining which has been applied in Nigeria and 
the procedure used to achieve plea bargaining. It also looks at the role played by different 
parties to a negotiation, i.e., the prosecution, the judge, the defence, and victims. It also 
looks at the new Administration of Criminal Justice Act of 2015 and the way it has altered 
issues surrounding plea bargaining. The empirical data for this research is used to explain 
the practicalities of plea bargaining as well as the contents of different statutes and how 
they affect the use of plea bargaining in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter Eight analysed the records of prosecution obtained from the two anti-graft 
commissions, i.e., the EFCC and the ICPC and investigates the dynamics of charging and 
sentencing as well as the effect of court hierarchies to the application of plea bargaining. 
The chapter also looks at the model of plea bargaining in Lagos state and discusses its 
significance. 
 
Chapter Nine is a discussion and analysis on the question of law and the conflict of laws in 
the application of plea bargaining in Nigeria. The chapter also looks at the critique of plea 
bargaining from the Nigerian context. 
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Chapter Ten is a general conclusion of the thesis. This chapter sets out the main argument, 
bringing together the different strands of the debates and analysis in the earlier chapters of 
the thesis. It draws a conclusion on the main findings of the research as well areas that need 
future studies.  
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Part A 
“Nothing can take the place of rigorous and accurate study of the law as already developed 
by the wisdom of the past. This is the raw material which we are to mold. Without this, no 
philosophy will amount to much”. Cardozo, The Growth of Law (1924). 
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Chapter Two 
Transitions and reforms: a global view on criminal justice and the institution 
of plea bargaining. 
2.0 Introduction 
The urgent need for a criminal procedure that is efficient in the disposition of cases 
alongside the demand for resource management in the administration of justice is among 
the strongest stimuli driving the constant changes in criminal justice. A cursory look at 
contemporary criminal justice policies and procedures reveals how these demands manifest 
themselves in the multidirectional changes in the field of justice and penology. As Damaska 
argues, some of these adjustments and modifications seemed to elude conventional points 
of reference, causing many of the orthodox concepts that we were accustomed to, coming 
apart (2004: 1018-1019).  Other scholars cautioned that this desperate quest for efficiency 
and the exaggerated sense of urgency can, in fact, lead to “misunderstanding and superficial 
analysis, lacking in perspective and context” (Feeley, 1982: 388).  
 
Although there are numerous structural changes going on, especially in the field of criminal 
justice, one of the most obvious consequence of this complex transition is the fast growing 
idea of negotiation with criminal offenders. Loosely called plea bargaining, Thaman (2010) 
presents this as a product of the reconstruction of the relationship between individuals 
caused by the deepening sentiment of democracy, which he claims has promoted the idea 
of consensual justice. Other proponents support this notion, arguing that the change in the 
manner of engagement between the State and the citizen, which is a necessary foundation 
for democracy is among the key elements inspiring plea bargaining (Schunemann cited in 
Rauxloh, 2012: 84). The opportunity, to negotiate criminal charges and sentences they 
claim, should be seen as a phenomenon that has redeemed the interest of parties by 
altering “the traditional subordination of the defendant under the powerful judge” (ibid). 
But critics have dismissed this stance, arguing that the idea of prosecution and sentencing 
through any means other than a conventional trial cannot be a phenomenon that would 
legitimately be placed alongside the concept of democracy (Skolnick, 2011). Although this 
argument is mainly posed by critics of plea bargaining who see plea bargaining as an affront 
to what they revere to be a traditional form of trial in open court, the fact that plea 
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bargaining has some degree ofefficiency, finality and a reduction in the cost of criminal 
litigations is a strong argiument that has taken prominence even among critics. It has also 
the major justification for the expansion of plea bargaining. But with this expansion of 
practice, theories about the utility and the effect of plea bargaining have also proliferated.  
 
In his famous theory, ‘Plea bargaining outside the shadow of trial’ Bibas (2004) shows how 
any discussions on plea bargaining must also consider numerous variables beyond the 
traditional simplistic claims of efficiency and cost. He then followed by suggesting that all 
arguments should bring into context the convergence of factors such as punitive legislation, 
penal populism and the dynamics of econo-legal approach to criminal justice administration 
and process. Arguably, all these aspects have added to the polemics of plea bargaining. 
Moreover, numerous questions have been raised about the role each of these factors plays 
in reshaping the future of criminal justice. Perhaps what has become familiar in 
contemporary scholarship is the extent to which the orthodox narratives that were 
traditionally driven by retributivism have been redefined (Baird, and Rosenbaum, 1988). 
This shift is also seen by some scholar as a reflection of the wider socio-economic and 
political trajectories that have historically transformed the institution of criminal justice to 
become a part of a network of governance and social order that includes the legal system, 
the labour market, and welfare State institutions (Garland, 2001: 5). 
 
Evidently, the history of criminal justice often reveals certain patterns, part of which is the 
silent but obvious gravitation toward some form of summary procedure used mostly as a 
means of achieving institutional goals (Garland 2001; McConville and Mirsky, 2005; Thaman, 
2010). A good example of this shift is the wide spread application of plea bargaining, often 
justified as  a way to ensure expeditious disposal of criminal cases. This new form of 
negotiatin instead of trial is slowly becoming a familiar legal practice around the world. 
Putting the concept of plea bargaining into a morespecific context, some scholars suggested 
that the motivation to negotiate with an offender outside the courtroom is a response to 
the inability of criminal justice institutions to deal with the inherent challenge of workload 
and cost of criminal criminal trials (ibid). The primary concern of this study, however, is in 
relation to the unprecedented spread of plea bargaining into legal regimes like Nigeria, 
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where there is growing and an unsettled debate on its suitability, effect, and even its 
legality.  
 
In the field of philosophy of law, these developments have reopened the debate on the 
classical social theory of the relationship between the state, the individual and the 
community when considering the reasons for systemic legal transformations (McConville 
and Mirsky, 2005: v). Evidently, some of these structural reforms have come with certain 
unfamiliar bureaucratic underpinnings that altered the role, obligation, relevance and 
interests of the principal participants in criminal justice process i.e. the judge, the 
prosecution, the defence and the victim. Some scholars even suggest that there is an 
emerging tendency synonymous with previous kinds of ameliorative procedures found in 
other criminal justice ideals such as restorative and rehabilitative justice (Braithwaite 1989; 
Zehr, 1990; Wright 1996).  
 
Other aspects of great interest include the way harsh penal legislations are re-emerging to 
coexist alongside the growing interest in charge and sentencing discount through plea 
bargaining. This becomes even more intricate when one concedes that the former is 
associated with the idea of the severe sentencing, and the latter is attributed to leniency 
and concession. The U.S criminal justice system is a classic example of this paradox, which 
raises the critical question in socio-legal scholarship on whether criminal justice has actually 
become punitive or is it rather a mixed process that encourages punitivism, but still 
condones other methods that promote leniency? Essentially, the widespread practice of 
plea negotiation has extended the debate on the shifting trajectories of criminal justice, not 
only because plea bargaining encourages penal discount, but also because it is often a 
practice driven by the pursuit of organisational priorities and practitioners’ interests (Feeley, 
1982: 200).   
 
Understanding the trajectories surrounding these contentious legal re-alignments may 
require some analysis of the interrelationship between law and other socio-political factors. 
However, this may seem a narrowed distinction of laws as normative when taking into 
account the argument of other scholars such as Schiff (1976) that a broader approach to 
understanding legal constructions will reveal a direct link between legal, social and political 
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situations (Schiff, 1976: 287). Owing to this, and the fact that plea bargaining is mostly 
associated with the practical realities of contemporary criminal justice, the primary 
approach to this chapter is to explore the jurisprudential narratives of crime and penology 
and how the structure and processes of criminal justice administration have constantly been 
influenced by numerous internal and external realities. To examine these issues, the chapter 
explores the literature that explains the different socio-legal realignments seen over the 
years, vis à vis the economics of legal institutions. Essentially, this explanation will involve 
the organisational priorities of criminal justice institutions, the legitimate demands of the 
public in criminal justice administration as well as the way in which political objectives of the 
state lead to the introduction of different reforms in the justice system. 
 
The chapter will further relate these issues to the emergence of plea bargaining in order to 
lay a foundation for subsequent chapters in which the thesis will contextualise some of the 
jurisprudential and practical impacts of the growing practice of negotiation in contemporary 
criminal justice systems. The jurisdictional focus of this chapter is the Common Law, 
especially the Anglo-American adversarial systems, as this is primarily the prism through 
which this research study is fashioned. It is also the legal system from which plea bargaining 
originated. This lays the foundation for subsequent chapters, in which the focus will be to 
discuss the conceptual and practical models of plea bargaining as well as the effects and 
critique that this controversial and less understood process has generated. 
 
2.1   Criminal justice in transition: a new paradigm of changes and reform 
Changes in social and political aspirations of different societies across the world are 
becoming largely centred on the quest for efficiency within the limit of resources. This is 
true of Nigeria as it is with many other countries in the developing and the developed world. 
This challenging reality is increasingly dominating the debate on governance, on rules and 
perhaps on criminal justice (Rhodes, 1997: 46). These changes, which encompass every 
aspect of the polity, have also altered the character of academic discourse on the concept of 
crime control and the maintenance of social order as a core goal of criminal justice (Garland, 
2001: 54). The structure of penal institutions has been altered in ways that essentially 
redefine the role of policing, prosecution and sentencing practices, ensuring “hierarchies 
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shifted precariously; settled routines were pulled apart; objectives and priorities were 
reformulated; standard working practices were altered; and professional expertise was 
subjected to challenge and viewed with increasing scepticism” (ibid: 4). Example of this can 
be seen in the rise of private prisons and indeed the system of plea bargaining that is taking 
criminal matters out of the courts on to negotiation tables. In what he termed as ‘left 
realism’, Cohen states: 
 
What is gained by giving up the romantic and visionary excesses of the 1960s is lost 
by forgetting the truisms of the new criminology of that decade: that rules are 
created in ongoing collective struggles; that “crime” is only one of many possible 
responses to conflict, rule breaking, and trouble; that the criminal law model (police, 
courts, prisons) has hopelessly failed as a guarantee of protection and social justice 
for the weak; that crime control bureaucracies and professionals become self-serving 
and self-fulfilling. These are truths that have not been refuted. Abolitionists might 
take these truths too literally by trying to translate them into a concrete program of 
social policy. Realists, however, convert too literally victims’ conceptions of their 
problems into the language of crime. This is to reify the very label that (still) has to 
be questioned and to legitimate the very system that needs to be weakened. We 
gain political realism but we lose visionary edge and theoretical integrity (1988:271). 
 
From the last quarter of the 20th century both theoretically and practically, perspectives on 
criminal justice in most western democracies have witnessed some significant 
transformations, especially in the field of crime control and in penal policies (McLachlin, 
2000: 313). As will be discussed in the later part of this study, there is for example the rise of 
punitive legislations in jurisdictions like the US, the upgrading of civil offences to become 
criminal in jurisdiction like England and an increase use of surveillance across many western 
democracies. The paradoxical outcome of these alterations has seen an increased 
restructuring of crime control strategies, the growing sentiment of risk society, over-
criminalisation, as well as the widespread application of plea negotiation and other forms of 
abbreviated procedures (Garland, 2001: 176). Predominantly, the orthodox idea of 
retribution is steadily given way to a new response that is more organized around the 
sentiment of risk which is causing penal populism and indeed the quest to expeditiously 
dispose cases (Garland, 1996: 2), especially that punitivism is an aspect that often causes 
enormous strain on the criminal justice system. Some of these reforms have altered the 
foundation of the entire justice system, ushering in new paradigms such as private prisons 
and private parole officers (Schlosser, 1998; Jones and Newburn, 2005).  
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Arguing the sentiment of ‘risk society’ from sociological perspective, Beck claimed that the 
growing emphasis about the ‘risky’ and the ‘outlaw’ is a phenomenon embedded in the 
conception that “in advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically 
accompanied by the social production of risks” (1992: 19). Accordingly, the “problems of 
conflict relating to distribution in a society of scarcity overlap with the problems and conflict 
that arise from the production, definition and distribution of techno-scientifically produced 
risks” (ibid). This theoretical explanation has rekindled a new territory in crime and penology 
studies prompting some sceptics to argue that emerging practices appear to have created 
the tendency for profound and unjustified compromise to the principles of process rights, 
procedural values. In the context of plea bargaining, these sceptics caution about the danger 
of turning crimes and punishment into commodities that can be simply bargained. Despite 
these genuine concerns, others were quick to suggest that reforming the criminal justice 
system is imperative, especially in the face of the urgent need for efficiency and security 
(Bay, 2001: 218). Bussmann went on to also argue that “law is obviously not in the position-
especially not in respect to the groups who are obliged to law-to guarantee stability” (cited 
in Rauxloh, 2012: 65). Perhaps these assertions represent the argument that the reforms are 
necessary for the common interest of both the state and the community (Bay, 2001: 218).  
 
Burke views the many changes in criminal justice administration as factors driven mainly by 
bureaucratic reasoning (2012: 117). Garland, on the other hand, referred to them as the 
embodiment of a “reworked conception of penal-welfarism” largely influenced by an 
economic style of decision-making (2001: 3) It is therefore clear that  most of these 
realignments are sturdily rooted in the unresolved struggle between old and new priorities 
on crime and penology. A paradigm that further reasserts the sectional interest in ‘law and 
order’ legislation, which can only be explained by the recurring interests of global capitalism 
(Burke, 2012: 170). It is, however, important to note that, an emphasis on the relationship 
between law and economics goes as far back as the 1940s, when attempts were made by 
the scholars at Chicago University to discuss “the application of economic theory and 
econometric methods to examine the formation, structure, process and impact of law and 
legal institutions” (Rowley, 1988: 125). Since then, this debate has developed to include 
branches of normative and positive law (Humes, 2002: 965).  
 34 
 
While the normative branch of law was used in this debate to question the jurisprudential 
concepts of efficient rules and how they depart from the dictates of economics (Mercuro 
and Medema, 1997: 7), positive law on the other hand was focused on the attempt to 
expound legal principles and their outcomes (Posner, 1998: 27). Ellickson, however, argues 
the connection between law and economics is no longer growing as a scholarly or curricular 
force (1989: 23-25). Instead, it is simply holding previously won ground (ibid). Yet, it is clear 
the manner in which contemporary objectives of criminal justice have been 
reconceptualization has suggested that law and economics are becoming more intertwined. 
Hence, the suggestion by Ellickson that there has been a decline in scholarly interest in law 
and economics seems quite simplistic, especially when one takes into consideration the 
widespread practice of plea negotiation, whose main justification is premised on the 
economics of criminal justice (Thaman, 2007: 2).  
 
It is, however, important to point out that this phenomenon that is driven by economic 
values which led to the advent of new methods and new players such as private prisons, 
private parole officers etc., did not dislodge the leading role played by the state; a role 
deeply rooted in the political philosophy of social contract. Through its organised 
institutions of criminal justice such crime control, maintenance of social order, penal policies 
and other pragmatic dispute resolution technics, the state still remains at the centre of 
legislation and legal reforms (Davies et al., 2009). These aspects that became strongly 
embedded in the idea of constitutionalism have conserved the state as the manifestation of 
social cohesion and organisation amongst people, as well as the political body in the 
formation and legitimacy of systems and institutions (Zedner, 2004: 159). These obligations 
become even more entrenched as the state continues to be the primary establishment that 
bears the formal political and customary responsibility for the whole society in accordance 
with settled constitutional principles (Ashworth, 2002: 4). Commenting on this, Shapiro 
states that for centuries, systems across the world have augmented the social relation 
between the state, the individual and the community, and that “we can discover almost no 
society that fails to employ this strategy that overwhelmingly continuos to appeal to 
common sense and legitimacy (1986: 1). In the context of trial and plea bargaining, the 
criticism has been on the shift from these settled rules of procedure that emphasis on 
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transparency and accountability to a system that condones private arrangements in which 
the public is unlikely to know how or why a deal was struck between the state and the 
offender. 
 
The argument that that social contract is an important element for the rise of consensual 
justice is premised on the notion that the sentiment of democracy has created an 
opportunity for negotiation among disputing parties as against the previously conceived 
dictates of the all-powerful state (Thaman, 2010). Although the field of criminal justice is 
going through a new phase debate in areas that relate to the classical theory of social 
contract itself, scholars such as Zedner (2006) for example, argued that contemporary 
trends in criminal justice, especially policing signify less a departure from historical practice. 
She further noted that these emerging developments are a reflection of the historical period 
when “state responsibility for crime control grew out of individual responsibility, communal 
self-help and private provision.” Critical legal scholars view most aspects of criminal justice 
as instruments of coercion and control pitted by the State against the solitary individual 
(Siegel, 2009: 26). They argue that through the official juxtaposition of guaranteeing justice 
and fairness, disadvantaged groups are made to “rely on the criminal sanction’s false 
promise of security and equality” (Roach, 1999: 117). Supporting this criticism, Burke 
pointed to how often policies on criminal justice and regulations are increasingly directed 
towards the poor and deprived, who are targeted as risky, irresponsible and unproductive 
individuals that deserve some degree of control and discipline (2012: 211). The idea of plea 
bargaining has in many occasions fell in this equation of accusation as a system that allows 
the strong to escape justice by negotiating with the state. This accusation, as will be seen 
later in this study is held strongly by some respondents. 
 
Other scholars such as Wacquant (2000) gave empirical evidence of the surge in the 
incarceration of mostly the poor and underprivileged, where he indicated the rampant rise 
in punitive legislation and over-criminalisation inherent in contemporary criminal justice, 
especially in jurisdictions such as the US. Further evidence also shows that in recent times, 
some regimes have extended and criminalised offences that were previously defined under 
administrative law, i.e., tax-related crimes and environmental offences (Maffei, 2004: 1051).  
A typical example of this is current laws of England and Wales, which has more than 8000 
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offences of strict liability (Rauxloh, 2012: 65). As recent as 2014, the UK government 
announced that it will introduce new criminal offence for tax evaders under the strict 
liability laws (Kaye, 2014). Similarly, a report from the US by ‘Right On Crime’ shows that 
there are now over 4,000 existing federal crimes.3  These include thousands of harmless 
activities that were traditionally not regarded as criminal offences.4 Among them are 
business activities such as importing orchids without the proper paperwork, shipping lobster 
tails in plastic bags, and even failing to return a library book. In addition to these Federal 
crimes, there are state crimes in which Texas alone has over 1,700.5 The implication of 
creating these often unknowable and redundant crimes and the removal of mens rea 
requirements have further overcrowded courts, causing an enormous backlog and, 
therefore, putting prosecutors and courts under intense pressure to deal with many cases 
within the limits of scarce resources. This naturally motivates the quest for alternative ways 
of ensuring efficiency through plea bargaining. 
  
Another explanation to over-criminalisation is the element in contemporary criminal law, 
which sees not only the commission but also the danger that crime may be committed as a 
sufficient culpability (Rauxloh, 2012: 64). The broad implication of this is that it created 
enormous complication in identifying genuine culpability. In the sense that, “to avoid the 
problems of causation, criminal liability had to be moved forward on the scale of action and 
culpability is increasingly related to the defendant's awareness of the danger and thus the 
mental state of the defendant instead of positive action” (ibid: 66). Owing to these factors, 
legal practitioners are drawn more and more to encourage guilty pleas as the most feasible 
way of obtaining a conviction.  
 
Relating this to other empirical evidence on the widespread application of plea bargaining, 
there is evidence to suggest that punitivism and over-criminalisation have in many ways 
been factors prompting criminal justice practitioners, i.e., prosecutors and judges to seek 
alternative ways of dealing with workload by promising lenient sentence in order to 
encourage guilty pleas (Turner, 2006: 205). Hence, the growing culture of over-
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on criminal justice. 
4
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5
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criminalisation is among the relevant factor in understanding the growth of plea bargaining. 
It is, however, important to note that these explanations also go beyond crime-and-
punishment upsurge to include other extra-penological trajectories. Ericson and Haggerty 
(1997) for example argued that the emergence of the sentiment of ‘risk society’ of late 
modernity has encourage penal populism. Norris and Armstrong also pointed that, of late, 
criminal justice has continued to become ‘actuarial’ and its interventions based on risk 
sentiment that emphasises on practices such as mass surveillance, offender profiling and in 
some cases, preventive detentions, all of which are making the society criminalised and 
consequently overburdening the criminal system (cited in Burke, 2012:203). This leads to 
the question on why legislations are increasingly creating new criminal offences in the face 
of an already overstretched criminal justice institution? In his attempt to explain this 
paradox, Bottoms (1995) pointed at the increasing politicisation of crime control strategies, 
which he categorised as ‘populist punitiveness’ and ‘Bifurcation’. The former he argued, 
represents the rise of the harsh penalty familiar in emerging legislation, and the latter 
represents how this increase in the degree of sanctions is mostly targeted towards the most 
serious crimes while minor crimes of lesser public visibility are treated leniently to reconcile 
monetary and other institutional burdens (ibid: 1995: 39-41). This argument is to some 
degree supported by a number of empirical evidence that shows how lower courts in 
jurisdictions such as the UK and the US are the ones flooded with cases that often end up in 
quick disposal through plea negotiation (Alschuler, 1979; McConville, 1998; Mccurdy, 2005; 
Rauxloh, 2012).  
 
Another point raised by Punch (2002) is in relation to the inherent difficulty in the practical 
administration of criminal justice, especially the organisational operation of contemporary 
policing and law enforcement that foster some diverse forms and patterns of deviance that 
are widespread in many societies (2009: 2). He gave examples of these patterns by 
categorising them into what he termed as ‘official paradigm’ and the other he called 
‘operational code’ (ibid: 2-3). The official paradigm, he argues, is designed to bolster 
institutional values and portray to the outside world the ‘public façade’ of efficiency, 
whereas, the operational code espouses how the process truly works (ibid). In practice he 
said, these official roles are mostly carried out through negotiated reality of internal 
institutional practices that often deviate from the paradigm (ibid). It is from these kinds of 
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bureaucratic undertones and the presumed ‘mutuality of advantage’ enjoyed by the state 
and the community that even the much-debated fallacies of plea bargaining are kept within 
constitutional legitimacy (Caldwell, 2011: 68). Other extended variables include the 
‘professionalism theory’ which argues that the possibility to negotiate is a product of the 
sophistication in criminal investigation that makes evidence clearer at the earliest stage 
(Mather, 1979: 284). This also includes the argument of improved forensics and ways of 
obtaining evidence, sometimes with so much accuracy that offenders admit guilt even 
before trial. But Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar's in their theory of ‘credible coercion,' argue that 
prosecutors, aware of the strength of their evidence invoke extra-legal practices of threat 
and coercion to secure guilty pleas (2004: 44). Yet, they maintain that coercion, when 
credibly backed by strong evidence, is an effective way for the accused to avoid an even 
worse alternative of going to trial for a harsher sentence (ibid). 
 
In relation to other structural adjustment in crime control strategies such as offender 
profiling and preventive detention, scholars argue that they are a reflection of the 
compelling evidence that suggests the failure of every known criminal justice strategy to 
combat crime and recidivism (Garland, 2001: 106-175). This pessimism has eventually 
resulted in a “reworked pattern of cognitive assumptions, normative commitments and 
emotional sensibilities” that motivates most of the practices in criminal justice 
administrators (Burke, 2012: 201-202). It has also resulted in placing greater emphasis on 
incivility, all in the name of safety and security (ibid).  Although some may argue that these 
measures have little to do with plea bargaining, the growing emphasis on surveillance is 
directly correlated to the question of over criminalisation and an overcrowded docket. 
Hence, the need for an expeditious way of dealing with workload becomes part of the 
priority of judges and prosecutors. Explaining other implications of the system of plea 
bargaining, Cornwell pointed out that the growing populist rhetoric on crime and penology 
has made liberal approaches such as restorative justice unattractive to policy makers (2007: 
16).  Similarly, there is, according to Crawford, a noticeable decline in the idea of 
correctional justice, which was earlier thought to be an alternative to the idea of retribution 
(1997: 176). As these alternatives concepts decline, a new phenomenon in the form of plea 
bargaining appears to be rising and becoming widespread. 
 
 39 
In the midst of this complex interplay of political, economic and legal trajectories, plea 
bargaining offers an unparalleled incentive for prosecutors to achieve expedited sentence 
and deal with any workload. This leads to the argument that the territory of criminal justice 
now operates in a mixed paradigm that produced some extraordinary contours. Moreover, 
discussion of plea bargaining in this context raises a great deal of criticism over a system 
that is seen to promote the idea of negotiation with a criminal offender and rewarding them 
instead of punishing them, that in the end fails to serve either the objectives of retribution, 
deterrence or even rehabilitation. But proponents of plea bargaining incessantly reject 
these accusations, claiming that plea bargaining helps in ensuring efficiency in criminal 
justice administration (Stitt and Chaires, 1992:72-74). Other scholars claim that the 
presence of plea bargaining is a reflection of the emergence of a new philosophy in criminal 
justice that is largely pragmatic in nature (Jung, 1997: 122), and that the convergence of 
these different elements in contemporary political and social rearrangements explains some 
of the consequences of the reorientation of the functions, objectives and practice of 
criminal justice administration in ways that were quite a radical departure from the 
trajectories of the old (Garland, 2001: 54). As Marsh et al., further argue, the entire history 
of criminal justice has been one filled with “reform and reaction, and of false and 
disappointed optimism” (2004: 5) The convergence of these aspects and the widespread 
practice of plea bargaining around the world is a crucial question in scholarship.  
 
Another important debate around the idea of plea bargaining around the world is the 
emphasis on the advantages of using consensual negotiation to deal with complex economic 
and financial crimes. As would be discussed in subsequent parts of this study, evidence has 
shown that, in a number of jurisdictions including Nigeria, plea bargaining has become a 
chosen method of obtaining a conviction for these types of crimes that are often hard to 
prove. Writing about developments in Georgia, Vogler and Jokhadze disclosed how the idea 
of plea bargaining proved very successful in recovering the appropriated wealth of the state 
from corrupt officials (2011: 7-8). This however brings to the fore questions about the 
viability of plea bargaining and how it can translate into a significant and legitimate process 
that not only supports prosecution, but also adhere to the ethical standards of legal practice 
such as transparency, procedural rights and the rule of law. These questions are among the 
primary interest of this research. These questions become relevant because summary 
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procedures, specially negotiated pleas, lend themselves more to informalities than 
conventional methods of trials. They also have a wider implication on the concept of 
transparency, public sentiment and perhaps on the general fabric of procedural justice. 
These indeed are aspects that put the credibility of the entire legal system at stake. Hence, 
when legal systems find a reason to introduce or far reaching reforms such as plea 
bargaining, a prudent assessment of its utility and implications is necessary. This includes 
the obligation build appropriate foundation of guidelines and regulations that will deter or, 
at least, minimise illegality as well as low moral and ethical standards in the administration 
of justice.  
 
Although the motivation and justification for plea negotiation may seem identical across 
many jurisdictions, the socio-legal effects and problems it presents vary in many ways 
depending on the problems and priorities of each of the jurisdictions under review. For 
example, the challenge brought about by the complexity of a 'new generation' of criminal 
cases such as identity theft, organ trafficking etc., whose definition and characteristic differ 
from one regime to the other, and also the capacity of courts to effectively try these cases 
differ among nations.6 What is perhaps apparent in contemporary politico-legal transition is 
the decline of full adjudicative process in criminal justice (Damaska, 2006: 1019). A number 
of legal regimes have now assumed the method of diverting cases from the conventional 
courtroom or mutating charges to lesser ones in the quest to have expedited disposal. In 
cases where this is not possible, other measures are put in place that encourages 
defendants to cooperate with authorities in admitting guilt (ibid).  
 
2.2 The history of plea bargaining: a global view 
While the practice of plea bargaining continues to expand all over the world, its origin is still 
widely debated. This lack of clear perspective on how, where and when plea bargaining 
began, often distorts what could ordinarily have been a simple understanding of procedural 
reform in criminal justice. The dividing line between different kinds of summary procedures 
has also contributed to the enormous misconception on the root and nature plea 
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 For example, crimes rates in Scandinavian countries are quite low compared to Caribbean countries. 
Therefore, courts in Finland or Norway may still be able to try all cases while those in Jamaica and Barbados 
may need to resort to some form of summary procedure  
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bargaining. Some scholars view plea negotiation as an expansion of the guilty plea 
procedure that existed for centuries (Fisher, 2000; Caldwell, 2011). Others, however, argue 
that the idea is not simply a guilty plea as known in older discourse and that until recently; 
criminal justice did not know of or support the kind of negotiation that is common in the 
contemporary institution of plea bargaining (Alschuler, 1979; McDonald, 1979). One fact 
that seemed obvious is that from the simple idea of guilty pleas to one that involves a guilty 
plea with the assurance of concession, the practice of plea bargaining has seen a major 
transformation in the last four decades. It has developed from a mere arrangement that 
occurs behind closed doors, known only to the parties involved; to a system that is 
approved by the statute. In most literature however, (Newman and Remington, 1973; Bond, 
1975; Alschuler, 1979; Dubber, 1997; Palmer, 1998; Caldwell, 2011) the historical evolution 
of plea bargaining is often closely associated with common jurisdictions where the ‘guilty 
plea procedure’ is said to have first originated.  
 
Revisiting the different accounts on the origin of plea bargaining, numerous scholars have 
attempted to show that the idea of confession, which was historically known to criminal 
justice was the aspect that evolved to what is now a negotiation between the state and the 
defendant. Different scholars have given account of this transition. In the US, Fisher pointed 
out that plea bargaining began contemporaneously with the very emergence of public 
prosecution, although the office of the public prosecutor is not exclusively a characteristic of 
the US criminal justice, he claims that it developed earlier and more broadly in the US than 
many other legal regimes around the world (2000: 889-892). This he suggested developed 
slowly into what looks like plea bargaining, but because judges and not prosecutors control 
sentencing powers, most plea bargains were first limited to those cases in which 
prosecutors could unilaterally dictate the process of charging (ibid). Bond (1975) traced the 
origin of plea bargaining to the guilty plea procedure which began in the seventeenth-
century courts of England.  Although it is difficult to have a valid historical account of exactly 
when simple guilty plea turned into negotiating with defendants, scholars such as Barbara et 
al., claim that it is possible some sort of negotiation in criminal justice began as far back as 
1226 (1976: 56). Yet, even the history of guilty pleas is one that remains contentious. 
Caldwell (2011) for instance claims that the first recorded case of a guilty plea in the United 
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States occurred in Massachusetts in 1804.7 In this particular case, he claims that the accused 
pleaded guilty, but the court refused to record his plea, rather he was sent back to remand 
on the advice of the court that he should reconsider the consequence of his plea. Alschuler, 
on the other hand, claimed that the first case of a guilty plea to be upheld by the US 
Supreme Court was in 1892,8 where the court refrained from accepting the defendants’ plea 
until he was assigned a counsel and advised thoroughly on the implication of such an 
admission (1979: 10). Other records include documents from the superior courts in New 
York City indicated the presence of guilty pleas as early as 1846, where about 28 per cent of 
criminal cases were disposed of through confessions, and by 1919 this figure has reached 88 
per cent (Feeley, 1982: 344). There is also evidence to suggest that from the 1800s to the 
1900s, a new pattern of the guilty plea emerged in the US, where defendants changed their 
initial not guilty to a guilty plea in exchange for charge concession (ibid: 344-345).  
 
This development continued in a fluid and unclear manner between a guilty plea and plea 
bargaining, until prosecutors, especially in the US began to engage in open and direct 
negotiations with offenders in return for lighter charges (Rai, 2007: 62). Although the term 
‘plea bargaining’ appeared much later, it is important to stress that all of these earlier 
practices that allowed for summary proceedings through guilty pleas had some 
characteristics of what was later developed to be known as plea bargaining or plea 
negotiation. Hence, it is safe to argue that this incremental phase of transformation of 
different kinds of summary procedures were the catalyst for the emergence of today’s 
legally sanctioned plea bargaining. Although, Anglo American justice system is the one 
known for developing plea bargaining, Thaman points out that the evolution or 
development of plea bargaining should not be seen as some kind of system that is exclusive 
to common law (2007: 12). Instead, he argues, it is part of a global reform in criminal justice. 
He said:  
 
All systems have existed, and continue to exist in all countries in varying degrees as 
lateral or subsidiary traditions. Plea-bargaining à l’Américain is thus not only a result 
of the accusatorial-adversarial nature of the American trial ethic, which allows the 
disponibilité of the charge, but also of more communitarian notions of compromise 
                                                 
7
 Commonwealth v Battis, 1 Mass. (I Will.) 95, 95-96 (1804). 
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 Hallinger v Davies, 146 U.S. 314 (1892). 
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and restoring the judicial peace. More importantly it must be emphasized that plea-
bargaining is just as much an offshoot of the Inquisitionsprozess with its stress on 
inducing admissions of guilt by using pressure, inducements, promises of leniency, if 
not outright torture. This will become increasingly evident when we discuss the 
inherent coercive nature of modern day American plea-bargaining (ibid). 
 
However, Albert Alschuler, in his well-known opposition to plea bargaining refuted the 
claims that negotiations in criminal justice have existed for centuries (1979: 2). He argued 
that the numerous assertions by scholars are misleading as they confuse plea bargaining 
with the practice of ‘Jury nullification’ (ibid). His assertions was that until the second half of 
the 19th century, plea bargaining was an unknown practice in the common law (ibid). He 
based this argument on records from legal treaties and case reports that indicate how 
through most of its history, the Anglo-American legal system discouraged guilty pleas (ibid: 
4-5). This strong position by Alschuler is however not new among opponents who 
consistently argue that guilty pleas should not be equated or confused with plea bargaining 
(McDonald, 1979: 386). Yet, a closer look at the characteristic of present day plea bargaining 
reveals how closely it is related to the old idea of guilty pleas. What is most different is the 
nature through which the two are often processed.   
 
In general, only a few scholars seriously contemplate that there was a period in which either 
some form of guilty plea or summary trial was absent (Pizzi and Montagna, 2003: 432; 
Thaman, 2007: 12). Referring to records from the Old Bailey for instance,9 Langbein 
indicates how, in periods preceding the mid-eighteenth century, most common law trials 
lack the kind of adversarial element that are often debated (1979: 262). These records 
exhibit clear patterns of extremely rapid trial processes where between twelve to twenty 
felony cases were tried daily by a single court (ibid). It was not until 1794 that a trial lasted 
more than a day, with the court seriously contemplating whether it had any powers to 
adjourn (ibid).10 Similarly, Feeley discovered similar patterns from the transcripts of the mid-
nineteenth century trial court proceedings in London that revealed common traits where 
“defendants were not represented by counsel; they did not confront hostile witnesses in 
any meaningful way; they rarely challenged evidence or offered defences of any kind”, 
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 Central Criminal Court of England and Wales referred to as the Old Bailey, which is the name of the London 
Street in which it is located. It is also among the buildings housing the Crown Court. 
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 R. v. Thomas Hardy, 24 St. Tr. 19, (1794).   
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making the whole practice at odds with what genuine adversariality ought to be (1982: 345). 
Similar hasty patterns were discovered by Friedman and Perceival in their study Florida and 
California in the period around the turn of the century, where most trials lasted not more 
than half an hour in a process where a jury was hastily put together, and cases were quickly 
outlined and the complainant gave his version of the incident (1981: 194). In some cases, 
“the defendant told his story, with or without witnesses; the lawyers (if any) spoke; the 
judge charged the jury. The jury retired, voted and returned…then the court went 
immediately into the next case on its list” (ibid). Owing to this history of how trials used to 
be and what they are today, Feeley states:  
 
When trials were once extensively relied upon, they were perfunctory affairs that 
bear but scant resemblance to contemporary trials, which while few and far 
between are often deliberate and painstaking affairs, at least as compared to what 
they once were. In a very real sense, the very nature of what a trial is has undergone 
revolutionary changes to such an extent that comparisons across lengthy periods are 
not even meaningful (1982:346). 
 
Arguably, criminal justice has evolved through different phases to what is today a full 
pledged plea bargaining, argued by proponents as a system that ensures efficiency in the 
face of workload and also serves as a convenient way of settling cases for prosecutors and 
judges (Heumann, 1981; Scott and Stuntz, 1991). Hence, the development of plea 
bargaining is not one that hinges on a single or simple variable. Instead, it is part of a long 
history that includes many aspects and contingencies. In contemporary criminal justice 
administration, plea bargaining appears to be a ready option on the table of those who 
practice it, irrespective of the pressure of workload. To appreciate the strength of this 
argument, one may reflect on the surge in plea bargaining across the world alongside the 
claims of drop in crime rate. For example, data shows the drop in crime across the UK and 
the US (Blumstein and Wallman, 2006). In the US, for instance, studies claim that crime 
rates have fallen continuously since the 1990s (Ouimet, 2002: 32). Similarly, the British 
Crime Survey shows that the total number of crimes dropped by 15.6% between 1993 and 
1999 (Povey, 2001). Along with the drop in crime rate, a recent study by Holloway indicates 
an exponential rise in plea bargaining, revealing how over 99 per cent of cases, in some 
jurisdictions, end up being negotiated (2014: 15). Although the claim of Holloway cannot be 
generalised across all jurisdictions, it shows a pattern in the increase in the application of 
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plea bargaining across many jurisdictions. For example, studies in the UK also revealed how 
increasingly English courts resort to plea deals instead of trials (Duff, 2000: 85). Besides 
what other scholars claim, Rauxloh pointed at some of the elements that are contributing to 
the rise of plea bargaining in England and Wales (2012: 18). She identified the growing 
emphasis on safeguard of the defendants’ rights, which inevitably made evidence easier to 
weaken as an important factor (ibid). This situation she claims, lead prosecutors to lean 
more towards guilty pleas as a better way of obtaining convictions than facing the nuances 
of trials (ibid). Taking these paradoxes into account, one is bound to agree with Feeley that 
the exigencies of the pressures on organizations with limited resources as relevant factors in 
the contemporary practice of plea bargaining do not on their own account for its rise 
(1986:342). Understanding plea bargaining therefore requires the examination of the 
practices in the light of different contingencies, including the argument of earlier scholars 
like Goldstein who view the rise of plea bargaining as part of the characteristics of modern 
courts, where it has proven practically impossible to subject every criminal case to a full trial 
(Goldstein, 1960: 1149).  
 
All the factors mentioned such as over criminalisation, modern offences, increased 
surveillance etc., have, in different ways influenced the rise of plea bargaining, allowing the 
practice to develop to an unprecedented prominence in many places around the world 
(O’Hear, 2007: 409). For example, studies have shown that over time, criminal justice 
procedure has, in both the US and in England and Wales, shifted from a jury dominated 
system to one in which negotiated guilty pleas are the norm (Duff, 2000; Holloway, 2004; 
Bar-Gill and Gazal, 2004). Although the extent of these negotiations and particularly the role 
played by parties differ among jurisdictions, there is a near consensus that plea negotiation 
has its root in common law adversarial justice system and they grew more rapidly under 
common law regimes. As early as 1978 for instance, 85 per cent of defendants charged with 
indictable offences in English courts, mostly in Crown Courts, and a large number of criminal 
defendants in US courts have their cases settled through some form of plea bargaining 
(Baldwin and Mcconville, 1979: 287-288; Bar-Gill and Gazal, 2004: 1).  
 
From common law regimes, the system of negotiation has now become a global 
phenomenon. Legal reforms in continental Europe and even in China have shown how even 
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traditional civil law regimes, who initially showed scepticism to the idea of plea bargaining, 
have codified this practice into their criminal justice system (Ma, 2002; Thaman, 2010; 
Rauxloh, 2012). The most common justification for jurisdictions where the legality principle 
used to be the norm is that summary procedures are imperative if the criminal justice 
system is to deal with the impasse and inefficiency brought about by the slow process of 
trial (Pizzi and Marafioti, 1996: 2). Despite the unlikely adoption of an Anglo-American 
transplant, Langer observed how the long-standing legal culture of inquisitoriality; the 
concerns of legal reformers and the different ways in which this practice was contextualised, 
has produced different methods of application across civil law regimes (2004:3-6). A critical 
look at theory and practice of plea bargaining reveals a constellation of factors and 
contingencies that differ from one legal regime to the other, including the origin and the 
justification for substituting trial with negotiations. This diversity will be addressed in 
chapter four of this research.  
 
Quite clearly, the practice of plea bargaining has earned a new prominence in criminal 
justice that is showing no sign of disappearing. Hence, some scholars are revisiting this 
process in an attempt to identify ways in which the structural and procedural defects should 
be discussed (Ma, 2002: 43). Particular attention is often paid to issues relating to coercion; 
prosecutorial self-interest, the growing passivity of judges and the criticisms and 
apprehension among the public. As will be discussed later in Chapter five, the legitimate 
concerns about the practice of plea bargaining has become a topic among scholars, many of 
whom are calling for a robust and critical reform to address these inherent flaws in the 
system (Frase and Weigend, 1995; Dubber, 1997; Guidorizzi, 1998; Uviller, 1999; Bibas, 
2001; Wright and Miller, 2002; Stuntz, 2004; Covey, 2007; Hashimoto, 2008; Moriarty and 
Main, 2011; Cassidy, 2011). This becomes even more significant because of the way “plea 
bargaining is increasingly gaining the quality of a routine practice which follows a particular 
deontological pattern and has given rise to a body of 'soft law'” (Jung, 1997: 114).  Although 
the argument that plea bargaining is an advantageous system appears to be deep-rooted in 
scholarship (Samaha, 2005; Thaman 2010), some empirical studies have cast doubt on this 
notion as both simplistic and narrow (Gillespie, 1977; Hann, 1973; Cousineau and Verdun-
Jones, 1979). Perhaps certain generalised similarities exist all over the world; the system has 
 47 
over time evolved to be used as a way of pursuing different objectives across different 
jurisdictions. 
 
2.3 Types of Plea Bargaining 
In a general sense, plea bargaining is simply an arrangement where a criminal case is 
negotiated between parties outside of full trial with the aim of arriving at some agreed 
charge or sentence. Yet, the variables that inform and influence each case are not exactly 
the same. The major distinctions are those to do with the kind of role parties play in the 
process. This is also true with the definition and terms used to describe plea bargaining. 
Cousineau and Verdun-Jones, for instance, argue that the whole range of terminology used 
to describe or define the plea bargaining are inconsistent, as there is hardly a single phrase 
or nomenclature that is capable of encompassing all the diverse practices that result in 
concluded negotiations (1979: 295). In theory, these expressions range from terms such as 
‘plea bargaining’, ‘plea negotiation’, ‘plea discussion’, etc. (ibid). These scholars, however, 
suggest that the definition by the Law Reform Commission of Canada seemed the most 
succinct. It states, "any agreement by the accused to plead guilty in return for the promise 
of some benefit” (ibid). 
 
Similarly, Conklin defines plea bargaining as the process where, the defence counsel elicits, 
or the prosecution offers, to the defendant, certain concession in exchange for a guilty plea 
and the forfeiture of the right to trial as well as all those constitutional safeguards of trials. 
He suggested that the prosecution's offer may consist of: (1) a reduction in charge; (2) a 
promise to recommend a to the sentencing court a lenient sentence; (3) dismissal of some 
of the charges; or (4) a promise to forego prosecution under statutes that could compound 
the sentence of can result in a conviction (1979:754). But does plea bargaining always 
comes with a guarantee or with a genuine commitment for penal concessions for every 
accused willing to plead guilty? Putting the various definitions into context, scholars were 
able to categorise plea bargaining into a ‘charge bargain’, a ‘sentence bargain’ or a ‘fact 
bargain’.  
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a. Charge bargain: this is the most common form of plea bargaining in which three 
scenarios are usually bound to occur. First is where a defendant pleads guilty to a 
charge or charges in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of other charges. Second is 
where a defendant pleads guilty to a charge or charges in exchange for a 
prosecutor's promise not to file other charges (Combs, 2002:10). Third is a situation 
where a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense in return for either a prosecutor's 
dismissal of the most serious charge or, a prosecutor’s promise not to file the most 
serious charge (Ashworth, 1998: 271; LaFave and Israel, 1985: 766-767). In particular 
circumstances, this form of plea bargaining may involve some elements of sentence 
bargain because by pleading guilty to a lesser charge, the defendant technically 
enjoys the potential of a shorter sentence (Caldwell, 2011:77). 
 
b. Sentence bargain: this is the only type of plea bargain in which the judge is directly 
involved, the defendant pleads guilty to charges in exchange for a promise of a 
lenient sentence. In most cases, the sentence to be awarded is specified before the 
verdict (Welling, 1987:319). According to Combs, in most sentence bargain 
arrangements, the prosecutor recommends for a “specific sentence which the court 
will almost certainly impose” (2002:10). Sentence bargaining is mostly common in 
continental European civil law regimes, largely as a result of the inquisitorial culture 
of the ‘powerful judge’. This is in contrast to the procedure in most common law 
jurisdictions like England and Wales, and Victoria, Australia where plea bargaining is 
permitted to the extent that the charges to be dropped can be agreed between the 
prosecution and defence, but the courts always decide what the appropriate 
sentence should be (Rai, 2007: 48).  
 
c. Fact bargain: This is evidently the most uncommon process of plea bargaining. In this 
instance, the defence and the prosecution agree that the later will present certain 
facts of the matter to the court in a subtle way, avoiding in essence the aggravation 
of facts and evidence (Rauxloh, 2012:26). 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Beyond doubt, the historical account of plea bargaining is suggestive of how the system 
developed from an informal, opaque process to a formal, codified and widespread affair. 
Despite fervent and pervasive criticism, there is evidence, especially among legal 
practitioners to promote plea bargaining. It is also evident that the system grew from what 
was simply a guilty plea procedure, often common with adversarial systems, to a full 
pledged negotiation for penal concession. Yet, like all socio-legal changes and reforms, there 
are still those legitimate grounds to question the utility of plea bargaining as some sort of 
imperative reform. What is more appealing to scholarship however, is how this process 
which initially seemed like a simple mechanism for dealing with overcrowded dockets has 
opened up a new philosophy that is multifaceted and complex, lending itself to concerted 
debate not only on law and legal reforms but also the economics of law and the changing 
relationship between the state and the individual. It has also exposed the overarching 
attitude of how legal frameworks create incentives as well as disincentives that, sometimes, 
make individual or bureaucratic interests the prevailing factor in decision making. 
 
In many instances, discussion on plea bargaining has led to a wider debate that often 
involves sociology, politics, and economics. Perhaps, any cogent and comprehensive 
explanation of the institutions of law must establish the credibility of these elements as 
integral parts of how legal systems and legal reforms evolve and work (McKaay, 1999: 93). 
These interwoven yet multifactorial relationships have been discussed in this chapter, 
especially through the range of evidence that shows how the institution of plea bargaining 
has evolved from a measure for efficiency to one driven by other variables, including 
institutional convenience and cost. Perhaps voices still resonate that suggest the decline in 
the law and economics scholarship, but it is evident that there is a renewed interest in 
political theories about the interrelationship between the field of law and economics. The 
obvious consequence of the eroding barrier between law and economics has also led to a 
gradual but steady retreat from the orthodox ideas of criminal justice such as retribution 
and desert. What this study further encompasses is how these realignments, 
rearrangements, and reforms, especially in the idea of negotiating with criminal offenders is 
significantly restructuring the entire landscape of the criminal justice. 
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Although evidence has consistently shown that criminal justice has always been susceptible 
to far-reaching reforms, what plea bargaining brings imposes itself so firmly onto the 
traditional structure of law and penology, generating an area of scholarship that is ripe for 
new thinking (ibid). Essentially, the expansion of plea bargaining has added a new quality to 
criminal justice as much as it has raised a new debate on jurisprudence. The polemics reveal 
the fragility of these developments and prompt complex questions about criminal 
procedure and indeed the entire institution and theory of penal law. Hence, the polemics on 
whether the prevalence of this practice merely denotes a transitional phase, or whether it 
portends a more fundamental change in the definitions of crime and justice (Jung, 
1997:122). Whatever plea bargaining brings to the wider spectre of criminal justice 
institutions; one irrefutable fact is that it is at the top of the many contemporary issues 
raising questions about the valid objectives of criminal justice.  
 
What also remains significant yet contentious is the traditional claim that the idea was a 
response to caseload pressure, an argument that is premised on the efficiency theory. As 
much as it remains legitimate, it is also a narrow view point as it repeatedly ignores other 
important aspects relating to the procedural convenience and personal interests of parties 
in a plea bargain, both of which are elements that have less to do with workload or even 
with justice. Evidently, the incentives and convenience that plea bargaining presents have 
become so attractive that even the evidence of a decrease in crime rates has not reduced 
the rate of plea bargaining. Yet, it should be clear that workload, pressure of inefficiency 
and punitivism are major drivers of plea bargaining, especially in jurisdictions like the US. 
 
Moreover, the way in which plea bargaining is gaining prominence in the realm of ‘soft law’ 
has prompted some scholars to caution about the inherent danger of an entrenched and 
over-exercised culture of negotiated settlements as against the public and transparent 
adjudication of cases through conventional trials (Ayres and Waldfogel cited in Wright and 
Miller, 2003:1417). Scholars have pointed to the importance of, at least, some minimum 
trial rates as a measure of a healthy justice system (ibid). Extremely low trial rates they 
argue, “perhaps in conjunction with low acquittal rates, may indirectly suggest the presence 
of an excessive trial penalty and the diminution of justice that comes with it” (ibid). One of 
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the issues that will be addressed in the cause of the study will be the kind of challenge that 
plea bargaining presents to other elements and traditional values of criminal justice. The 
study will also look at how the system has affected both the practice and sentiment of 
justice.  
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Chapter Three 
Theoretical framework. 
3.0 Introduction 
Scholarly analysis of policies and reforms often leads different theoretical arguments on the 
aspects that define and drive the phenomenon in question.  In this respect, this thesis 
intends to lay a theoretical foundation on theoretical juxtapositions that attempt to explain 
the practice and application of plea bargaining. It is however important to state that there 
are many theories on plea bargaining, including those that relate to the issues of human 
rights; the fundamental values of criminal justice such as the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty in an open court. However, for the purpose of this study, the main 
approach will be to narrow the discourse to two main theories, i.e., the utilitarian theory, 
which explains the reasons for the emergence and spread of plea bargaining, and the 
decision theory which explains how the system applies in practice. The reason for choosing 
these theories is because the main questions of this research revolve around the arguments 
on the advantages that plea bargaining presents to a system marred by inefficiency, the 
effect that these negotiations have on the individual choices that parties make and the 
implications of negotiations on the general practice of criminal justice. 
 
The relevance and application of these theories to research, especially in aspects such as 
plea bargaining is because the whole idea of plea bargaining in Nigeria and elsewhere 
emanates as a result of the quest for an alternative procedure in criminal justice that is 
expected to be less costly and more effective than traditional trials. Hence, interrogation 
into this widespread utilitarian argument require for a utilitarian theory perspective that is 
capable of looking at the arguments from the point of acclaimed advantage. This is the 
rationale behind the use of utility theory.  
 
The second theory which is the decision theory has its relevance to this research because it 
looks at the practice of plea bargaining. Essentially, the application and success of any plea 
negotiation lies in the willingness of the parties, mostly the prosecution and the defence to 
agree to the terms of the negotiation before the matter is taken to court for accent. 
Therefore, understanding and explaining these dynamics are best achieved when one 
discusses them from the context of the different reasons why people will accept or reject a 
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particular proposition and perhaps how they weigh their different interest as a result of the 
outcome of any idea that they accept or reject.  
 
It is important to state that the two theories used in this study are not one and the same. 
Instead, they are distinct of each other. Yet, understanding the treason for the rise of plea 
bargaining and going down to the motivation of individual parties requires a discussion on 
the general utility of plea bargaining and then the particular characteristics of the goals that 
parties intend or expect to achieve as an outcome when negotiating over a criminal matter. 
While the utilitarian theory discusses many general aspects that define institutional 
priorities, the decision theory is often more intricate because it is an effort to explain the 
variety of reasons that influence individuals to accept or reject a plea bargain. It is also one 
that involves different priorities driven by different situations.  This chapter would explore 
both theories and polemics in order to lay a foundation for understanding subsequent 
discussions and analysis in this study.   
 
3.1 Utilitarian theory 
The common notion that criminal justice is based on moral precepts has long been a subject 
of dispute as many scholars attempt to define the logic and objectives of criminal justice 
institution from different perspectives (Posner, 1975; Bradley, 1993; Cole 1999; Sherman, 
2002; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012). Even though judges and legislators frequently talk about 
the protection of the society from crimes, the reasoning is often expressed in different 
terms, including economics and organisational incentives. In the classical juxtaposition of 
utilitarian philosophers such as Bentham and Mill, utilitarianism is defined by how much an 
action produce happiness and promotes the interest of not only the performer of the 
action, but everyone affected by that action (Elster and Grapes, 1982). In this sense, 
utilitarianism is a concept that places value on the outcome of an action and how it affects 
the majority. This leads to the discussion on who benefits from plea bargaining and how.  
 
Einstein and Jacob argue that the utility of plea bargaining and the opportunity to negotiate 
is a product of the quest for incentives for the principal participants in the criminal justice 
administration (cited in Feeley, 1982: 341). Essentially, this argument suggests that 
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consensus between defence attorneys, judges and prosecutors is mainly to serve the 
interest of the parties. A successful plea negotiation is, therefore, one that allows the 
parties to arrive at a common ground that gives officials the chance to avoid cumbersome 
trial procedures and also guarantees leniency for the accused. Blake and Ashworth view 
plea bargaining as a method promoted by legal practitioners for the purpose of convenience 
and self-interest that often has little to do with the interest of other parties (cited in 
Rauxloh, 2012: 45). This argument is, however, in contrast with the utilitarian juxtaposition 
of institutional legal theory, which explains legal reforms such as plea bargaining as ways of 
alleviating the general inefficiency in criminal justice administration (Blumberg, 1966; 
Goldstein, 1960; Thomson, 2004 cited Rauxloh, 2012: 37). The main utilitarian argument 
also suggests that without some form of expedited procedure, especially in jurisdictions 
where crime rates are high, the entire criminal justice system stands the risk of grinding to a 
halt (Fine, 1987: 615). Chief Justice Berger commented on this by saying that if every 
criminal case were to go through a full trial procedure, the states “would need to multiply 
by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”11 However, some scholars have 
contended that it is the length of individual proceedings that often strains the justice system 
(Riess cited in Rauxloh, 2012: 64).  
 
Taking into context the incentives that plea bargaining presents, it is evident that its 
widespread cannot be attributed to simply a single phenomenon (Mather, 1978; Miller et 
al., 1978; Nardulli, 1979; Feeley, 1982: 342). Instead, even the utilitarian theory must be 
balanced along the line of the entire the structure of the criminal court system as it 
undergoes constant reform to fulfil different objectives and interests. Cooper for example 
suggests that plea bargaining is a reflection of the conflicting trajectories that are peculiar to 
criminal justice, where the need for some procedural adjustment based on the 
representations of subsisting socio-legal contingencies give rise to changes, and necessitate 
the introduction of new methods and procedures to relieve the functional aspects of the 
system (1972: 427-428). These include, for example, the changing nature of penal policies 
that ushered in the culture of elevating what were traditionally minor civil offences to 
criminal responsibilities. Thaman also stressed that plea bargaining is, in fact, a reflection of 
                                                 
11
 Santobello v New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
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‘consensual justice’ that has become part of the integral reform in criminal justice across 
many jurisdictions, aimed at avoiding the exhaustive, cumbersome and costly rigours of a 
full conventional trial (2007: 1-2). He further states:  
 
Consensual procedural forms are part and parcel of criminal procedure reforms 
worldwide and are driven by the desire for procedural economy:  to either avoid the 
formal preliminary investigation by investigating magistrate or prosecutor and the 
preparation of an exhaustive investigative dossier, typical of inquisitorial systems 
patterned after the continental European “civil law” model of criminal procedure, or 
the formal, oral, increasingly adversarial trial which has been complicated by the 
increase in procedural guarantees given to criminal defendants and rendered more 
unpredictable to the extent that lay judges are given control over the issue of guilt 
(ibid). 
 
Despite these supportive arguments, plea bargaining has attracted equal criticism as a 
system that turns prosecutors into agents of the state whose role is to secure a plea and 
turn it in for conviction. Yet, one must also admit that the more a society becomes 
overwhelmed by overcrowded dockets, slow trials and recidivism, the more it becomes 
difficult for every case to be subjected to trial. Similarly, the evidence across some 
jurisdictions that reveal the constant elevation of simple civil offences to criminal liabilities 
has added value to the idea of subjecting cases to simple procedures as against a long jury 
trial (Mather, 1978: 283). Although not all societies are going through these, the underlying 
tensions and interests that brought them into some societies will, over time reoccur in 
others (Garland, 2001: 7). Plea bargaining has therefore continued to expand in different 
ways, both as a measure that helps parties sort out their dispute expeditiously and alleviate 
the stress on the justice system as well as a method used by individuals in ways that have 
little to do with the interest of the society (Rauxloh, 2012: 64-67). In all of these familiar 
situations, there is evidence of the utility of plea bargaining as a flexible intervention that 
condones a great deal of informality than conventional trials. Depending on the 
circumstance of every case, negotiations between parties can be adjusted to achieve both 
the demands of the prosecution and those of the defence. Another argument is that plea 
bargaining provides the flexibility that allows prosecutors to fit the circumstance of 
individual cases to the abstract rules of a penal code (Mulcahy, 1994: 413-414). Even the 
most ardent critics of this practice such as Alschuler concede that it is a system that accords 
a greater and more flexible alternative than conventional trial processes (1968: 71). 
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However, he was quick to point out that the notion of flexibility is “an advantage that all 
lawless systems exhibit in comparison with systems of administering justice by rules” (ibid). 
Besides the familiar legal explanations, the utility of plea bargaining had also been defended 
by some scholars from an economic context (McDonald and Cramer, 1992; Bar-Gill and 
Gazal, 2006), arguing that it is an essential mechanism that relieves the enormous economic 
and administrative pressure of full trials. Others also claimed that plea bargaining 
reinvigorates criminal justice process by avoiding the technicalities and cost of full trial 
(Combs, 2002; McDonald and Cramer, 1992; Stuntz, 2004; Bowers, 2008). These benefits 
that include resource management, administrative convenience and expediency are among 
the factors that help keep all the lapses of plea bargaining overlooked (Caldwell, 2011: 68). 
Despite the different reasons given by proponents in support for plea bargaining, one thing 
that is evident is the enormous difference between conventional trials that are done in open 
transparent courts and plea bargaining which is mostly negotiated in private through a 
process of bidding, compromise, trade-off and other kinds of private arrangements that will 
be rejected in open trials.  
  
Other critics of the utilitarian theory of plea bargaining point at the wide-ranging discretion 
that prosecutors exhibit by adjusting penal provisions and paving the way for sentences that 
are less than legislatively required sanctions (Thomas, 1985: 505). Although these 
discretionary elements are seen by proponents as a way of facilitating a successful plea 
bargain (Ma, 2002: 22), they no doubt lock the individual into a position where no further 
objective investigation of his case is possible (Barbara et al., 1979: 58). Hence, the argument 
that the argument that such discretionary conducts “must also be balanced against the 
utility of pre-ordained rules, which can limit the importance of subjective judgments, 
promote equality, control corruption, and provide a basis for planning, both before and 
after controversies arise” (Alschuler, 1968: 71). For any system to be effective in delivering 
justice argued Wright, it must also aspire to replicate through its guilty pleas the kind of 
transparent and legitimate outcome that trials would have produced (2005:83). 
 
Arguing on the utilitarian side of plea bargaining, Easterbrook contends that most of the 
proposals that insist on reverting solely to full trials are illogically calling for a return to a 
cumbersome route (1992: 176). Trials he says, means more zealous legal arguments, dogged 
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insistence on every procedural technicality and more persistence on complex rules of 
evidence (ibid). He further observed that waiving any of these demands “is to surrender by 
degrees, objectionable for the same reasons urged against plea bargaining. If however, the 
trials are short, how can an observer tell whether counsel tracked down every lead, 
researched every argument?” (ibid). Moreover, Blumberg insists that protracted cases have 
the potential of creating an irreconcilable conflict “posed in terms of intense pressures to 
handle large numbers of cases on the one hand, and the stringent ideological and legal 
requirements of due process of law, on the other hand” (1966: 22). However, opponents of 
these notions insists that empirical evidence has shown how the emphasis on workload is 
over amplified by courthouse workgroups, i.e., prosecutors and judges who are the primary 
beneficiaries of most plea negotiations (Samaha, 2005). But even if the courts have the 
prerequisite capacity to handle every case argued Easterbrook, disallowing plea bargaining 
will lead to fewer prosecutions and convictions. (1992: 1975). 
 
There is also a strong criticism of plea bargaining as it affects the legitimate interest of the 
defendant, the victim, and even the community.  Arrigo (2007) maintains that the 
compromise common with the way pleas are bargained often leaves the community 
dissatisfied with the outcome. This aspect plea bargaining had long been debated in legal 
theory, especially among social psychologists who emphasise that compliance with law stem 
from the community’s sentiment in the transparency and fairness of legal procedure (Tyler, 
2006: 161; Alkon, 2009: 20). Where the process is not open they argue, the community 
becomes reluctant to participate in the successful application of the law (Hough and 
Roberts, 2005: 2). Although some scholars tend to suggest that, the concept of transparency 
does not necessarily mean that every procedural step is brought under public scrutiny 
(Ashworth, 1994: 271), it is important that the public understands the reasons for a plea 
deal and the objective it was meant to serve. 
 
The utilitarian argument for plea bargaining had also been challenged by scholars who argue 
that most negotiations impose pressure on the defendant to plead guilty without giving him 
or her the opportunity for proper adjudication. Langbein, for instance, equated the system 
to the medieval practice of extracting a confession through torture (1978:13). Along the 
same line of argument, Kipnis insists that plea bargaining is a method akin to pointing a gun 
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on the accused and threatening them to accept guilt (1976: 98). Easterbrook, however, 
rejects these notions, stressing that any attempt to oblige the accused to stand trial, when 
they actually chose to bargain, means compelling them to take risks they probably do not 
intend to take (1992: 1971). In fact, for the risk averse defendant, it is legitimate, perhaps 
even more logical to choose a less costly process and a lighter punishment than take the 
chance of an extended trial with probably the potential for a more severe penalty (ibid). He 
further tries to strike a balance between the advantages of plea bargaining and those of 
trials, saying: 
 
Trials come with a variety of rules that exclude probative evidence thought to 
mislead jurors who may not be perfect Bayesians. During bargaining, the parties can 
consider all the evidence that will come in at trial, and then some. The persons doing 
the considering are knowledgeable; prosecutors are more likely than jurors to 
discount eyewitness accounts, and prosecutors know from experience which details 
are most likely to separate guilt from innocence. (1992: 1971). 
 
On the rights of the victim, some scholars insist that for most part, plea bargaining excludes 
the victim from narrating his story in an open trial while allowing the prosecution or the 
judge to engage in the process of discounting sentence solely for defendant's cooperation 
(Wright and Miller, 2002: 33). This they argue affects the victims understanding of justice 
and send a symbolic message to the society that the accused was rewarded instead of 
punished (ibid). It also suggests that the primary goal of criminal justice is processing and 
that justice is only a secondary (ibid). 
 
Essentially, the utilitarian paradigm is one that emphasises on the advantages of engaging 
parties to negotiate instead of taking the long and onerous route of full trial. What this 
suggests is that whatever the shortcomings of plea bargaining, it also must be reconciled 
with the numerous benefits which it offers to the state and to parties. Hence, the system 
should rather be seen as a liberal approach, which does not necessarily bar defendants from 
insisting on their rights to trial, but offers them an opportunity to accept their guilt for a 
lesser penalty.  
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3.2 Decision Theory  
Scholars have made attempts to explain the factors that influence the decisions of parties 
involved in plea bargaining (Scott and Stuntz, 1992). Earlier models include the Economic 
Model of Landes (1971), and later the theory of ‘Plea Bargaining in the shadow of Law’ 
(Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979; Cooter, 1982). In the model proposed by Landes (1971), he 
demonstrates that plea bargaining is synonymous with a market transaction in which the 
prosecutor buys the guilty plea of a defendant in exchange for a promise to pay with 
sentence leniency. This theory seemed to suggest that prosecutorial objectives are often 
targeted towards the maximization of expected sentences subject to foreseen resource 
constraint. Landes went further to claim that the likelihood of the prosecution agreeing to 
conclude a bargain becomes higher when the expected penalty on trial is smaller (1971: 64). 
This means that charges against the accused are highly likely to be dismissed once the 
prosecutor sees little chance of conviction through trial or where he expects a negligible 
sentence.  
 
Along the same line of argument, the decision theory and equilibrium model of Nagel and 
Neef (1976) indicate that parties strike a ` plea deal in the shadow of expected trial 
outcomes, focusing primarily on the probability of acquittal and the proportionality of 
sentence discount. This argument views the process of plea bargaining as “analogous to a 
buying/selling transaction in a market that has no fixed prices” (ibid: 1). This position 
portrays the defence as the buyer, seeking concession (discount) in charge or sentence, and 
the prosecutor as the seller intending to settle for a high price (charge or sentence), within 
the constraints of existing statute or guideline (ibid). In the process, each of the parties has 
in mind how much he is willing to settle for (ibid). Although the proponents of this model 
did not deny the impact of other factors in determining the outcome of plea bargains, they 
seem not to give most of these factors much relevance. Instead, their emphasis is mainly on 
the sentiment of penal concession and the outcome of the negotiations. 
 
Responding to Landes’s model, Rhodes contends that, despite the valuable insight provided, 
it is unclear how the individual decision making described in Landes’s theory accounts for 
certain aggregate, or macro, aspects of criminal justice (1976: 312). In this revised approach, 
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Rhodes demonstrated that “the ratio of guilty pleas to trials is negatively correlated with the 
severity of the sentence exchange for guilty pleas, significant at a one per cent level of 
confidence” (ibid). The outcome of his hypothesis suggests further that, the defendants' 
demand for a trial is inversely related to the concessions gained for accepting a guilty plea 
offer (ibid: 331). Forst and Brosi (1977) also examined another variant of Landes' model, 
revealing that the length of time it will take the prosecutor to make a decision depends on 
the strength of the available evidence against the accused and is only slightly dependent on 
the gravity of crime alleged.  
 
Reinganum also contends that the evidence presented by Landes is weak (1988: 714). He 
says, the difficulty with Landes’s theory is that the conclusions that he tested do not strictly 
follow from the theory, “since the actual sentence offered in a plea bargain is indeterminate 
(there exists a range of mutually acceptable sentence offers) if the defendant is risk averse” 
(ibid). He also observed that the model is only centred on negotiated pleas without 
reference to trials, and is based largely on the presumption that all defendants are guilty 
(ibid). In conclusion, Reinganum presented an argument somewhat similar to that of 
Grossman and Katz (1983), mainly discussing the extent of prosecutorial discretion and 
choices in an ordinary plea bargaining. His analysis suggests:  
 
Sufficiently weak cases are dismissed, where this sufficiency does not depend upon 
the resource cost of trial but upon the social costs and benefits of punishing the 
innocent and the guilty, respectively; that defendants against whom a sufficiently 
strong case exists are offered a sentence (in exchange for a plea of guilty) which 
increases with the likelihood of conviction at trial and the defendant's anticipated 
disutility of trial and conviction; and finally, the defendants are more likely to reject 
higher sentence offers, so that the likelihood of trial is an increasing function of the 
strength of the case (Reinganum, 1988: 723). 
 
Other scholars like Easterbrook (1992) have brought into context other factors that were 
ignored in the previous theories. Such factors include time discounting, limited funds, risk 
preference of defendants and agency costs as relevant elements in the cause of decision 
making during plea bargaining. Many prosecutors, for example, believe they can achieve a 
strong conviction record through plea bargaining than going to trial. The defence on the 
other hand also uses plea bargaining as a means of securing lenient sentences for their 
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clients, while the judge benefits from being relieved of the difficulties of an overcrowded 
docket (Blumberg, 1970: 264). 
 
Lerner (1999) also added other external aspects to the debate i.e., the availability of 
information, time constraint, economy and work pressure as factors that affect on individual 
decisions. Another variable explained by Scott and Stuntz, is the psychology of framing and 
the weak sense of judgment, especially in respect of poor and unsophisticated defendants 
poised against experienced and well-informed prosecutors (1992: 1912). Giving a scientific 
explanation to decision theory model, Hastie (2001) explains how individuals’ choices are 
influenced by different constraints of human socio-psychology relating to their emotions, 
perceptions, performance and judgment.  
 
Although the question of how rationale any decision could be is subjective, Dhami maintains 
that reasonable decisions could best be made by weighting and integrating all the available 
and relevant information about a case (2013: 296). Yet, it was argued that people rarely 
perform such compensatory processing of information because of their cognitive limitations 
and partly because of external decision-task constraints (Dhami and Thomson, 2012). All of 
these arguments have in them some common elements of how most plea negotiations are 
processed in practice. The reality is, individual decisions in plea bargaining could be 
influenced by a range of factors including the jurisdiction of the case or geography of a 
specific court (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004: 166), the sex, race or age of a party (Mitchell, 
2006: 439). 
 
In an elaborate but more specific analysis of decision-making in plea negotiation, Bibas 
presented the theory of ‘Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial’ (2004: 2465). He 
contends that, the classic ‘shadow of trial’ model which is premised on the argument that 
“the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence largely determine plea 
bargains” does not seem to incorporate critically other practical variables that play 
significantly in informing the decisions of parties during negotiation (ibid). He first 
referenced the broader structural impediments that distort plea bargaining, which include 
“poor lawyering, agency costs, and lawyers' self-interest” as well as rules relating to bail and 
pre-trial detention (ibid). The second point he made was in relation to works on behavioural 
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law and economics, which suggest that factors such as, “overconfidence, self-serving biases, 
framing, denial mechanisms, anchoring, discount rates, and risk preferences all skew 
bargains” (ibid: 2467). These multifactorial factors add to the complexity and diversity in 
understanding or, at least prevent us from holding on to any particular factor as one with 
the most influence on the decision of parties. What is rather clear is that decision in plea 
bargaining is often dependent on individual factors that could be distinct across different 
cases. Yet, one of the most common feature of these decisions is that they are often the 
outcome of the different objectives that each of the parties aims to achieve. 
 
Functionalist Theorists, on the other hand, maintain that the choices and willingness of the 
parties, especially defendants to accept plea bargaining has a lot to do with the 
sophistication of investigation and the strength of evidence (Mather, 1979: 284). Advances 
in institutional working strategies, they argue, augments the possibilities of extensive pre-
trial screening that technically leaves the defendants with little room to contest culpability 
(ibid). This argument is an extension of the proposition based on the ‘Theory of 
Professionalization’ which suggests that even the early reliance on jury trials was due to the 
presence of amateur actors, while reliance on guilty pleas increased with the advent of 
professional policing, investigation and lawyering (McConville et al., 2005: 2). Feeley went 
further to add to this debate by pointing at other factors elements such as the development 
of substantive criminal law and access to resources by both the prosecution and the accused 
as part of what contributes to the culture of parties choosing to negotiate (1969: 340).  
 
Focusing specifically on the prosecutor’s role, (being the most influential party in most plea 
bargaining), McConville states that the decision, to either negotiate or go to trial may 
sometimes be exceptional complex even for the prosecution (1988: 577). This is because the 
prosecution is often left to operate within a broader parameter of discretion, and “in trying 
to rationalize their conduct, they may be forced to choose between conflicting obligations” 
(ibid). Because of this inherent challenge, there is always the possibility that social 
objectives and societal preference might not necessarily be reflected in the prosecutor’s 
decision (ibid). Since the chance to negotiate increases the number of cases the prosecutor 
can dispose of within the limit of his time and resource, the system exacerbates the 
consequences of this divergence between social objectives and private goals (ibid). 
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Moreover, because of the varying interest and constituencies that prosecutors represent, 
they are susceptible to making decisions in line with the ensuing priorities of the moment, 
which may sometimes have little to do with the principles of justice and fair play (Zacharias, 
1997: 1181-1182). For example, the terms or reason for negotiation could be to maintain his 
reputation for securing convictions, to ease workload or even to maintain a good 
relationship with the private bar for future employment opportunities (ibid). Other scholars, 
however, have emphasised that of all factors, budget constraint is the most significant in 
compelling prosecutors to make the difficult decision on how to treat each case and even 
harder choices on which case to pursue to trial and which to negotiate (Bar-Gill and Gazal, 
2004: 2).  
 
Another important aspect that reveals some extraordinary intricacies include situations 
where the prosecutor’s decision rests on delicate societal underpinnings.  For instance, 
where the prosecutor is to make decisions in highly publicised cases with widespread social 
impact. In this kind of situation, the prosecution will most likely prefer trials than 
negotiations even if that is not a rational choice to make (Alschuler, 1968: 107). This usually 
happens because the decision to plea bargain will almost certainly come under intense 
public suspicion and criticism, requiring the prosecutor to explain to the public that a 
negotiation was the only viable means of achieving a successful conviction (Katz, 1979: 556).  
It such circumstances, prosecutors are more likely to choose to defend an acquittal at trial 
than the painstaking task of explaining to the community the reasoning behind a plea deal. 
In the end, these kinds of choices become largely motivated not by principle but by foreseen 
pressure, fear of blame and censure (ibid).  
 
Debating the factors that often influence defendant’s choices in plea bargaining, Bar-Gill and 
Ben-Shahar (2004) identified such factors as the degree of guilt and the strength of the 
evidence as the most significant. They argued that when the evidence in the prosecutor’s 
hand is so incontrovertible, an offer of negotiation in return for leniency is most likely to be 
accepted by the defendant (2004: 44). Paradoxically, an empirical study by Bottoms and 
McClean suggests that while guilt and evidence prompt defendants to plead guilty, only 49 
per cent of the defendants responded that plea bargaining is indeed capable of resulting in 
some sort of reduced sentence, and only 5 per cent responded by admitting that their 
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willingness to plead guilty was in anticipation of leniency (1976: 112). Hence, what is clear is 
that most defendants take a decision in expectation of a quick disposal of their case. 
Another study conducted by Bordens (1984) made similar discoveries, suggesting that the 
strength of the prosecutor’s case and the defendant’s sentiment of being guilty are strong 
elements that affect willingness to accept an offer for a plea agreement. The study, 
however, indicates that the extent of promised sentence also plays an important role in 
encouraging the defendant to plead (ibid). Bordens and Bassett argued further that, even 
innocent defendants are likely to accept a plea offer if there appears to be a high probability 
of conviction at trial and most importantly where the bargain contains a promise of 
probation (1985: 94-95).   
 
Although there are claims that defendants exercise some degree of choice and free will in 
making decisions, evidence has shown that they actually have little choice outside the 
prosecutor’s proposal and the advice and recommendation of their counsel. This has, in 
many cases raised questions about the right of the defendant and principles of procedural 
justice. For example, the problem of fairness and coercion arises where defendants who 
first claim innocence, eventually plead guilty (Mcconville, 1998: 566). Although this kind of 
dilemma is not common in criminal justice, it is seen to resonate more in negotiated cases, 
often as a result of a threat that is followed by the assurance of an attractive penal discount. 
Ordinarily, a defendant facing charges and given the offer of a plea bargain will tend to 
evaluate the implications and consequences of his or her decision. This is a choice that is 
expected to be rational and calculated, but often becomes complex, especially where the 
defendant has no legal representation. Perhaps where a defendant is adequately 
represented by a competent attorney, these choices are more likely to be well informed as 
counsel assumes the role of a professional adviser and negotiator (Gentile, 1969: 523).  
 
Although attorneys are presumed as fair representatives of their client, the controversial 
nature of their decisions in plea bargaining has also come under academic scrutiny. 
McAllister and Bregman (1986) and Kramer et al., (2007) have studied the manner in which 
defence attorneys represent and make recommendations to their clients during plea 
negotiations. These studies revealed three likely scenarios. The first is that when the 
evidence against the defendant is weak, and the potential sentence is short, the defence 
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attorney's recommendation is mostly consistent with the wish of the defendant (ibid: 581). 
In the other two scenarios i.e., where there is a strong evidence of the potential for a long 
sentence, or where there is a weak evidence with the potential of a long sentence, defence 
attorneys are more likely to recommend for a guilty plea than insist on a trial (ibid). The 
studies further confirm the importance of evidence on the outcome of a plea offer. 
Considering this from a different angle, studies show that even defence attorneys can be 
risk-averse, and may resort to negotiations despite the chances of acquittal at trial (ibid). 
Another study by McConville also shows that defence lawyers sometimes make decisions 
based on standardised case theories and stereotypes of the kind of clients they are 
representing (McConville, 1998: 572). The image of the client as honest and law-abiding or 
as feckless and dishonest does often influence the way their cases are treated from the 
outset (ibid). 
 
In relation to the choices and role of judges in plea bargaining, scholars have attempted to 
identify the most relevant factors that influence their choices (Ferguson, 1972; Gallaghe, 
1974; Maynard, 1982; Turner, 2006). Since adjudication and sentence is mostly a nebulous 
process that depends on the facts, nature and circumstances of each case, judges often 
choose to play either an active role in plea negotiations or maintain ignorance that any 
bargain actually took place (Felkenes, 1976: 138). This complex approach to decision-making 
becomes possible because each of these choices is quite easy to make in a practice that is 
often disguised in privacy and its procedure seldom forms part of any public record or 
administrative review (ibid). Turner further pointed out that because parties usually present 
to the court a concluded agreement, even the post hoc task of inquiring the voluntariness of 
such negotiation is “fairly perfunctory and ineffective” (2006: 206). Often, judges desist to 
inquire deeply into the case due to the concern that they may possibly nullify an already 
concluded deal (ibid). They may often prefer to benefit from a successfully concluded plea 
bargain, which automatically means that the conviction and sentence they award will not be 
reversed since plea bargaining shields any procedural errors and even the incompetence of 
the judge (Fisher, 2000: 1039; Hessick and Saujani, 2009: 226). These incentives, therefore, 
become appealing for they save the judges’ reputation and in some cases, conceals their 
incompetence (ibid).  
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Another reason that may inform the decision of judges to avoid tampering with a concluded 
negotiation is the mounting pressure of caseload alongside the constant demand for 
efficiency (Hessick and Saujani, 2009: 227). By allowing plea deals to go unscrutinised, time 
and resource are severely saved. These are some of the major factors that substantially 
affect the judges’ decision and often make them hesitant to engage in an investigation 
capable of nullifying what is simply a concluded affair (ibid).  Although all parties have 
variety of reasons for taking a decision, scholars are particularly concerned about the 
choices that judges make. This is because it is the final decision that seals the fate of a 
defendant. Proponents of judicial participation for instance cautioned that in order to 
determine the rationality or otherwise of any negotiation, it is essential for the judge to 
make the difficult decision of studying all the documents and evidence of the prosecution 
(Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 2004: 45). This is important in order to ascertain the strength of 
such evidence and the sincerity of the plea deal that it was not obtained through some 
inappropriate means (ibid). However, such commitment is often unlikely because judges 
seldom meddle in the process that ensures that their only role is simply to convict and 
sentence with finality (Hessick and Saujani, 2009: 226).  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
Reflecting on these theories, one of the peculiar characters of plea bargaining is that it 
encompasses both institutional and individual pursuits. Principally, plea bargaining is often 
argued from the perspective of utility as much as it is about the concerns on where the idea 
of procedural justice becomes compromised. Opponents often argue thatthe fundamental 
ideals of criminal justice are so significant in ensuring justice and fairness and cannot be 
simply substituted for reasons of convenience and cost. Yet, any theoritical discussion on 
plea bargaining should include the utility it presents to the general process of criminal 
justices, as well as the nature and characteristics of the individual decisions that parties 
make in order to increase their gains from the outcome of any negotiation. A study by 
Wright (2005) revealed that both criminal justice institutions and parties often seek to 
exploit certain benefits in line with their ensuing individual or occupational interests. As will 
be discussed in later part of this study, plea bargaining when clearly defined within certain 
 67 
extents and limitations have the potential of bringing legitimate outcomes. Yet, those are 
boundaries that may sometimes be fluid and less understood. 
 
The incentives that plea bargaining brings has undoubtedly made it quite appealing and 
whether impliedly or expressly, negotiation always find its way into criminal justice 
administration. Perhaps several explanations have been given by proponents to justify the 
utility of plea deals and to establish the rationale behind the diverse choices that parties 
make during negotiations. Yet, the quest to resolve these questions has proven to be 
exceptionally difficult as plea bargaining raises many questions in reconciling between the 
traditional objectives of criminal justice on one hand and the inherent institutional goals of 
the state and the individual interests if parties on the other.  Often, it is the institutional and 
individual concerns that become the prevailing drivers of most negotiations. Other factors 
that add to this complexity are the fact that negotiations often occur with relative 
informality and in private with little information on why and how these agreements were 
reached. Furthermore, the nature of these engagements varies from one case to another, 
making any generalised explanation weak and inconclusive.  
 
Theories also suggest that most negotiations are influenced by the variety of factors that are 
geared towards achieving different objectives. Perhaps, the general argument on utility is 
easy to comprehend, but understanding the inner motives of individual parties is one aspect 
that is difficult to measure. This has led scholars to resort to all kinds of juxtaposition and 
models including scientific and those that revolve around disciplines such as social 
psychology. This proliferation of ideas from sociological to economic; scientific to 
behavioural law is evidence of how plea bargaining is one of the most complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon in modern criminal justice debate.  
 
Due to the complexity of these theoretical juxtapositions, a common but simpler variable 
was adopted by some scholars, which is to try and explain these factors from a process-
tracing approach (Posner, 1975: 757), which involves the observation of the processes 
through which they are undertaken while exploring the role and motivation of different 
players involved.  Yet, one cannot invalidate the theories that explain plea bargaining from a 
wider framework of social equilibrium where individuals or institutions identify and pursue 
 68 
their objectives. In relation to the decision theory, the simple argument is that parties tend 
to negotiate in the shadow of what each of them regards as the most advantageous 
alternative in the ensuing circumstance. But in general, evidence suggests that every 
negotiated plea has its own peculiarities and is driven by its own individual trails.  
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Chapter Four 
Practical models of plea bargaining: a comparative perspective. 
4.0 Introduction 
The global spread of plea bargaining not only reveals a trend of systemic convergence in 
criminal justice reform across different types of legal cultures, but shows how emerging 
criminal justice procedures are amending the fundamental concepts that traditionally 
distinguish Anglo-American adversarial system with system that are peculiar to civil law of 
continental European and beyond. It also reinvigorates the notion that in contemporary 
criminal justice, there is no single regime or model that operates strictly within the 
prototype of common law or civil law system (Damaska, 2004; Vogler, 2005, Thaman 2010). 
Although residual differences remain, what is most obvious is the hybridisation of elements 
of both systems across the world, with one dominating over the other, depending mostly on 
the legal tradition of the regime in question (Ogg, 2012: 230). The result of this legal 
development has further strengthen the argument that plea bargaining is one of the 
concepts in contemporary criminal justice that is applied and becoming widespread among 
different kinds of legal traditions.  As will be seen in this chapter, even countries with deep 
rooted socialist political and legal culture have accepted plea bargaining. 
 
The chapter takes a comparative look at plea bargaining across the world and how it 
imposes itself in both common law, civil law and even in jurisdictions with a strong socialist 
legal history. The chapter explores the pattern of development, procedural features and the 
challenges confronting the application of plea bargaining in these regimes. Although this 
study is primarily geared towards the general practice of plea bargaining and its emergence 
in Nigeria, a scholarship on a far reaching phenomenon such as plea bargaining often 
requires a comparative understanding of how the system is modelled across different legal 
regimes.  
 
There are reasons why each of these jurisdictions was chosen. Starting with Anglo-America, 
it is relevant to state that Nigeria, being a former British colony, maintains a criminal justice 
system that is historically developed on the model of the adversarial criminal justice system 
of England. Moreover, the relationship even after independence has remain politically and 
economically very close that English system of administration and justice has continued to 
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be a point of reference for legal reforms in Nigeria. Most statutes i.e., the evidence Act, the 
Land Use Act, the Criminal Code etc., were mostly inherited from the laws of England. Even 
as many of these provisions were amended, substantial parts of most of these statutes still 
retain their English heritage. The research also looked at Germany and Italy in order to 
understand the nature of plea bargaining in legal regimes with a civil law model of criminal 
justice. This is to reaffirm the argument that plea bargaining has transcend beyond its 
traditional Anglo American frontiers to places where the idea of criminal justice is the search 
for truth through and inquisitorial approach. Lastly, the study looks at Russia and China as 
part of a wider comparative study of how plea bargaining is finding grounds in regimes with 
deep communist culture of criminal justice administration. Moreover, it is well known that 
China is a major player in global politics and economy, with very wide footprint on the 
African continent. Although its relationship with most African states including Nigeria is 
mainly on economical, it is a tie that opens the gate for a closer future relationship on many 
aspects to which the legal system cannot be ruled out. 
 
4.1 The United States of America 
One of the most entrenched laws in the United States is the right to a jury trial as 
guaranteed by the Sixth amendment to the US Constitution. In practice, however, a jury trial 
has become an exception, replaced largely by plea bargaining, especially in routine criminal 
cases (Marcus et al., 2016). The justice system that once considered itself as the epitome of 
adversariality has in the last four decades seen an increased retreat from trials. About 95 
per cent of criminal cases across all the 50 states are now disposed of through negotiations 
(Ross, 2006: 717).  
 
But it is important to state that courts in the US have for a long time allowed different forms 
of guilty pleas. Evidence, for instance, suggests that the earliest form of court-sanctioned 
guilty plea methods were the plea of nolo contendere and later the Alford’s plea (Bibas, 
2002: 1363).12 While these types of pleas do not wholly qualify as plea bargaining, they have 
                                                 
12
 Alford’s plea originated in the case of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), where the Supreme Court 
noted that: "An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the 
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts 
constituting the crime” See also, Bibas S. (2003:1363) Harmonizing Substantive Criminal-Law Values and 
 71 
a similar effect as they all lead to a conviction (ibid). Since 1967, a number of bodies across 
the US began a strong advocacy for plea bargaining to be made legal.13 In subsequent years, 
beginning with the case of Brady in 1970,14 and Santobello in 1971,15  the Supreme Court 
ruled on the legality of plea bargaining. Since then, argued Hollander-Blumoff (1997), 
prosecutors and defence have continued to endorse and expand the application of plea 
bargaining.  
 
One of the most common feature of the US mode of plea bargaining is the high sentencing 
discount that guilty pleaders enjoy, which contributes to widespread acceptance of skewed 
negotiations that lead to innocent defendants pleading guilty (Turner, 2006: 205). But even 
as large sentence discounts serve as a mitigation of highly punitive sentences, it is, on the 
other hand, a mechanism used to induce guilty pleas.16 This has led to a higher rate of guilty 
pleas and a lesser rate of acquittals (Wright, 2005: 139; Erhdhard, 2008, 316-317).  
 
The US model of plea bargaining also gives judges some residual powers, but these are 
limited to acceptance or rejection of plea deals.17 They are not allowed to make any 
interventions in an on-going or future plea negotiation in ways that would make the court a 
direct participant in the process.18 It also ruled that where such plea agreement is based on 
a non-binding sentence recommendation, the judge must warn the defendant that such 
recommendations were not binding and that the defendant’s sentence would be based on 
the court’s discretion and not the prosecutor’s recommendation.19 What research shows, 
however, is that most judges do not review or intervene in an already concluded bargain 
                                                                                                                                                        
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas Cornell Law Review, 88, 1361-1411, p1363. 
Where he noted that the US criminal justice system has long allowed defendants to enter a plea of nolo 
contendere, essentially denying culpability but accepting punishment as if guilty. He further stated that in the 
last decade the Supreme Court has equally approved a new form of plea called the Alford pleas, in which 
defendants plead guilty while simultaneously protesting that they are innocent.  
13
 . The American Bar Association project on the Standards for Criminal Justice and the Presidential 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Standards for Criminal Justice advocated the recognition of plea 
bargaining as a legitimate process (Maynard, 1984). 
14
 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
15
 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). 
16
 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
17
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d) (2). See also, State v. Kivioja, 592 N.W.2d 220 (Wis. 1999); United States v. Hyde, 520 
U.S. 670 (1997).  
18
 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see also United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 455 (7th 
Cir. 1998).   
19
 Ibid. Also in Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) (4). 
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(Turner, 2006; Fisher, 2000; Hessick and Saujani, 2009).  Another aspect peculiar to the US 
criminal justice system is that these rules are general rules based on the provisions of 
Federal Laws and guidelines; case law in various jurisdictions may sometimes differ.  
 
In principle, therefore, the US model disallows any significant involvement of judges unless 
new evidence emerges, indicating clearly that where the charges or punishment agreed 
upon in the negotiation does not reflect the facts of the case or the relative guilt of the 
defendant, judges must allow defendants to withdraw their plea (Thaman, 2010: 366). The 
Supreme Court has also stated that where a plea was induced by a prosecutor’s promise, 
without which the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, the prosecutor must fulfil such 
a promise or the court will order specific performance in fulfilment.20 Moreover, where 
judges depart from sentence recommendations, defendants retain their right to appeal their 
sentences (Ross, 2006: 702). However, other courts are of the opinion that even the right to 
appeal may be waived by the terms of the plea agreement.21 The paradox, however, is that, 
because of the way these negotiations are conducted, defendants seldom withdraw or 
challenge their pleas. 
 
A systemic appraisal of the US model clearly reveals how the plea bargaining is mainly 
guided by what the prosecutor and the judge decide to do, which sometimes is in 
contradiction to laid down guidelines contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
This has added to the problems of inconsistency, coercion and other forms of unethical 
conduct, which in the end may render the negotiation between the defence and the 
prosecution flawed. Moreover, since the prosecution exploits the existence of numerous 
overlapping criminal statutes in order to achieve or fulfil their end of the bargain, the 
system becomes prone to a selective application of the law (Ma, 2002: 26). Despite these 
flaws, evidence suggests that courts in the US have continuously allowed this practice to 
increase, which according to Ross is because of the emphasis placed on conviction as the 
desired outcome of a legal contest (2006: 717). Others claim that the reason for the 
expansion of plea bargaining is the  unease the American system used to have with the kind 
of rights that the adversarial system grants the defendant (Alschuler cited in Schulhofer, 
                                                 
20
 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). 
21
 United States v. Melancom, 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992). See also Ross (2006:721).  
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1984: 1104). As research shows, the US criminal justice is one characterised by punitivism 
and high level of incarceration (Loury et al., 2008). This is suggestive of the fact that the 
system is prone to convictions which is what punitivism does. Perhaps this is in contrast to 
the criminal justice system in Nigeria which has no clear evidence of incarceration.  
 
Trying to explain this development, Turner pointed out that the growth in the culture of 
punitive legislation on the one hand, and the culture of steep penal discounts for guilty 
pleaders on the other, has continued to make plea bargaining attractive to parties (2006: 
205). The implication, however, is that the exponential increase in the rate of guilty pleas 
has drastically reduced the number of acquittals, dismissals, and convictions by trial (Wright, 
2005: 104-106). The prosecutor’s powers in these negotiations had also forced many 
defendants to abandon meritorious trial defences in anticipation of significant discounts 
through negotiation (ibid: 85-86). These enormous powers of prosecutors are among the 
distinctive characteristic of the US model of plea bargaining, in which the prosecution can go 
as far as recommending a particular sentence to the judge, which for instance, is contrary to 
what is obtained in the UK While this form of recommendation remains a practice in the US, 
the Supreme Court has handed down a series of judgements intended to protect defendants 
from the coercive nature of negotiation as a result of the powers of the prosecution.22 
Although the relationship between sentence reduction and coercion can be blurred, the fact 
that a defendant is often given the choice between punitive outcome at trial and a reduced 
sentence for pleading guilty is to many observers an imposing phenomenon. The various 
rulings of courts were targeted as ensuring that defendants have the free choice between 
pleading and trial, but evidence has shown that these measures have not been sufficient in 
deterring prosecutors from coercing defendants in to pleading guilty (Langer, 2005: 231).  
 
Plea bargaining in the US has also been a subject of debate on grounds of inconsistency, 
especially in sentencing practices. To deal with this challenge, the US sentencing 
commission established Federal Sentencing Guidelines that set the mandatory sentencing 
limit since 1984 (Turner, 2006: 205). These guidelines require that a defendant who pleads 
guilty is entitled to a discount of up to one-third of the original sentence (ibid; Stuntz, 2004: 
                                                 
22
 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Bradshaw v. 
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 183 (2005). 
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2559). What this means is that sentences are tied to charges thereby limiting the judiciary’s 
discretionary powers over sentencing, and reducing disparities in penalty between similar 
offences (ibid). Yet, the reforms were in many ways ineffective and only added to the 
already existing prosecutorial powers because sentences have become even more 
dependent on the charges that the prosecution chose to bring after a deal had been struck 
outside the court (Standen, 1993: 1506; Kuckes, 2005: 248). Breyer further pointed out that 
whether one considers these guidelines as generally charged offence’ i.e., the charges being 
presented or ’real offence’ i.e., the actual offence committed “is less important than 
recognizing that the sentencing depends to a greater extent on what the prosecution elects 
to charge” (cited in Standen, 1993: 1508). 
 
For most part, one of the points of unanimity among scholars of the US criminal justice 
system is that plea bargaining is a rampant phenomenon. This obsession with plea 
bargaining is however not out of place especially when one also understands the pressure 
upon prosecutors working to bring efficiency to a system that has the reputation of punitive 
legislation and mass incarceration. Workload is therefore a legitimate justification for US 
prosecutors and plea bargaining has offered an alternative to the traditional burden of a 
jury trial.  It is also by far a convenient way of ensuring swift conviction and adding to the 
prosecutor’s objective to have a strong public record of efficiency in areas of the US where 
prosecutors are elected to hold office.  Plea bargaining is therefore the first option 
whenever the opportunity presents itself, with punitivism and the assurance of large 
sentence being the chief mechanisms used to secure guilty pleas.   
 
4.2 England and Wales 
Some scholars argue that until the mid-18th century, plea bargaining was alien to English 
criminal justice system (Rauxloh, 2012: 27-28). Although there are several accounts of how 
and when plea bargaining (commonly referred to by English practitioners as guilty plea 
procedure) first emerged, the best evidence relates to the periods when judges began 
accepting defendant’s plea without going through a full jury trial. According to Cockburn, 
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the decades between 1587 and 1590 saw the process of ‘guilty plea’ (cognovit)23 becoming 
a routine exercise in English courts (1978: 264-265). At every assize he argues, “five or six 
prisoners” confess and were sentenced without further process (ibid).  This later developed 
into a practice where guilty pleaders were rewarded with a sentence discount (Rauxloh, 
2012: 28).  
 
Turner’s case in 1970 was the first decision by the Court of Appeal that laid down a judicial 
foundation for the practice of plea bargaining.24 Although this judgement acknowledged the 
practice of plea negotiation, it did not encourage it.25 The main principles in this case, as 
expressed by Lord Parker, were that defence counsel may advice his client, even strongly, 
that a guilty plea, along with a sign of remorse is a mitigating factor capable of attracting a 
sentence concession (Rauxloh, 2012: 29). Moreover, the accused must make such plea of his 
volition. The rule prevents judges from engaging in plea bargaining or giving any assurances 
regarding a sentence discount.  
 
The first sets of guidelines based on the rule in Turner were embodied in the Court of 
Appeal’s Practice Direction in 1976. It is, however, important to note that along with the 
principles in Turner’s rule came other principles regarding the defendant’s right to 
concession in a guilty plea. In the case of R v Cain for instance, Lord Widgery states that 
defendants are entitled to know that guilty pleas attract lesser sentences and “any accused 
person who does not know about it should know about it” (Rauxloh, 2012: 30).26 Also, 
Slapper and Kelly indicated that a number of those who pleaded guilty did so in expectation 
of sentence discount (2011: 161). 
 
Evidently, practitioners continued to use this practice even as it continues to come under 
intense scrutiny. As far back as 1978, the English Court of Appeal pronounced its clear 
objection to any form of negotiation in criminal cases.27 The first instinct of the Appeal 
Court, according to McConville and Wilson was that plea bargaining was contrary to the 
                                                 
23
 The term Cognovit refers to a written confession by a defendant. 
24
 R v Turner, (1970) 54 Crim. App. R. 352. See also Rauxloh, (2012: 29). 
25
 R v Atkinson, (1978) 2 ALL ER 460,462. See also, Baldwin and McConville, (1979: 288). 
26
 R v Cain (1976) QB 496. 
27
 R v Atkinson (1978) 2 All ER 460. 
 76 
principles of the adversarial system and must, therefore, be outlawed (2002: 364). Despite 
this chorus of judicial discouragement and discontentment, the practice continued across 
the country,28 and with the development of pre-trial reviews in some Magistrates’ Courts, 
the opportunity for plea bargaining was further enhanced (McConville, 1998: 579).  
 
Like their US counterparts, English legal practitioners, especially in lower courts, apparently 
do not often heed to the rules laid down by the Court of Appeal, i.e., to advice their clients 
appropriately on the implication of a guilty plea (Rauxloh, 2012: 30-31). This she argues, is 
connected to the practical realities of the work, pressure on the courts and indeed the 
professional relationships between and shared interests of courtroom actors (ibid). 
Similarly, Mulcahy (1994) in his study of two Magistrates’ Courts in England revealed that a 
number of interrelated factors, which include the avoidance of the potential cost as well as 
the unpredictability of trials, fuel the practice of negotiating pleas. It is, therefore, safe to 
argue that the advantages of flexibility and convenience that plea bargaining presents have 
made it increasingly impossible for some of the restrictive rules suggested in Turner to be 
sustained (Rauxloh, 2012: 31). For instance, it allows the parties to simply discuss and agree 
on what charges to uphold and which to drop before taking the matter to court. On arrival, 
all that is needed is the defendant’s plea of guilty and no further evidence or witness is 
required before pronouncing sentence. 
 
The English model of plea bargaining has continued to develop, mainly on a charge bargain 
basis.29 The Court of Appeal expressly approved this but cautioned that it must be 
conducted openly.30 Here again is the clash between theory and practice. Plea bargaining by 
its very nature is unlikely to be an open process. The earliest rules guiding plea negotiations 
in England and Wales include section 3(2) and 23(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985, which allows the Crown Prosecutor to terminate charges or to downgrade the charges 
to less serious offences (Ashworth 1998: 141). Later provisions include paragraph 6 of 
schedule 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which substituted section 20 of the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act 1980, in which the accused is given the right to request an indication on whether 
                                                 
28
 Russel L.J in R v Smith (1990) 1 WLR 1311. See also Rauxloh, (2012: 30). 
29
 R v Winterflood, (1979) Crim LR 263. 
30
 ibid. 
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custodial or non-custodial sentence will be the likely outcome if he or she were tried 
summarily (ibid). Where such a request is made, the court is entitled to respond (ibid). 
 
The Runciman Report (Criminal Justice Report, 1993)31 is a great example of the 
characteristic of plea bargaining in English courts. It shows for example how defendants 
plead guilty when they are factually innocent (Rauxloh, 2012: 54). This development was 
followed by a series of Court of Appeal judgements on the guiding principles for plea 
bargaining. Lord Auld’s Report (2001) also proposed the introduction of a discount on 
sentencing for criminal defendants who plead guilty at the earliest stage. Unlike its 
predecessors, this report went further to recommend that such a scheme should be 
accompanied with an advance indication to a defendant who is considering pleading guilty 
(ibid). It also includes the ruling of courts on limits and exceptions on sentence discounts.32 
Moreover, statutory provisions were also introduced to guide these practices.  
 
In 2002, the Court of Appeal argued in clear terms that, failure by the trial court to reward a 
guilty plea with a sentence discount contradicts the “settled practice and general grounds of 
fairness.”33 This stance by the Court of Appeal makes it mandatory for judges to give 
sentence concession whenever an accused person opts to plead guilty irrespective of the 
nature and circumstances of the plea. The Criminal Justice Act 2003, for instance, gives 
authority for a sentence discount for pleading guilty.34 The extent of sentence reduction for 
a guilty plea is between one-quarter and one-third of what would have otherwise been the 
sentence (Slapper and Kelly, 2003: 164). The Crown Prosecution Service under the ‘statutory 
charging’ scheme introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 also reaffirms the power to 
determine whether to charge a defendant and what offence to charge. While these powers 
have been part of the common law, the presence of plea bargaining in the system makes it 
possible for the prosecution to use discretion in ways that will induce the defendant to 
plead guilty (Ashworth, 2000: 28).  
 
                                                 
31
 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 6
th
 July 1993. 
32
 See R v Holington and Emmens, (1985) 7 Cr App R (S) 281, 285 and also R v Costen, (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 
182. 
33
 R v March, (2002) 2 Cr App R (S) 98. 
34
 s. 144 CJA 2003. 
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Principally, the English model of plea bargaining emphasises that judges should not be 
bound restrictively to the contents of any arrangement made between the parties, i.e., 
defence and prosecution (Slapper and Kelly, 2011: 163). Instead, the judges have retained 
their complete sentencing discretion (Baldwin and McConville, 1979: 288), and unlike the US 
model, the prosecution cannot make sentence recommendations to the court. The 
implication, however, is that it undermines any confidence the prosecution may have in 
offering the accused promises as to the extent of punishment to be imposed by the court 
(ibid).  
 
Like most other models, the question of transparency is also a serious issue in the English 
system, largely because the practice of plea bargaining in England and Wales is carried out 
privately, resulting in a significant amount of plea bargains, but also ones that are often 
characterised by either threat or the expectation of sentence discount (Mulcahy, 1994: 411-
413).  
 
Despite these problems, plea bargaining has become prevalent and attractive to the main 
actors in criminal justice in England and Wales. In his submission to the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Procedure, Judge Pickles states: 
 
It is good to have a chat with the lads. How tempting to sit down and sort it all out 
sensibly, wigs off.... The tension of open court has gone. The shorthand writer is 
absent. No press or public. Even the accused - around whose fate it all revolves - is 
not there.... In this easy atmosphere, Turner or any other case can be overlooked in a 
genuine effort to find a sensible short-cut, off the record (ibid).  
 
The development of the English model of plea negotiation is therefore similar to that of the 
general nature of criminal law system, which uniquely derives its motivation from 
institutional underpinning that “allows developments of the justice system in a way that is 
more flexible and likely to happen more quickly than more formal jurisdictions where 
changes in the penal code need many years to work through” (Lewis, 2006: 179). 
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4.3 Germany 
The German criminal justice system is one that is strongly based on civil law principles, with 
emphasis on the traditional idea of truth seeking under the direction of a powerful judge 
(Rauxloh, 2012: 61). It also has an entrenched culture of the ‘legality principle’ that demands 
the compulsory prosecution of all criminal cases (Frase and Thomas, 1995: 353).35 But since 
the early 1970s, a number of provisions have been introduced to grant the prosecutor some 
powers and discretion especially in minor offences (Ma, 2002: 35).36 This is seen as one of 
the first ground-breaking exceptions to the legality principle that heralded the emergence of 
a model of plea bargaining (ibid). Although the provisions were originally meant to deal with 
minor offences, prosecutors began using it as a means of disposing of even serious crimes 
(Herrmann, 1991: 758). In retrospect, however, it appears that there is evidence to suggest 
that earlier developments permitted the development of a system of summary trial that 
later transformed into plea bargaining.  This argument relates back to the reunification of 
Germany in 1990, which saw a surge in criminal cases, especially white collar crimes and 
drug offences, prompting practitioners to resort to summary procedure based on 
negotiated pleas (Swenson, 1995: 375). Until 1982, the German criminal justice system was 
one extolled as a system that flourishes without any kind of plea bargaining (Langbein, 
1979), Rauxloh pointed out that the argument raised in the 70’s, especially by Langbein, is 
more of a suggestion as to why German lawyers should avoid plea negotiations than it was 
about the actual practice (2012: 63). Even at the time of Langbein’s writing, plea bargaining 
is widespread in the German courts (ibid; Swenson, 1995: 375). 
 
The beginning of a major turning point was the time cases of plea negotiations started 
reaching the appellate courts, and regulatory standards began to emerge, laying the 
foundation for what is today the German model of plea bargaining (Rauxloh, 2012: 68). The 
first judicial ruling outlining the legality of negotiation came in 1987 when the first case 
involving negotiated settlement reached the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht),  where the court ruled that it is not a violation of ‘basic law’ 
(Grundgesetz) (ibid). Following this judgement, it laid down the first set of rules on plea 
                                                 
35
 The ‘Legality Principle’ has been in the German Code of Criminal Procedure since 1877. 
36
 Amendments made to section 153a of the StPO. The amendment made in 1973 authorises the prosecutor to 
exclude from prosecution an accused found guilty of minor offence on the condition that, the accused agrees 
to pay certain amount to a charitable organisation or to the state 
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bargaining where it stated that in any negotiation, the contents must be fully exposed, all 
parties must be involved, the defendant’s confession must be investigated to ascertain 
voluntariness and such negotiation should not include any ultra vires promises (ibid: 69). 
 
The Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) however did not make any clear 
pronouncement nor declare any rules on plea negotiations until 1989 when, for the first 
time, it permitted judges to contact parties outside the courtroom in  a ruling that fell short 
of clarifying whether such contact includes any assurance of penal concession for the 
defendant (ibid). It is, however, important to stress that despite these rulings, the 
procedural guidelines were not comprehensive, causing a struggle between applicability and 
procedural laws that continued in a state of inconsistency for years. Commenting on this, 
Rauxloh argues that the failure to provide clear guideline was understandable as the 
Bundesgerichtshof was caught between the traditional principles of the German criminal 
process on one hand and the necessity of informal agreements on the other (ibid: 70). The 
solution she says “was believed to lie in a linguistic distinction between illegal accordance 
(Absprache) and legal understanding (Verstandigungen), but no criteria were provided to 
distinguish between the two in practice (Ibid).” 
 
In 1998, the Bundesgerichtshof produced a ruling that set out some conditions and limits on 
plea bargaining that included the necessity that any negotiation has to be made during the 
main trial and must involve all the parties including the lay judges and co-defendants (ibid). 
Another rule was that which disallowed the trial court from disclosing a sentence limit but 
permitted it to give an indication of the upper limit of any intended penalty (ibid: 71). 
 
Similarly, standards laid down by the Federal Supreme Court caution against judicial 
coercion (Weider, cited in Turner, 2006: 236). This rule disallows judges from making 
statements indicating that the evidence against the accused is so strong that conviction is 
inevitable while at the same time showing that a confession would attract a shorter 
sentence (ibid). Where such remarks are made, the judge may be disqualified from further 
trying the case (Herrmann, 1991:773).37 In the same vein, the defendant has the right of 
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 BGH 3 StR 452/04, Beschluss v. 8.2.2005. This is the 2005 German Supreme Court case of Beschluss. 
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appeal and can raise the issue of coercion or threat on appeal, where this is established, the 
appellate court is authorised to reverse the decision.38 Despite these safeguards, the one 
thing that is obvious with the character of plea bargaining everywhere is that it is often 
difficult to elucidate what really constitutes ‘undue pressure’. Also, like in other 
jurisdictions, plea bargaining continued to be largely driven by informal and private 
interaction between the parties (Rauxloh, 2012: 70). 
 
A comprehensive model of plea bargaining was first accepted by the Federal Court of Justice 
and written into section 257c of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) in 2009 (Weigend 
and Turner, 2014: 81). In what appears to be a long-awaited judgement, “the German 
Constitutional Court in 2013 upheld the constitutionality of the 2009 German law 
authorizing the negotiation of criminal judgments between the court and the parties” (ibid). 
Widmaier, however, argues that even before the full codification of plea bargaining into the 
German criminal justice system, the courts responsible for trying economic crimes were 
accustomed to this type of practice (cited in Rauxloh, 2012: 67). Other scholars also 
supported the argument that plea negotiations have been occurring in Germany long before 
it became a familiar phenomenon in public domain (Lynch, 2009: 67). Section 257c states 
that the subject matter of an agreement may only comprise the legal consequences that 
could be the content of the judgment and of the associated rulings, other procedural 
measures relating to the course of the underlying adjudication proceedings, and the 
conduct of the participants during the trial. It also goes further to state that ‘a confession 
shall be an integral part of any negotiated agreement. The verdict of guilt, as well as 
measures of reform and prevention, may not be the subject of a negotiated agreement.’ 
This addition to the Code also goes to the extent of stating clearly that the court is 
mandated to announce what content the negotiated agreement, and on free evaluation of 
the circumstance of the case, the court should also indicate an upper and lower sentence 
limit. This is in addition to the fact that participants will be given the opportunity to make 
submissions, while a negotiated agreement comes into existence if the defendant and the 
public prosecution office agree to the court’s proposal. 
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 BGH 4 StR 84/04, Urteil v. 16.9.2004. This is a 2004 German Supreme Court case of Urteil. 
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The German model has three forms of plea bargaining, i.e., (1) the diversion bargain, (2) the 
bargain over penal order and (3) the bargain over confession (Ma, 2002: 36). As Hermann 
(2006) states, all of these forms of negotiations occur at all stages in German criminal courts 
from preliminary investigation to the conclusion of a trial (cited in Rauxloh, 2012: 73). Their 
contents, however, depend on the nature of the offer; the time of the negotiation; the place 
and the parties involved (ibid). Hence, classification, as to which type of plea bargaining is 
involved, depends mainly on these variables (ibid).   
 
Diversion bargain is evidently the most common form of plea bargaining under the German 
criminal justice system, where the defendant has an opportunity to compensate the victim 
or make payments to a charity or the government (Ma, 2002: 36-37). The second is the 
bargain over a penal order. This entails the prosecution preparing a document containing 
the defendant’s offence and the requisite penalty, which he or she may accept or reject. In 
this kind of offer, the punishment mainly includes forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, a 
suspended sentence, a day fine or even the suspension of a driver's licence (ibid). The third 
version is the confession bargain, where the defendant agrees to confess, thereby 
shortening the length of the trial. In this case, the judge is authorised to indicate to the 
defendant the upper limit of the sentence that will likely be imposed (ibid). The procedure is 
usually for the protocol to be read out in court where the defendant pleads guilty to the 
alleged offence before the professional judge, after which the professional Judges retires for 
a conference at which the lay judges, for the first time, hear about the plea discussions. But 
unlike in trials, lay judges are not allowed to review the case file, hence have to “rely on the 
professional judges' representation of the facts to make their decision” (Turner, 2006: 211). 
With regards to sentence concession, the German Code states in Sec 302 that ‘If a 
negotiated agreement (Section 257c) has preceded the judgment, a waiver shall be 
excluded. An appellate remedy filed by the public prosecution office for the benefit of the 
accused may not be withdrawn without his consent.’ The rule governing a confession 
bargain on the other hand appears more like an exception to the general rule of German 
criminal justice, which does not consider a confession as a conclusive proof of guilt but 
rather as forming part of evidence (Rauxloh, 2012: 62). 
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Another important point in this procedure is that despite the defendant’s right to appeal 
judgements, which they can as well waive (Turner, 2006: 221), judges are not permitted to 
take part in a discussion relating to waiver of such appellate rights.39 Hence, any such 
agreement is mainly informal between the defendants and public attorneys. It is also 
important to note that such waiver has no binding force, but in practice, the parties, i.e., 
public attorneys usually keep to it (Turner, 2006: 222).  
 
Another important aspect of the German model that helps in avoiding overcharging is the 
right of the defence to have a full knowledge of the prosecutor’s evidence before the 
conclusion of any negotiation (Ma, 2002: 38). The challenge to this rule, however, is that 
prosecutors are likely to drop collateral charges in order to encourage a plea from the 
defendant (ibid). Also, to safeguard the defendant, the rules disallow the imposition of 
multiple consecutive sentences (Frase and Weigend, 1995: 339), and judges were not 
allowed to accept a guilty plea where a defendant protests his innocence (Turner, 2006: 
229). Defendants are also not allowed to “plead to hypothetical crimes, or to real crimes 
they could not have committed” (Frase and Thomas, 1995: 344). The importance of these 
rules also goes as far as making it highly unlikely for the prosecution to use some 
mischievous tactic or threat in order to secure a plea (Turner, 2006: 220). Moreover, the law 
obliges prosecutors to reduce into writing the reason for any decision they make on either 
the disposal or trial of a case. This requirement was meant to make prosecutors cautious, 
and to make only genuine deals (Ma, 2002: 39).  
 
Despite these numerous attempts to ensure safeguards, the inherent powers of the judge 
still create the tendency for coercion. The German law allows judges not only to initiate plea 
discussions but also to participate in a trial where the negotiation fails (ibid, 2006: 236). This 
is evidence to the fact that, even in plea bargaining, Germany still maintains its culture of a 
proactive judge (Turner, 2006: 214).  
 
A unique element of the German model is the rule regarding victims. In this respect, the law 
gives the victim the powers to insist that the prosecution sends their case to trial (Ma, 2002: 
                                                 
39
 Anfragebeschl. v. 24.7.2003, StV 10/2003, 544.   
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38). Where the prosecutor declines this request, the victim has the right to approach the 
court and ask for a review of the reason for the refusal (ibid). This is a significant departure 
from other models of plea bargaining; it is also a rule that in many ways ensure the interest 
of the victim is not compromised or completely surpassed by the interests of the 
prosecution. The general rule in this context is however limited to instances where the 
prosecutor’s decision not to pursue a trial is on evidential grounds and not in relation to 
public interest, in which case the victim’s right does not apply (ibid).  
 
The German model also stresses the centrality of the search for truth and the 
proportionality of punishment (Weigend and Turner, 2014: 82). Yet, this idea of 
proportionality which emphasises consistency of sentences, is challenged by the fact that 
the various prosecutorial offices across localities or district have different ways in which 
they deal with cases, especially the choice of whether or not to prosecute certain category 
of cases is subject to different kinds of approaches (ibid: 39).  
 
Opinion on plea bargaining among legal practitioners in Germany is divided. Some are keen 
to accept these new changes as some form of utilitarian reform (Swenson, 1995), while 
others tend to lean more towards the old regime (Langbein, 1979), contending that 
negotiating with an offender violates Rechtsstaat-principles.40 Proponents, however, 
countered this argument, maintaining that confession and agreements are, in fact, 
compatible with the concept of the Rechtsstaat (Fionda, 1995). Schmidt-Hieber (1982), for 
instance, suggests, “cooperative disposition of cases leads to friendlier, more benevolent 
sentences”, and that agreements should be permissible as long as they are a mutual search 
for the correct outcome (cited in Swenson, 1995: 398). This argument, however, fails to 
accept that many of the unresolved flaws of plea bargaining do in fact contradict the 
fundamentals of Rechtsstaat. While the principles of Rechtsstaat places emphasis on ethics, 
morality, and rationality, numerous studies on plea bargaining reveal how threat, coercion 
and the personal interest of officials often drive the process of negotiation (Kipnis 1976; 
Mulcahy, 1994; Bargill and Ben-Shahar, 2004).  
                                                 
40
 The Rechtsstaat is a doctrine common with continental Europe which is that the power of the state is limited 
by the provisions of the law. It is essentially a principle that protects the citizen from the arbitrariness of state 
power by defining the role of criminal justice and outlines the source and extent of governmental authority. 
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What is also of no doubt is the fact that the rise of plea bargaining has an effect on the 
traditional emphasis on truth-seeking since it does not allow for careful judicial scrutiny of 
every fact and every item of evidence.  Despite these challenges, a recent study by Dahs 
revealed that in about 30 to 40 percent of all criminal cases, there is evidence of an attempt 
at negotiation (cited in Rauxloh, 2012:72). Similarly, Lynch claims that negotiated pleas 
account for 20 to 30 percent of all convictions (2009: 67). A recent study by Satzger (2006) 
suggests a dramatic surge of up to 80 percent in some courts. Making a general appraisal of 
the system, Damaska stated that the German criminal justice has, over the years witnessed 
a transition from the hierarchical towards the coordinate model of justice. Meaning that, 
“the traditional unilateral decision making has, to some extent, been replaced by a 
cooperation of prosecutors, judges, defence counsel and the accused” (cited in Herrmann, 
1991: 775). The defendant is no longer restricted as a subordinate. Instead, he is now legally 
authorised to participate in the process (ibid). What is important about this model is the 
way in which all parties, including the victim, are involved in the process and the fact that 
the defendant’s right to appeal still remains (ibid).  
 
4.4 Italy 
One of the landmark attempts to introduce plea bargaining in Italy occurred in October 
1988 when the Italian Parliament adopted a proposal for a new Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Codice di procedura penale) (Ogg, 2012: 232). As the Code came into force in 1989, many 
scholars saw it as an ambitious attempt towards the introduction of some adversarial 
elements based on Anglo-American model into a system that was traditionally guided by 
civil law principles (Montagna, 2004: 430). The main trigger for this reform was the level of 
inefficiency and backlog in the Italian criminal justice system, to the extent that, on a 
number of occasions the Parliament felt compelled “to grant amnesty to whole classes of 
defendants, in the vain hope that its action would provide the overburdened system with a 
fresh start” (Pizzi and Marafioti, 1992: 6).  Other factors that the 1988 reform attempted to 
address include the need to divest the excessive powers of the judges, and shift some of 
these powers to the public prosecutor ‘Pubblico ministero’ (Pizzi and Montagna, 2004: 431).  
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On the International political arena, there was also the enormous pressure by institutions 
such as the European Court of Human Rights, Amnesty International and others, who 
insistently called on the Italian state to review its laws in order to deal with the notorious 
level of inefficiency (Pizzi and Montagna, 2004: 438; Ogg, 2012: 232).  Out of this pressure 
for reform, which includes summary procedure in form of plea bargaining. At first, the 
reforms faced resistance from judges resulting in a large number of appeals reaching the 
constitutional court, especially in the early years of the introduction of the Code (Illuminati, 
2005: 572-576). Illuminati further notes “(f)ar more constitutional claims came before the 
Constitutional Court in the first years after the reform than were ever referred to the Court 
during the preceding four decades under the provisions of the Code of 1930” (ibid: 574).  
 
The disapproval of this system was mainly centred on the argument that it infringed Article 
112 of the Italian Constitution, which provides for the legality principle.41 This led to the 
courts giving series of broad interpretations of the exceptions to the new adversarial rules, 
especially regarding evidence (Ogg, 2012: 240). As a result, judges continued going back to 
the old method of introducing evidence at trial and re-launching “a system that began to 
look more and more inquisitorial and less adversarial” (Pizzi and Montagna, 2004: 430). 
Evidence also suggests that because Italian prosecutors are mainly educated and trained in 
a civil law system, they also continued to view this transplant as a departure from 
acceptable norms (Boari and Fiorentina, 2001: 219). 
 
The Italian Parliament was forced to intervene and amend the constitution in 1999, 
abolishing many of the exceptions created by the courts (Illuminati, 2005: 576). Again, the 
Parliament was called upon in 2001 to intervene owing to the continuous resistance of the 
Constitutional Court to adapt to the new reforms contain in the Code.42 Taking a bold 
stance, the Parliament stated the “Constitutional Court's systematic misinterpretation of the 
Constitution” has necessitated the Parliament to adopt plea bargaining as a recognised 
method of criminal procedure (Semukhina and Reynolds, 2009: 408).  
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 Costituzione della Repubblica italiana. 
42
 Codice di procedura penale. 
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The Italian model of plea bargaining is based on the adoption of two forms of abbreviated 
procedures categorised as ‘party agreed sentence’ (Pettegiamento dula pena)43 and 
‘summary trial’ (Ma, 2002: 390). In a party agreed sentence, the prosecution and the 
defence enter into an agreement as to the extent of a sentence, in which case the sentence 
should not exceed two years, even if the original sentence for the offence is above two 
years (Maffei, 2004: 1061). It also allows the defence to negotiate up to a one-third 
reduction in sentence (ibid).44  
 
Another distinctive feature of the Italian model is the permission given to the accused to 
make a direct request for a bargained settlement either at the preliminary hearing or during 
the trial (Boari and Fiorentina, 2001: 216).45 Where this happens, the prosecution is then 
authorised to accept or reject such request. But the Code went further to put a burden upon 
the prosecution when he or she rejects the defendants offer, they are required to state 
clearly the reasons for such refusal, which the judge is empowered to overrule and go ahead 
to impose a sentence as requested by the defendant (Miller, 1989: 230).46 To protect the 
prosecution from a situation where the judge and the defendant might be conspiring to 
avoid due process, the Code went further to grant the prosecution the right to appeal such a 
decision if the judge overrides the prosecution. 47  But where there are no such situations, 
parties are barred from appealing convictions unless if the prosecution has modified the 
nature of the original charge or charges.48  
 
The Italian model also demands that where the request for negotiated settlement comes 
only during the trial, then any pronouncement by the judge should be made at the close of 
such trial.49 Furthermore, the law requires the judge to ascertain the voluntariness of the 
plea and to ensure that the sentence agreed between the parties is proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the case as contained in the prosecutors file 
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 Sometime referred to as “bargaining as to the punishment”, it is a procedure closest to plea bargaining in 
common law regimes. See, e.g.  Newcombe, K. (2007). Russia. In C. M. Bradley (Ed.), Criminal procedure. A 
worldwide study. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 
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 C.P.P. art. 444. 
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 ibid, art. 446(l). 
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 ibid, art. 448(1). 
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 ibid. art. 448(2). 
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 ibid, 443. 
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 ibid, art. 448(1). 
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(Miller, 1989: 231).50 This power to review cases or even overrule the prosecution has 
prompted some scholars to contend that the Italian system of plea bargaining has placed 
unhelpful restriction on the powers of the public prosecutor (Maffei, 2004: 1061).  
 
Another important distinction between the Italian model and other models is the degree of 
limitation imposed by the Code. In the sense that a party agreed sentence is only applicable 
to minor categories of offences involving pecuniary fines or where, in light of the 
circumstances of the offense and the offender, the statutory sentence reduction of up to 
one-third, does not exceed two years imprisonment (Gifford, 1983: 80).51 
 
The ‘abbreviated or summary procedure’, on the other hand, can only be initiated by the 
defence, who puts a request to the court for a quick disposal of his case. Although some 
may argue that this type of summary trial does not qualify as plea bargaining, its procedural 
character places it within the definition of plea bargaining, because it is not only followed by 
mandatory sentence discount at the preliminary stage of the matter, 52 it is also described 
under the Code to constitute practices that are akin to most types of plea bargaining. Article 
439 of the Code states that to initiate a summary procedure; the prosecution should present 
the defendant’s request to the court, at least, five days prior to the preliminary hearing. The 
judge is then at liberty to accept to reject such request, at least, three days before the 
hearing.53 This, however, does not deter presenting the same request again during a 
hearing54 in which case the judge’s decision on whether to accept or reject is to be made 
instantaneously.55 Similar to the rules in the party agreed sentence is that where the 
prosecutor refuses to consent, the defendant can directly ask the judge for such a reduction 
in sentence and the judge may overrule the prosecutor (Ma, 2002:41). 
 
Critics, however, argue that by making prosecutorial consent a prerequisite,56 the 
prosecutors power have been expanded, and made the defence vulnerable (Miller, 1989: 
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228). Another situation that further puts the defence under pressure is the general structure 
of the Italian penal system, in which judges and prosecutors have closer occupational 
relationship than in common law jurisdictions, which makes it often unlikely for the judges 
to overrule the prosecutor for the sake of the defendant’s interest (Boari and Fiorentina, 
2001: 211).  
 
Evidence also shows that most plea bargains in Italy involve lower courts, i.e., the Pretura,57 
whose jurisdictions are limited to offences attracting four years of prison term or pecuniary 
fines (ibid). Because of this limitation in jurisdiction, the development of plea bargaining in 
Italy has been slow, that in the first five years since the introduction of the new Code, only 
about 8 per cent of all cases were disposed through negotiations (ibid: 213). Hence, two 
decades on, the Italian criminal justice system still struggles with overly protracted cases 
(Ogg, 2012: 229). Part of the reasons for this slow success according to Boari and Fiorentina 
is the limit placed on sentence reduction, which made plea bargaining particularly 
unattractive to many defendants (2001: 214). Aware of the flawed character of trials 
notorious for their delay, loss of evidence and the frequent absence of witnesses, most 
defendants, especially those on bail tactically exploit these flaws instead of accepting guilt 
(Pizzi and Marafioti, 1992:6; Boari and Fiorentini, 2001: 217).  What plea bargaining 
achieved, however, was the alteration of the dynamics of court processes, especially for 
minor offences by ensuring the opportunity to negotiate. Furthermore, Miller argues, “by 
permitting the parties to decide on the merits of the case as well as on the sentence, the 
procedure validates the role of the competing parties” (ibid: 230). Yet, there are aspects of 
the Italian model that touches on some of the principles of criminal justice, particularly the 
rule that bars parties from appealing unless the prosecution has modified the original 
charges. 
 
4.5 Russia  
The Russian Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) introduced in 2001 was one of the significant 
turning points that saw the emergence of adversarial elements, including plea bargaining 
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 The Pretura is the lower court in Italy, similar to Magistrate courts in England and other common law 
regimes. 
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into a system that was historically an inquisitorial one (Solomon, 2005; Burnham and Kahn, 
2008). Although the CPC came into force in 2001, it was the result of series of painstaking 
decisions and amendments stretching back to the mid-1990’s (Pomorski, 2006: 130). These 
new rules heralded the beginning of substantial changes to the previous Soviet era criminal 
justice procedure (Burnham and Kahn, 2008). It was also a step that saw the separation of 
judicial functions from prosecutorial ones (Pomorski, 2006: 131).58 These developments 
were the prelude to what was later to become a Russian model of plea bargaining. The aim 
of the reform they said was to increase the efficiency of the criminal justice system by 
reducing the number of cases that went through to full trial (Semukhina and Reynolds, 
2009: 407).  
 
The Russian model of plea bargaining, commonly referred in Russia as ‘Special Court Order 
Proceedings’ brought a paradigm shift in prosecutorial process, restricting the enormous 
powers of judges by adopting a consensual procedure that gave parties incentives to 
negotiate (Sharlet et al., 2005: 194; Mizulina, 2006: 785). The new practice was mainly 
modelled on the Italian ‘bargaining as to the punishment’ (Pettegiamento dula pena), and 
has the common procedural elements of most continental European plea bargaining 
practices (Newcombe, 2007). Although the CPC did not mention the phrase ‘plea 
bargaining’, it clearly recognises and legitimises a bargain between the prosecution and the 
defence (Pormoski, 2006: 139). Yet, it is important to state that the features of this model 
are restrictive, as much as they guard strongly against the kind of prosecutorial discretion 
found in other countries. Judges were also left with their powers to accept, reject or amend 
charges (Geintse cited in Semukhina and Reynolds, 2009: 406) 
 
According to Russian procedural laws, the defendant has the choice to either agree entirely 
with the charges against them or go to trial (Semukhina and Reynolds, 2009: 405). 
Therefore, the prosecutor is not allowed to charge for a lesser offence than the one 
committed (Ibid). Where they accept the charges, defendants then file a petition requesting 
a ‘‘special order of court proceeding,’’ in which the judge is authorised to go ahead and pass 
                                                 
58
Art. 123(3) of CPC.  See also Decree of January 14, 2000, which struck out Article. 256(1) and (2) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code. 
 91 
a sentence without a trial, 59 and any penal concession should not be more than two-thirds 
of the maximum sentence allowed for the offence (ibid: 401). Regarding the limit and scope 
of offences to be negotiated, the law only allows for those offences whose original 
punishment does not exceed 10 years, with the exception of juvenile offenders (ibid: 40).  
 
Another feature of the Russian model is that the victim has the powers to consent or reject 
any request for plea bargaining.60 If the victim refused to give his or her consent and the 
prosecution still goes ahead to negotiate with the defendant,, the negotiation becomes 
reversible on appeal (ibid). On appeals generally, a defendant cannot appeal his conviction 
based on ‘factual error’, because in the cause of special court order proceedings, the court is 
not considered to be engaged in fact-finding processes (ibid). 
 
Further entrenching plea bargaining, the Duma in 2009 amended the CPC to the extent that 
a defendant who willingly signs an agreement of cooperation with the police and fulfils the 
agreement will be awarded some concession, and his sentence will not exceed 50 per cent 
of the original maximum sentence allowed for the crime (ibid). Yet, similar to other legal 
reforms that occurred after 2001, there was a great deal of scepticism amongst scholars and 
practitioners on the potential effect of plea bargaining on the Russian criminal justice 
system (Orland, 2002; Rybalov, 2003). This concern became even more widespread 
according to the available data, which shows how plea bargaining is rapidly becoming 
common phenomena in criminal courts across the country (Semukhina and Reynolds, 2009: 
409), suggesting that up to one-third of all criminal cases are dealt with through plea 
bargaining (ibid). But in many ways argued Jara, there is an evidence of retreat to the 
inquisitorial model as defendants can choose to be adjudged based only on the investigative 
file, and the supervisory function of Russian judges has not been completely diluted (2013: 
6). Iovene also argues that the summary trials are slowly becoming more like the traditional 
inquisitorial proceeding that was practiced prior to the introduction of the CPC, as the 
courts now become deeply involved in rigorous investigation of the case, hence resulting in 
long and cumbersome trials, the aftermath of whjch is the resurgence of judicial backlog 
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(2013: 1), which in the first place was among the challenges that plea bargaining was meant 
to remedy. 
 
4.6 China 
With over 700,000 criminal cases filed every year (Lynch, 2009: 68) and an increasing 
number of criminal cases handled by the police (Fu, 2003: 194), the strain on criminal justice 
administration in China is obvious. This exponential year-by-year rise is causing enormous 
cost, and also challenging the efficiency of the justice system (Weidong, 2006: 1). One of the 
primary reasons for this heavy burden is the procedural character of the Chinese criminal 
justice, which requires repeated supplementary investigations, and also the familiar 
situation of witnesses disappearing, causing delays (Tao, 2004: 4; Weidong, 2006: 1). But 
even before the introduction of plea bargaining, China have a prevalent culture of harsh 
interrogation technique with the aim of securing guilty pleas, sometimes awarding leniency 
for those who confess and severe punishment for those who resisted (Cohen, 1966: 503). 
This has historically led to a large number of guilty pleas (Peerenboom, 2008: 858)  
 
In 2003, the Supreme People’s Court acknowledged the widespread practice of simplified 
mode of trial in Chinese courts and agreed to introduce it as a new reform (Gen-ju, 2002: 
28). This was followed by the Supreme People’s Procuracy and the Ministry of Justice issuing 
a joint statement authorising the use of a simplified procedure in criminal cases (Lynch, 
2009: 69). This combination of legal and policy statement marked a defining moment in 
what was to become a fully articulated Chinese model of plea bargaining. Many 
commentators, however, cautioned on the need to set limits to the class of crimes which 
are negotiable (Lynch, 2009: 69). One of the most striking points of this debate was that 
China should not copy a system of justice from the United States (ibid). Many Chinese 
scholars and commentators argued that China must uphold its traditional values of 
proportionality between crime and sanction (Tao, 2004: 4). 
 
The Chinese model of plea bargaining introduced two kinds of practices, i.e., the summary 
procedure (jianyi chengxu), and the simplified procedure (Putong chengxu jianhua shen) 
(Lynch, 2009: 68). While the summary procedure aims at dealing with less serious crimes 
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that attract a prison term of not more than 3 years,61 the simplified procedure, on the other 
hand, is mainly applied to offences that attract a prison term of more than three years (Gen-
ju, 2002: 27). The two practices are all based on negotiated pleas, but restricted to the 
requirement that “the facts are clear, the evidence is sufficient, and the defendant 
confesses” (Lynch, 2009: 68). It is also required that the prosecutor, the defendant, and the 
judge all agree to this method (Gen-ju, 2002: 27).  
 
In practice, the Chinese model of plea bargaining does not mean that all forms of trials are 
suspended. Instead, the practice works in a simple way where parties agree to a negotiated 
settlement, and the prosecutor presents his or her case file case file to the judge for review, 
after which the defendant is then called upon to make a final statement to the judge before 
sentence (ibid: 68). Once a judge consents, no further examination of witnesses or 
verification of evidence is necessary (ibid). The main aim of plea bargaining in China is to 
expedite the disposal of the case. A general exception to both procedures is that they 
cannot be applied to in cases that attract the capital punishment (ibid).   
 
An empirical study by New York University School of Law and the U.S Asia Law institute 
showed that one-fifth to one-third of all criminal cases in China are now disposed of through 
plea bargaining (Lynch, 2009). However, the result of this study points to some defects in 
the system, including the lack of adequate legal representation (Weng, 2002: 36; Lynch, 
2009 69). Weng also pointed out that a major challenge to the application of plea bargaining 
in China, which could be relevant in the context of other nations, especially in the 
developing world, is the lack of adequate defence attorneys (2002: 36). Hence, most 
defendants are left at the mercy of the prosecution and the court. This is a major difficulty 
for defendants who lack any informed advice to either plead guilty or insist on trial (Weng, 
2002: 36). Another problem that was identified was that, while the rule requires the court 
to obtain the defendant's consent before any simplified or summary procedure is applied, 
the courts, in many instances, introduce or suggest such procedure during the hearing itself, 
thereby depriving the defendant of sufficient time to make any informed assessment of his 
situation (Lynch, 2009: 70).  
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Another character of the Chinese criminal justice that poses the risk of inappropriate pleas is 
one that is similar to what is obtained in the US where you have punitive legislations existing 
side by side a system that offers lenient sentence to those who plead guilty. Despite these 
flaws, research has shown that most judges and prosecutors agree that the existence of this 
practice has added a great deal of utility to the justice system, whereas defence lawyers are 
divided on whether it is a positive development or not (Lynch, 2009: 20). But beyond this 
utilitarian argument, most judges also admitted that the process is more concerned with 
efficiency than with the delivery of justice (ibid). What is apparent is that the introduction of 
plea bargaining in China has ushered in a new paradigm into a system that was traditionally 
based on a socialist model of criminal justice. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
A close examination of the different jurisdictions discussed reveals how contemporary 
reforms in criminal justice across the world have resulted in hybridisation of both common 
law and civil procedures. One of the major outcomes of these changes is the way the 
orthodox approach of subjecting every criminal case to a full trial is diminishing, replaced 
mainly by a system of plea bargaining. The growth in the practice of plea bargaining, 
especially in civil law systems, is further evidence of how emerging criminal justice policies 
represent a radical departure from the old priorities.  
 
The comparative evidence of these developments across regimes also reveals that the 
system of plea bargaining is mostly a product of routine practice among legal practitioners 
and not one that necessarily began as a response to clearly defined problems. It is, for most 
part a product of convenience that also became a tool to manage caseload. Over time, each 
legal system accepted the concept and developed its own model based on its priorities and 
legal culture. Yet, one thing that remains clear is the way plea bargaining changes the face 
of criminal procedure. 
 
Evidence also reveals that the procedural laws enacted to govern plea bargaining often 
differ between different jurisdictions. For example, most civil law regimes set limits to the 
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kind of offences allowed to be negotiated, and judges still have much stake in the process 
compared to common law. Contrary to some theoretical approaches, evidence also shows 
that both in the civil and the common law areas, it is the parties that mostly define how a 
plea negotiation is achieved. This perhaps is because the system mostly operates in a 
private fashion and consists of all kinds of compromises and trade-offs. Owing to these 
challenges and inconsistencies, legal regimes such as Russia have imposed strict regulations 
on the extent of sentence concession and on the powers, that each of the parties is 
permitted to exercise. What is also evident is that despite the flaws and criticisms that often 
follows the application of plea bargaining, policy makers have shown willingness to 
integrate the system into their criminal law statutes. The system has proven time and again 
to be attractive even in the face of a tradition of ‘legality principles’.  
 
As plea bargaining continues its global reach, a constellation of factors has also continued to 
influence its development. These include factors such as punitive legislations, the need for 
efficiency, the idea of managerialism, cost and other socio-legal elements that have 
historically affected criminal justice reforms.  
 
Although each jurisdiction has its own motive for introducing plea bargaining, a common 
feature of these regimes is the way the system has reshaped the procedural characters of 
each regime. It was seen for example how the system leads to either a concentration of 
powers in the hands of the the prosecution in which case such powers are likely to be 
abused, or the abdication of such powers by the judge, which makes the search for truth 
even more difficult. The most obvious tension in all of these is in trying to reconcile between 
long-standing values and a new transplant. This is often the complex choice that had to be 
made between those who support plea bargaining and those oppose to it. As Jung pointed 
out, what at first seemed only like a mechanism for a more streamlined channelling of 
complex cases and a heavy caseload, “on the second sight, hint(s) at a new attitude and 
position as regards the relationship between the state, society and the individual” (1997: 
122).  
 
A careful study of the different regimes also reveals how rules are constantly reviewed and 
guidelines issued, which is indicative of the wariness of allowing an unchecked system of 
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plea bargaining. This also suggests that there is a clear concern about the way plea 
bargaining clashes with some of the fundamental values of process rights and human rights. 
For example, most civil law regimes are apprehensive of the idea that a prosecutor may 
choose freely whom to prosecute and who not to. Hence, the degree of limitation and 
judicial control often imposed. Other safeguards are found in jurisdictions whose model 
includes the consent of the victim as a way of adding transparency and quality to the 
process, and also a way of reducing the common suspicion of a deep compromise by the 
prosecution i.e., in Germany and Russia. 
 
What is also common is the kind of power imbalance that plea bargaining results in, 
especially in common law. This becomes even more concerning owing to the fact that plea 
bargaining everywhere is a system that allows conviction without a trial. In this context, one 
is tempted to look more closely at the German model, which is hedged with more 
safeguards, as it provides the basic platforms upon which the prosecution, defendant, and 
the victim all have the opportunity to influence and agree on how these negotiations take 
place. Similarly, it has allowed the right to appeal, which in itself is a guarantee that errors 
will be revisited and amended. Perhaps, it is impossible to have a universal standard 
procedure of plea bargaining, giving the fact that every legal regime is rooted in a distinct 
socio-political foundation, with different socio-legal priorities. These were among the 
reasons why in all jurisdictions, including Nigeria, plea bargaining has resulted in polarised 
opinions among scholars as well as practitioners.  Yet, neither the strength of criticism nor 
the evidence of how the system has affected process rights was enough to reverse this 
trend of negotiating with offenders. Since it first emerged, plea bargaining has shown 
resilience by transcending it traditional boundaries of common law, it has also found its way 
as an integral part of the legal system of many countries across the world.  
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Chapter Five 
Critique of plea bargaining. 
5.0 Introduction 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the past four decades has seen the expansion of plea 
bargaining around the world. What used to be an informal and unregulated practice, has 
been transformed into a legislatively sanctioned procedure. Yet, the controversy that 
greeted plea bargaining since it first came to attention has remained as intense as ever 
(Blumberg, 1967; Alschuler, 1968; Casper, 1972; Kipnis, 1976; Langbein, 1992; Schulhofer, 
1992; O'Hear, 2007; Burke, 2007). One of the major reasons for opposing this system is the 
perception that the process has very little respect for process rights. Alschuler, for example, 
has maintained that plea bargaining undermines the structure of criminal justice by shifting 
the process of determining sanctions out of the courtroom into informal channels and 
arrangements (1979: 32). Because the process lacks transparency, argued Binder, it thrives 
on institutional conditions utterly inconsistent with the interest of the society (2002: 348).  
 
Other scholars argue that the system as neither serving the goals of retribution nor deters 
or rehabilitates offenders (Stitt and Chaires 1992: 72-74). It is simply a process synonymous 
with the ‘commodification of justice’, turning legal sanctions into negotiable instruments to 
be bargained and discounted, the outcome of which has been the flagrant dilution of the 
social fabric of justice (ibid: 72-74). A Texas judge once referred to plea bargaining as a 
process that “inevitably produces the ridiculous result that, as crime grows worse, 
sentencing becomes more lenient” (Callan, 1979: 327). Kassing and Wrightsman claim that 
plea bargaining condones practices contrary to these legal requirements of freedom from 
coercion, transparency and other values of due process (1981: 490).62 For the process to be 
legitimate argues Binder, it must not only submit to procedural checks of an independent 
court but also the political check provided by a democratic public (2002: 330). 
 
Another wider implication of plea bargaining is that the insistence on trial by the accused 
has become a less condonable conduct capable of attracting heavier sanctions. Ashworth 
referred to this paradox saying that, if the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right, 
then it is wrong that the exercise of this right by someone who is convicted at trial should 
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result in a sentence that is higher than would have been if he pleaded guilty (1998: 288). 
Proponents, on the other hand, defend plea bargaining as a form of consensual agreement 
where individuals accept an offer for plea bargaining on their own volition. (Bar-Gill and 
Gazal 2006: 2). Similarly, ‘contractarian’ theorists suggest that a concluded bargain benefits 
all parties as “it both saves judicial resources and makes all participants better off than they 
would be if they had taken the risk of losing at trial” (Zacharias, 1997: 1138).  
 
Although plea bargaining is a system that has been criticised from different perspectives, it 
is crucial for this thesis to examine these issues and further relate them to the debates on 
the emergence and application in Nigeria. Hence, relevance will be given to those areas that 
define the issues which made plea bargaining possible in Nigeria and those that generate 
criticism. The chapter begins by looking at the general idea of bureaucratisation of criminal 
justice. This leads to further discussions on specific aspects relevant to this research, which 
include the claims of forced guilty pleas and those relating to inconsistent sentencing 
practices as well issues that touch on the legitimacy of shifting criminal procedure from 
open courts to private or informal channels. The chapter will critically examine these issues 
from both theoretical and empirical standpoints. 
 
5.1 Bureaucratization of criminal justice procedure 
Conventional trials are broadly referred to as the means for a free and fair criminal 
procedure (Skolnick, 2011). Likewise, the culture of a transparent process before an 
independent judge along with the guarantees of subjecting evidence to intense scrutiny has 
been the foremost argument of proponents of procedural justice. Although plea bargaining 
has often rejected the technicalities of criminal justice procedure, these procedures, 
according to Vogler (2005), are the bedrock of human rights. These elements of perceived 
due process, which also include the presumption of innocence and freedom from coercion, 
are often postulated as fundamental components that ensure fairness and safeguard the 
rights of all parties (ibid). Commenting on the significance of these values, Justice Felix 
qualified them as a necessary compendious expression for all those rights that must be 
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enforced in criminal justice of all free societies.63 These values also collectively constitute 
what scholars such as Amann termed as ‘constitutional criminal procedure’, which operates 
within the framework of clearly defined procedural codes of legality, consistency, and 
equality (2000: 814). Other general principles in this realm include the principle that accused 
persons must not be subjected to secret trials, the essence of which is to foster fairness and 
truth in the administration of justice by opening legal proceedings to public scrutiny 
(Bassiouni, 1992: 267).    
 
The advent of plea bargaining is seen by opponents as a challenge to the core values of 
criminal justice. Instead of promoting rights, it is seen as a system that introduced 
bureaucratic ethos which allow criminal cases to be decided privately between parties using 
the mechanism of charges, or sentences discount while avoiding clear and open 
adjudication. Opponents further argue that even if criminal justice is hungry for reform, plea 
bargaining is not the best alternative (Alschuler, 1968: 71). They also condemn the notion 
that plea bargaining has the advantage of flexibility that trials do not have, stating that 
“flexibility is an advantage that all lawless systems exhibit in comparison with systems of 
administering justice by rules” (ibid). It is also criticised as an unfair process that tends to 
determine a criminal case “without full investigation, without testimony and evidence and 
impartial fact-finding” (ibid). Others condemned plea bargaining as an ‘anti adversary’ 
method that accommodates unrestrained discretion that often affects the “accurate 
separation of the guilty from the innocent” (Schulhofer, 1979: 1979).  
 
For the most part, plea bargaining is seen as a bureaucratic procedure in which the court 
seldom functions as an organ of the state that inquires into the facts and applies legal rules 
to what really happened. Instead, it sits simply to pass sentence (Lynch, 2014: 1676). This is 
because, in contrast to the traditional principles of criminal justice, plea bargaining allows 
parties to agree jointly to some compromise prior to trial or outside the court, and then 
choose the information they want to put forth, or the one they think is relevant to what 
they want to achieve. In the end, the dispute is settled in any way they see fit and not 
necessarily based on the strength of facts and evidence (ibid: 1677). Hence, as Lynch further 
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argues, the court ceases to be “an independent engine for state administration of justice,” 
but rather plays the simple role of arbitrator. The implication of this is “because our 
governing ideology does not admit that prosecutors adjudicate guilt and set punishments, 
the procedures by which they do so are neither formally regulated nor invariably followed 
(ibid: 1680). In most cases argued Scott and Stuntz, the courts award sentences “because of 
what prosecutors and defence lawyers do not say at sentencing (1992: 1912). Hence, the 
sentencing hearing seems rigged to support the deal that the two attorneys have already 
struck” (ibid). It is, therefore, a system that is seen as clearly shifting criminal justice process 
from adversarial practice to an administrative one, often affecting the “rigorous 
subsumption of the true facts to their statutory criminal elements, as a guarantee of the 
equal enforcement of the law” (Thaman, 2010: XVIII).  
 
However, it was noted that any administrative process depends largely on the defendant’s 
willingness not to insist on trial (Lynch, 2014: 1680). Vogler and Jokhadze also pointed out 
that the pressure to plead guilty often comes from “avaricious and overcommitted defence 
lawyers, incompetent trial lawyers, lawyers anxious about their success rate or simply those 
lawyers wishing to curry favour with their opponents or the court” (2011: 29). Yet, in 
contrast to the general rules of criminal procedure, the bureaucratic elements of plea 
bargaining have obviously created a system where the defendant is expected to argue his 
case and even evidence with the prosecution and outside the court in order to have a have 
a better deal in the negotiation (Lynch, 2014: 1680). 
 
Another consequence of administering criminal justice through negotiations is that the 
accused is often regarded as factually guilty and therefore expected to plead without 
objection (Mcconville cited in Rauxloh, 2012: 53). Consequently, the prosecution assumes 
the role of adjudicating as well as setting punishments (Lynch, 1997: 2124-2130). Hence, 
Blumberg characterised plea bargaining as "a contrived, synthetic, and perfunctory 
substitute for real justice” (1974: 29). As part of his comprehensive and sustained attack on 
plea bargaining Alschuler said: 
 
The practice of plea bargaining is inconsistent with the principle that a decent 
society should want to hear what an accused person might say in his defense-and 
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with constitutional guarantees that embody this principle and other professed ideals 
for the resolution of criminal disputes. Moreover, plea bargaining has undercut the 
goals of legal doctrines as diverse as the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the 
insanity defense, the right of confrontation, the defendant's right to attend criminal 
proceedings, and the recently announced right of the press and the public to observe 
the administration of criminal justice (1983: 933-934). 
 
Some scholars suggest that the structural and procedural underpinnings of most plea 
negotiations are so skewed that they impede the opportunity for parties to either enjoy a 
transparent public trial or even demand further scrutiny or review of their case or evidence. 
The bureaucratic nature of this system also leads to situations where the prosecutor and the 
defence attorney become commonly bound in the quest for organisational convenience 
rather that their moral responsibility of ensuring justice (Feeley, 1982: 3). Other scholars 
view plea bargaining as a process synonymous to, “exchange of official concession for a 
defendant’s act of self-conviction” (Alschuler, 1979: 3). Part of this is because of the way 
that even the defence counsel becomes a party prone to making “bland assurances, and in 
effect manipulates his client, who is usually willing to do and say the things, true or not, 
which will help his attorney extricate him” (Blumberg, 1967: 29). These criticisms become 
possible because characteristically, plea bargaining entails deals made for a variety of 
reasons that do not necessarily fall within accepted standards of legal procedure (Wright 
and Miller, 2002: 34).   
 
Easterbrook, however, contends that a bargain between a defendant and the state, 
approved and enforced by a court should not be simply condemned as unfair or unregulated 
(1992: 1976). Not only is the practice of plea bargaining a rejection of the rigours of trials, 
but it is also evident that it is a system used across the world to deal with the challenges 
brought by overcrowded dockets and the complexity of certain criminal cases whose 
character cannot be easily proved through a full trial. Therefore, argues Palermo et al., plea 
negotiations should not simply be rejected on the grounds that only trials are a 
manifestation of justice (1998: 119). What cannot be disputed, however, is the procedural 
contrast between plea bargaining and trial. The latter is premised on the principle that 
“factual guilt does not replace legal guilt as the test to determine whether someone should 
be convicted of the offence charged” (Rauxloh, 2012: 53). Plea bargaining, on the other 
hand, involves agreements that mostly occur in “the prosecutor's or defence attorney's 
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offices, the judge's chambers, in the corridor outside the courtroom, or over lunch in a local 
restaurant” (Cloyd, 1979: 454). The finality of the process is often found in the willingness of 
the defendant to cooperate with the State in pleading guilty without a trial (ibid). Even when 
plea negotiation attempts to take on the character of conventional trials, there is often the 
potential for significant power imbalance between the prosecutor and defendant that 
naturally makes adversariness difficult (O’Hear, 2007: 424). In the sense that unlike 
conventional trials where the defendant presents his defence in an open court and is 
allowed to challenge every evidence presented by the prosecution, plea bargaining is by its 
character an out-of-court process. In the end, argues Justice Charles Levin, the system 
descends into a charade based on the willingness of administrators to reduce the standards 
of justice in order to fulfil certain objectives (cited in Alschuler, 1983: 931).  
 
Yet, proponents maintained that the debate on plea bargaining should be pragmatic enough 
to admit that “the opportunity for adversariness has expanded in direct proportion to, and 
perhaps as a result of, the growth of plea bargaining” (Feeley, 1982: 338). Gentile, for 
instance, argues that the practice does not affect adversariness, but the dynamics of the 
adversarial system (1969: 523). This argument suggests that plea bargaining only alters the 
role of the parties, but the ultimate choice of accepting a plea deal still lies with the 
defendant (ibid). Hence, negotiation is an indication of the strength of the adversarial 
criminal justice system that is undergoing a new phase of reform and readjustment (Feeley, 
1982: 338-345). Even if the criminal justice system has the capacity to try every case, argues 
Douglas, “conviction without trial will continue to be a necessary and proper part of the 
administration of criminal justice” (1988: 266). Other proponents insist that the 
imperfection of plea bargaining is only a reflection of the imperfection of an anticipated trial 
(Easterbrook, 1992: 1976). Vogler and Jokhadze also argue that the justification for the 
acceptance of plea bargaining by most institutions and courts is based on the notion that 
the principles of due process are mainly concerned with the prohibition of coercion rather 
than voluntariness of parties to cooperate with authorities (2011: 24). Yet, they cautioned 
that for plea bargaining to be successful, it must be accompanied by due process safeguards 
(ibid: 25). Rejecting the idea of plea deals, A Federal judge once said: 
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(T)o me, the essence of this practice, and what radically distinguishes it from the 
adversarial litigation model embodied in textbooks, criminal procedure rules, and 
the popular imagination, is that the prosecutor, rather than a judge or jury, is the 
central adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the judge as arbiter of most legal 
issues and of the appropriate sentence to be imposed) (cited in Lynch, 2003: 1403-
1404).  
 
 
Other critics such as Stitt and Chaires argue that plea bargaining is a practice that annihilates 
the possibility of procedural safeguards because the way it operates resembles some form 
of commercial contract in which the sentence becomes a negotiable instrument (1992: 72-
74). It is important, however, to assert that there are clear distinctions between commercial 
contract and plea bargaining. As Easterbrook pointed out, courts do not enforce the 
promise to plead guilty in the future, whereas, the principle of an ‘executory contract’ is an 
integral part of contract law (Easterbrook, 1992: 1975).  Again, judges who do not take part 
in the plea negotiation often set the price (punishment), whereas, in all commercial 
contracts, the price is a matter of prerogative to be decided by the parties in the course of 
the agreement (ibid).  
 
Plea bargaining by its character leads to situations where the defendant surrenders most of 
the rights enshrined in the principle of adversariality, i.e., the right to cross-examine 
witnesses and scrutinise evidence and the privilege against self-incrimination (Ross, 2006: 
720).64 Hence, it becomes prone to abuses and unethical conducts, sometimes degenerating 
into a process that is driven by convenience instead of the will to do justice. Most 
importantly, bureaucracy and adjudication should not be merged into one single 
conglomerate, so also, the question of guilt and innocence must not be viewed as 
subcategories of each other (Alschuler, 1968: 111). 
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5.2 Elements of threat, coercion and undue influence 
Scholars across all the jurisdictions studied in this thesis have continued to debate on the 
subject of coercion and threat in criminal justice (Kipnis, 1976; Leo, 1992; Pollock, 2014; 
Baswell et al., 2014). Newman and Weitz argued, “where that most precious of all elements 
‘Free will’ is stolen, the law hastened to erect its doctrine of duress to mark the larceny” 
(1956: 313). Also, the general rule of criminal responsibility is that an act is done without 
compulsion, that if a person commits any act under compulsion, responsibility for such act 
cannot be ascribed to him or her as his or her willingness becomes a question of both fact 
and law (ibid). These are important principles that no criminal law or statute should fail to 
recognize. 
 
In relation to the prevalence of threat and coercion in plea bargaining, the debate often 
originates from the broad range of discretionary powers of the prosecution. Studies, 
especially in the US where plea bargaining is most practiced indicates that threats are 
common mechanisms of manipulation used in securing guilty pleas (Alschuler, 1968: 60-61). 
Gersham for instance argues that the enormous discretionary powers exercised by officials, 
especially prosecutors, has given rise to situations where they have the freehand to decide 
“whom to charge, what charges to bring, whether to permit a defendant to plead guilty and 
whether to confer immunity” (cited in Stitt and Chaires, 1993: 72). In other instances, they 
unilaterally fit in certain kinds of charges which they deemed appropriate, to different kinds 
of offences, or fit into similar offences, different kinds of charges (Ma, 2002: 22).  
 
Prosecutors have also been accused of threatening defendants with the choice between 
pleading guilty to a reduced charge/sentence, or going to trial to risk the full rigour of the 
law (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 2004: 43). This practice according to Langbein is immoral as it 
subjects the accused to fear and to condemnation without proper adjudication (1979: 204). 
He equated the practice to the medieval method of extracting a confession through torture 
saying, “there is, of course, a difference between having your limbs crushed if you refuse to 
confess, and suffering some extra years of imprisonment if you refuse to confess, but the 
difference is of degree, not kind. Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive” (Langbein, 1978: 
12-13). Langer, however, contends that despite these discretionary powers, most 
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negotiations are achieved not by threat but by the weight of evidence available to the state 
(2005: 251). Hence, when properly exercised, plea bargaining is a method that facilitates 
rather than hinder the process of justice (Ma, 2002: 22). These kinds of arguments on 
whether it is threat or the strength of evidence that leads to a concluded plea bargaining 
appears to remain unresolved not because they are contradictory, but because of the 
nature of the institution of plea bargaining which has established for itself a reputation for 
condoning informal and out of court agreements that are not always transparent. Hence, 
the character of each individual case and how a plea was agreed is often difficult to know. 
This has caused scholars to theorise these complexities by identifying some of the major 
factors that lead to a concluded bargain, of which strength of evidence is one and 
threatening the defendant is another. An important principle that must be taken into 
account is that, whether through the exercise of discretion or otherwise, the principles of 
criminal justice forbid any form of threat and coercion? The overwhelming answer to this 
question is that when an individual is coerced to accept culpability, the whole process 
becomes prejudicial to the rights of such individual and may lead to wrongful convictions 
(Bar-Gill and Gazal, 2004: 1).  
 
While legislation and guidelines have been enacted in many jurisdictions to discourage 
putting the defendant under pressure, these legal measures are limited and “some of the 
traditional anti-duress measures may not do much to redress their misfortune…it might 
often be better for these coerced individuals if such anti-duress measures would not be 
applied at all” (Gazal and Ben-Shahar, 2004: 1). This counter-intuitive position of Gazal and 
Ben-Shahar is based on the theory of ‘Credible Coercion’, which suggests that “if the threat 
were to be turned down, it would be in the interest of the threatening party to carry out the 
threat, rather than retreat” (ibid). Although in principle there are other traditional 
safeguards such as ‘allocution procedure’, during which the court puts questions to the 
accused in order to ascertain their voluntariness, evidence has shown that in most cases of 
plea bargaining, the courts focus more on the form of the plea rather than its substance 
(McConville, 1998: 569). Some critics, therefore, see even the process of allocution65 as a 
way of legitimating the accused’s plea rather than a means of inquiry (ibid).  
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Another common practice is the mis-presentation or exaggeration of evidence. This 
technique is often used as form of intimidation to threaten the accused with a harsh penalty 
at trial and with leniency for pleading guilty (Turner, 2006: 206). The implication of this is 
that plea bargaining is presented to the defendant as the only reliable means to avoid a 
punitive sentence, which in the end allows the prosecutor to effectively dictate the terms of 
the negotiation, leaving the defence with fewer options than to plead guilty (O’Hear, 2007: 
425). This controversial character of plea bargaining has essentially turned the prosecutor 
into an agent of the state whose primary role is to ensure a guilty plea at all cost. It also 
undermines the moral responsibilities of him or her as a servant of the law whose duty is to 
ensure that the guilty does not escape, and the innocent does not suffer.66  
 
The controversial nature of prosecutorial powers and their potential misuse was revealed in 
an empirical study by Caldwell (2011), where he showed how prosecutors engage in the 
noxious behaviour of overcharging defendants in order to pressure them into accepting a 
plea bargain. 67 He identified the prevalence of this kind of behaviour, which he categorised 
as ‘the horizontal’ and ‘the vertical’ overcharging technique (ibid: 85).68 Easterbrook, 
however, contends that the practice of setting high offers is mainly for the guilty, as for the 
innocent, such offers will often be rejected in the hope that an acquittal at trial is imminent 
(1992: 1969).  Yet, short of open admissions of guilt by the defendant, the prosecution will 
not always know, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant is, in fact, guilty (Caldwell, 
2011: 72). Hence, one is bound to disagree with Easterbrook in the face of empirical 
evidence that suggests that plea bargaining is associated with coercive practices in framing 
charges. As unethical and misleading as these practices are, evidence further suggests that 
they are amongst the key factors that make plea bargaining work effectively, especially in 
relation to the risk-averse defendant, often resulting in inaccuracy and wrongful convictions 
(Bar-Gill and Gazal, 2004: 1). Yet, some proponents maintain that such conducts do not arise 
because of the enthusiasm of the prosecutor to obtain a conviction, but because the 
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innocent may sometimes appear guilty (Easterbrook, 1992: 1971). Therefore, what disrupts 
the separation of the guilty from the innocent should not be seen as only a flaw in a 
bargaining process, but also a flaw that is common with trials (ibid). A further claim was that 
most prosecutors are well aware that charging the innocent is a poor choice because such 
persons are likely to fight in trial and earn an acquittal (ibid). These argument, however, do 
not take away the bad reputation of coerced pleas. It is therefore important not to ignore 
the use of discretionary powers, especially where officials unfairly decide which law to 
enforce and which to disregard.  
 
Although some studies have attempted to discredit the argument that innocent people 
plead guilty due to obnoxious behaviours of officials (Radelet et al., 1992), a recent work by 
Rakoff et al., (2014) demonstrated that the case of innocent defendants pleading guilty is a 
widespread problem in plea bargaining. They cited other similar examples of the disturbing 
frequency of this problem, particularly the records of the US National Registry of 
Exonerations,69 which indicates that of the 1,428 legally acknowledged exonerations that 
have occurred since 1989 involving the full range of felony charges, 151 (or, again, about 10 
per cent) involved false guilty pleas (ibid). In allegations that attract capital punishment, 
empirical studies have long demonstrated evidence to suggest that innocent defendants 
often plead guilty to avoid the death penalty (ibid). Similar findings by Gross (1996) have 
shown that in allegations of offences that attract the death penalty, prosecutors use the 
threat of full sentence at trial to secure a guilty plea. Erhdhard (2008) also revealed the 
consensus among prosecuting and defence attorneys that intimidation with a potential 
death penalty for capital offences is a strong impetus that puts the prosecutor in a unique 
position of power and advantage (ibid: 316-317). Perhaps, this critique cannot be 
generalised because capital punishment is no longer universal.  
 
Other scholars, however, argue that it is not in the prosecutor's best interest to engage in 
coercing the innocent because “every conviction of an innocent person undermines 
deterrence by reducing the marginal punishment of the guilty, and thus injures the 
prosecutor” (Easterbrook, 1992: 1971). Notwithstanding these arguments, the advantages 
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that guilty plea confers makes it very likely that officials might act inappropriately to secure 
the defendant's plea (Standen, 1993: 1501). Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2004), however, 
contend that the only fault-line in respect of prosecutorial coercion is when such threats are 
not credible (ibid: 44). Where the evidence against the accused is strong, cogent and 
verifiable, then such a threat is not only credible, it is in fact to the advantage of the 
accused, because a trial will indeed result in a heavier sentence (ibid). Bibas also argues that 
by threatening to go to trial, the prosecution is only assuring that he or she will exercise 
legislatively authorised powers (2003: 1427). Any assumed unfairness occurs only where the 
prosecutor uses disproportionate offers or false claims as a means of circumventing weak or 
difficult cases (Gentile, 1969: 550) But it could be argued that overcharging or fraudulently 
misrepresenting evidence contradict the essential principles of justice. Scott and Stuntz also 
argued that as long as post-trial sentencing was not manipulated by the prosecution, 
“coercion in the sense of few and unpalatable choices does not necessarily negate voluntary 
choice,” and neither does a large sentencing discount (1992: 1920-1921). This line of 
argument is also weak on the ground that, coercion and threat, in all forms, affect 
voluntariness; negate the values of a fair deal, and leads to imposition rather than free 
choice. There is no doubt an accused always has the option to insist on a trial, but the 
problem is that he or she may not always know whether the threat is genuine or not, as the 
bulk of evidence or the absence of it is often held by officials. Justice Stevens of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court summed up the inappropriateness of coercion saying:  
 
A prosecutor should not act as a partisan eager to convict, but as an office of the 
court, whose duty it is to aid in arriving at the truth in every case… His object, like 
that of the court, would be simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to any 
pride of professional success. And, however strong may be his belief of the 
prisoner’s guilt, he must remember that, though unfair means may happen to result 
in doing justice to the prisoner in the particular case, yet justice so attained is unjust 
and dangerous to the whole community.70  
 
There has been a number of proposals on how to remedy these undesirable aspects of plea 
bargaining. Bibas, for instance, advocated the full involvement of defence counsel so that 
facts and evidence could be evaluated by a professional on behalf of their clients (2004: 
2531). Others suggested that rules should be implemented to require some organisational 
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review of the facts at an early stage before the prosecutor formulates any charges (ibid).71 
The problem here is that internal organisational oversight often involves members of the 
same organisation and, therefore, lacks the necessary objectivity (Caldwell, 2011: 90). 
Furthermore, where such oversight becomes firm and objective, it has a tendency to result 
in confrontational outcomes as members of the organisation may likely be pitched against 
each other (ibid). 
 
Other critics called for a system of plea bargaining that should only emphasise on sentence 
bargain (Alschuler, 1976: 1137). Where charge bargaining becomes necessary it “should be 
used only as an incident to ‘sentence bargaining’ in situations in which the sentence that 
seems appropriate cannot be imposed without an adjustment of the charge” (ibid). This idea 
is premised on the notion that, if the sentence is not determined by the charge but by 
evidence, it will technically restrict prosecutors to filing only appropriate charges (ibid). But 
even with these kinds of measures, nothing stops prosecutors from filing excessive charges, 
and in the fear of testing evidence at trial, defendants will continue pleading guilty to lesser 
charges in spite of the weakness of evidence (Caldwell, 2011: 86). Therefore, he contends, it 
is only when the justice system is trial centred, that a prosecutor will have less reason to file 
charges that he does not intend to pursue, or that which cannot secure a conviction (ibid: 
84).  
 
Coercion also touches on the principle of individual liberty and human rights.72 Hence, 
courts have consistently emphasised the essence of voluntariness, with some going to the 
extent of declaring any plea deal induced by threat as void.73 It is indeed important to state 
the common regulations contained in most plea bargaining guidelines of different legal 
regimes in which voluntariness is cardinal to the outcome of any plea bargain. Paradoxically, 
studies have shown that because negotiations promote judicial economy and procedural 
efficiency among other things, judges are often reluctant to venture into the arena of 
testing the fairness of an already concluded deal (Fisher, 2000: 1039; Turner, 2006: 206; 
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Caldwell, 2011: 71). The knowledge of this lack of judicial scrutiny is also among the reasons 
prosecutors use skewed tactics and undue pressure on defendants (ibid: 84). Moreover, in 
jurisdictions where prosecutors have strong political affiliations, especially where they are 
elected,74 they may choose to prioritise the securing of convictions as a means of boosting 
their reputation and their future political prospects (Alschuler, 1968: 106).  
 
To address some of the problems of coercion and compromises inherent in plea bargaining, 
some scholars think judicial participation should be encouraged in order to “balance the 
normative obligation of neutrality with the bureaucratic demand for efficiency” (Lee, 2005: 
33). Although some critics argue that judicial involvement slows plea bargaining, it is also 
important to note that the quest for expediency, no matter how important, should not 
compromise the rights of parties to obtain justice (Langer, 2005: 250). Striking a balance 
between the two i.e., ‘due process’ and ‘efficiency’, it is safe to argue that even when 
ensuring due process, efficiency can still be achieved, especially if the system avoids 
unnecessary legal technicalities and relies mainly on the substance of a case. Moreover, it is 
important to stress that the legitimacy of any criminal justice system is that it does not 
compromise procedural justice for the sake of efficiency and cost. Furthermore, if plea 
bargaining becomes inevitable, defendants unsatisfied with the decision should be able to 
request a new hearing or go on appeal. This knowledge by the prosecution and the 
defendant of other legal alternatives is an important reform for the institution of plea 
bargaining. 
 
5.3 Inconsistent sentencing 
One of the most important theoretical attempts to explain penal inconsistency in criminal 
justice was the ‘conflict theory’, which attributes sentencing variation to the power relation 
inherent in class societies. The theory demonstrates that the most severe sanctions are 
often imposed on persons in the lowest social class (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971: 475). 
Although this theory has generated a great deal of interest, critics maintain that the 
evidence put forward “consistently fails to support the expectations of conflict 
                                                 
74
 In the United States, the office of the prosecutor, mostly referred as the District Attorney could either be an 
elected or appointed official. Depending on the jurisdiction, district attorneys may an appointee of the chief 
executive or elected by the voters. 
 111 
criminologists with regard to the state's sanctioning machinery” (Chirico and Waldo, 1975: 
769). They further argue that even ‘conflict criminology’ does not necessarily have the 
capacity to give a clear perspective on the many variables that create inconsistencies in the 
criminal justice process because “conflict does no better than traditional perspectives in 
criminology” (ibid). What these arguments demonstrate is that scholars, especially in the 
field of criminology have made attempts to explain the causes of inconsistent sentencing in 
criminal justice. Even though a number of theories have been debated, each of the theories 
seemed to come under criticism. In the context of plea bargaining, there are other theories 
that have attempted to give a better perspective on this debate. 
 
 Attempts to explain sentencing inconsistency was also one expressed in ‘labelling theory’, 
which sees the bias and inconsistency in sentencing as mainly caused by the response to the 
accused as deviant. Although this view of subconscious bias has not suffered as much hostile 
criticism as conflict theory, scholars such as Tittie (1975) and Gove (1975) have insisted that 
empirical evidence has failed to provide cogent support for this perspective (Bernstein et al., 
1977: 362). Yet, in an attempt to balance the dynamics of these arguments, Maynard 
pointed out that, depending on the stage of the process and the kind of variables examined, 
each has different and contradictory effects that often do not explain much of the 
discrepancy in sentencing outcomes (1982: 348-349). This argument supports the position 
of many scholars of plea bargaining, who argue that inconsistency in sentencing outcomes is 
as a result of many factors. They include the choices that different prosecutors make and 
how much they are willing to compromise. It also includes the nature of the defendant the 
ability of his or her legal representative to negotiate for the best possible outcome. As will 
be seen in the later part of this study, empirical evidence has shown how the rich and 
powerful who can afford the best lawyers are often more likely to get large sentence 
discount than the poor defendant. What is perhaps common is that plea bargaining has a 
reputation for awarding a different kind of sentences to the same kinds of offences (Davies, 
1970; Langbein, 1979; Chilton, 1991; Zander et al., 1993; Mcconville, 1998). This 
inconsistency is so unpredictable that for the rich, plea bargaining could be a way to escape 
justice and for the poor, it could result in situations where they are coerced and threatened 
to admit guilt. As some scholars argue, it is common for defendants to come under pressure 
to plead guilty (Baldwin and Mcconville, 1979: 296). A study by Wright (2005) reveals how 
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jurisdictions like the US, which has a high number of cases treated in this skewed method 
have a lower rate of acquittal and a higher rate of guilty pleas. The study also shows how a 
large number of defendants are attracted to abandon what could have been meritorious 
trial that could have led to acquittal because they have been awarded a sentencing discount 
that is far less consistent with the allegation (ibid). However, comparing the nature of 
sentencing between guilty pleas and conventional trials is a complex undertaking, as the 
two practices “represent different processes to which defendants are nonrandomly 
assigned” (LaFree, 1985: 291). Instead, each of the two processes has a different way of 
dealing with a criminal matter i.e., plea bargaining is based on negotiated settlement while 
conventional trials are based on the rigorous argument on facts and evidence in open 
courts. Evidence by LaFree suggests that defendants’ insistence on trial may get a defendant 
acquitted for offence that he might have been convicted if he or she pleads guilty (ibid). 
 
Proponents of plea bargaining, on the other hand, stressed that the defendant who helps in 
the expeditious disposal of his case also saves time and resources and, therefore, deserves 
to be rewarded.75 In the words of one Chicago judge, “defendants who waste taxpayer’s 
money and the court's time deserve more time in jail” (cited in Samaha, 2005: 348). This 
notion, which is inherently driven by an economic way of thinking is clearly inconsistent with 
traditional expressions of legal rationality because it invariably turns ‘cost’ into an ethical 
phenomenon, the waste of which is deemed punishable (McConville, 1998: 578). But 
according to Lynch, implying that guilt and sentence are determined by some form of 
mercantile bartering is wrong, stressing, “the process of negotiating pleas, in my experience, 
is not accurately regarded as one of ‘bargaining’, if by that one imagines some simplistic 
model of haggling over prices” (2002: 1403). 
Other scholars such as Wright and Miller have cautioned over discounting sentence solely 
for defendant's cooperation (2002: 33). They pointed to how this approach inadvertently 
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sends a symbolic message to the defendant of being ‘rewarded’ instead of being punished 
(ibid). In the end, it affects the victims’ understanding of justice and retribution, and makes 
the public sceptical of the system, especially where they observe an unexplained leniency 
that suggests a compromise (ibid). Scott and Stuntz also stressed that the allocation of a 
criminal sentence through what looks like “a street bazaar” has proved unappealing to most 
observers (1992: 1912). They point to the “seeming hypocrisy of using an elaborate trial 
process as window dressing while doing all the real business of the system through the most 
unelaborate process imaginable” (Ibid). Commenting on the inherent problem of this kind of 
sentencing culture, Felekens (1976) states: 
If the great majority of plea agreements are successful in handling accused persons 
justly and swiftly, as proponents of the practice suggest, it is a useful and acceptable 
pattern of prosecutorial behaviour. However, as long as it remains a process with all 
the possibilities of dealing with accused persons unequally in order to achieve self-
serving goals, plea negotiations will not be recognized as a proper and useful 
procedure in the criminal law” (134-135). 
This argument by Felkens relates to the series of evidence that show how plea bargaining 
presents inconsistency in the criminal justice system due to reasons that include the 
prosecutors attitude of coercion and threat, unequal treatment of offenders based on the 
bias of labelling the poor as deviant etc. Even though inconsistent sentencing is often 
possible due to the discretion of prosecutors to drop charges as part of a negotiated deal, 
proponents, insist that such sentence discount cannot simply be regarded as unethical since 
they are not based on promises made by the prosecutor with the intent of breaching them 
later (Douglas, 1988: 286). Ferguson went further to stress that it is “not only unnecessary, 
but also dangerous, to prohibit it on a differential treatment causing undue pressure type of 
argument” (1972: 40).  
 
Most of the argument about inconsistency in sentencing relates back to the attitude of the 
prosecution who is mostly seen as the party with the most influence in plea negotiation, as 
the defendant is often left with the fear of uncertainty if they insist on trial. Paradoxically, 
studies have also shown that misjudging the outcome of trials and settling for negotiations 
is not a matter only for the defendant; prosecutors can equally underestimate the likelihood 
of conviction and settle for terms that do not by any proportion, correspond to the gravity 
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of the offence (Turner, 2006: 209). Hence, the high or low of charges or sentence concession 
may depend on the perception of the parties (ibid). Another factor discovered by 
researchers is that, in the face of a strong prosecutorial case, even professional defence 
attorneys may be risk averse, and lead their clients to plead guilty (McConville, 1998: 567). 
The general effect of these aspects of plea bargaining is that parties negotiate when they 
would otherwise go to trial, or go to trial when they would otherwise bargain (Bibas, 2008: 
2468). 
 
Ferguson contends that the argument about the defendant’s anticipation of a lenient 
outcome as some form of undue influence is ironic (1972: 35). If such leniency is to be 
abolished, then all forms of plea bargains had to be abolished, as each comes with the 
promise or an expectation of a reduced charge or a reduced penalty (ibid). Another paradox 
according to Kipnis is that, when bargained-for sentences are considered as reasonably 
lenient, it goes to suggest that by insisting on a trial, the defendants must relinquish their 
opportunity to the lowest reasonable sentence (1979: 564).  
 
As criminal justice systems across the world continue to come to terms with the expansion 
of plea bargaining, they are also becoming aware of the challenges of inconsistency of this 
process. Hence, a number of guidelines (as seen in chapter four) have continued to emerge 
in jurisdiction like the US as well as England, aimed at alleviating the problem of 
inconsistency. One such example is the provision of Section 170 (9) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 of England and Wales which states that sentence reduction is appropriate in guilty 
pleas because such pleas reduce the cost of trials (cited in Rauxloh, 2012: 35). Similarly, a 
decision by the English Court of Appeal states explicitly that where a defendant pleads 
guilty, he is entitled to sentence discount.76 Again in 2007, a sentencing guideline was 
issued, which highlights the level of approved sentence reduction in cases where accused 
persons plead guilty (Easton and Piper, 2012: 96).77 The challenge to these statutory 
declarations, however, lies in the fact that, sentencing differential will always have closer or 
even similar effects on the defendant as much as inducement will have (Gallagher, 1974: 
45). This, of course, is in the face of the arguments that the defendant who willingly pleads 
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guilty while sufficiently aware of his rights, should be considered as someone that relieves 
the community to a greater or lesser inconvenience, and should be rewarded (Bradley, 
1999: 72-73). While this line of argument sounds compelling, it is obviously lacking in 
perspective as it fails to give adequate consideration to other aspects such as coercion and 
threat that have characterised the institution of plea bargaining. Hence, Bradley’s argument 
appears to look at the end and not the means through which a negotiation was achieved. It 
also fails to admit the fact that in criminal justice, the process is as important as the 
outcome. 
 
5.4 Lack of transparency and public participation 
In his work ‘Transparent Policing’, Luna (1999) described how the secret enforcement of 
laws harms trust, damages legitimacy and affects the general perception of justice. This is 
similar to Bentham’s philosophy which insists that the legitimacy and strength of legal 
principles and procedure are premised on the transparency of the system (Müller-
Schneider, 2013: 51). Hence, transparency is not only at the centre of criminal justice, but 
also a fundamental aspect of jurisprudence. It is emblematic of fairness, equity, and the 
confidence that the law is fair and open to address the excesses and misconducts of officials 
(McCormick and Garland, 1998: 27; Zedner, 2004: 15-16). Likewise, argued Blumberg, it is 
through openness that “possibilities and opportunities fraught with the danger of venal and 
dishonest release of defendants on the pretext of bargaining" will be avoided (1967: 179). 
The institution of plea bargaining has been heavily criticised for its lack of procedural 
transparency (Felkenes, 1976: 136; Lynch, 1994: 116; Stuntz, 2006: 947). As much as open 
trials serve as a means of illuminating facts, evidence and official misconducts, the lack of 
transparency in plea bargaining serve as a tool that covers them up (Zacharias, 1997: 1178). 
Hence, the legitimate interest of the community in ensuring that the law works even against 
the law enforcer becomes compromised (Alschuler, 1968: 79). Blumberg argues that the 
amount of secrecy common in plea bargaining creates the distinct possibility for even 
culpable defendants to benefit (1967: 179).  
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What is even more problematic is that plea deals are influenced by a range of factors such 
as the degree of compromise among parties, coercion of defendants, personal interest of 
prosecution, administrative desire for efficiency instead of legality etc.,, most of which are 
outside the acceptable norms of criminal justice’s idea of adjudication based on facts and 
evidence (Wright and Miller, 2002: 32-35). In the end, the surrounding circumstances that 
influenced the outcome remains known only to the few parties involved (ibid: 34). Arguing 
for transparency in the process of justice delivery, Felekens emphasised that basic 
constitutional tenets “are opposed to the rule of men; rather, the accepted rule of law 
demands that its legal processes be open to the scrutiny of the public as well as the 
appellate courts” (1976: 134-135). Schulhofer also maintained that any form of justice 
achieved behind closed doors impairs the possibility for the effective punishment of crime 
and also the accurate separation of the guilty from the innocent (1979: 1979). Hence, the 
notion of Baldwin and Mcconville who criticise plea bargaining as mainly an institutional 
routine meant to provide administrative convenience to attorneys and judges (1979: 300). 
In the quest for convenience, officials have become complacent in dealing with the many 
problems that lack of transparency brings. 
 
Looking at the other side of this debate, it obvious that any attempt to make plea bargaining 
a public affair will inevitably reduce the number of successful negotiations, which will, in 
turn, lead to more trials, fewer convictions and more burden on the criminal justice system 
(Gentile, 1969: 544). This is because by turning the system into a transparent process, many 
of the skewed negotiation technics and unethical behaviour that have plagued the system 
may not be condoned. In his argument, Gentile contends that to sustain the practice of plea 
bargaining, prosecutors and defence attorneys, who are capable of protecting their 
interests, should be allowed to devise their own mode of settlement (Gentile, 1969: 544). 
There are, however, a number of problems with this line of argument. The first is that 
secrecy limits any external review and, therefore, makes the process vulnerable to abuse 
and corruption. Secondly, defendants, especially those under-represented by legal counsels 
face the risk of been left at the mercy of the professional and powerful prosecutor. Thirdly, 
as crime continuous to be an offence against the state and not against an individual, any 
process or outcome that prevents the public from knowing the truth affects the legitimacy 
of the entire criminal justice system. Another problem is where the public perceives that the 
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interest of the prosecution and those of the court are aligned against those of the individual 
defendant (Hessick and Saujani, 2009: 231). While the desire for efficiency, expediency and 
finality are incentives that are hard to reject in the face of workload and cost, these 
utilitarian elements must also be balanced with the values of ‘process rights’ to ensure that 
defendants are not subjected to unfair secret arrangements in which the fundamental 
values of justice are undermined. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Considerable evidence point to the fact plea bargaining contradicts some of the most 
important principles of due process such as transparency, consistency, and freedom from 
coercion. Yet, it is no doubt that plea bargaining had also provided real benefits in 
addressing some of the challenges of criminal justice, particularly those of protracted 
criminal procedure. Furthermore, it has become a means to remedy or to 'repair' the 
excessive levels of punishment resulting from the kind of punitive legislation which has been 
promoted by crime control advocates and populist political groups (Jung, 1997: 122). The 
challenge here is that, without addressing some of the flaws inherent in the process of plea 
bargaining, the system will continue to produce results that are inconsistent with criminal 
justice ideals, the aftermath of which may continue to see the guilty as well as the innocent 
been convicted.  
 
This chapter has also shown that the institution of plea bargaining has presented a situation 
that accommodates bureaucracy in criminal justice administration that allows a practice 
environment where the state officials, particularly the prosecution to have different options 
of either pushing for a full trial or working towards a negotiated settlement. As Langer 
states, they routinely act as the sole de facto adjudicators of cases that, when they decide to 
dismiss charges, they effectively acquit the defendant, and when they pursue and obtain a 
guilty plea, they effectively convict (2005: 250). This is because whatever the motive is on 
the side of the prosecution, a charged dropped lets the defendant off and a guilty plea 
automatically convicts the defendant. This reconfiguration of the role and responsibilities of 
parties and the imbalance of power has exposed criminal justice to legitimate criticism, 
prompting ‘’reformists’ to demand for rules that will place officials under strict ethical 
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obligation and practice guidelines. Above all, the sentiment of equality and fairness, which 
are essential for the development of legitimate legal reform are becoming irrelevant, 
especially to those who do not accept that plea bargaining has enormous flaws.  
 
The amount of evidence demonstrating the improper behaviour of officials in trying to 
secure guilty pleas will continue to raise questions as to whether to persist with a system 
that is guided by neither procedural standards nor by the rule of law (Cohen and Dobb, 
1989: 91), or to reject it. Notwithstanding the strong utilitarian arguments put forward by 
proponents, the fact that plea bargaining is deeply compromised by lack of transparency, 
coercion and inconsistency in sentencing will continue to generate widespread concerns in 
public and scholarly discourse. This becomes even more problematic because little is known 
about the rules followed, the ones circumvented, and how many are broken behind the 
invisible curtains of plea negotiation.  
 
The various arguments contained in this part underline the problems facing jurisdictions 
such as Nigeria. It demonstrates how the emergence of plea bargaining and its application 
have generated diverse opinions on the future of criminal justice. The search for procedural 
alternatives to full trials has not only allowed plea bargaining to gain prominence in 
different jurisdictions, but also reveals how reforms in criminal justice ae sometimes capable 
of affecting the traditional foundation of justice. For example, evidence has shown how plea 
bargaining promotes managerialism at the expense of adversariality. It also shows how the 
inquisitorial concept of ‘search for the truth’ is replaced by an administrative way of 
decision making. 
 
However, as discussed at the beginning of this study, the search for efficiency has been the 
driver of plea bargaining.  This, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, is among the key 
arguments for the emergence of plea bargaining in Nigeria.  A closer look at the opinions of 
some scholars also demonstrates the legitimacy of the utilitarian juxtaposition for plea 
bargaining, and the strength of the decision theory model as key to understanding the 
dynamics of individual plea deals. The plethora of arguments, empirical evidence and 
theories discussed so far are necessary foundations for understanding the emergence of 
plea bargaining in Nigeria and elsewhere as much as they are also relevant for the 
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subsequent analysis of the practical application, problems and advantages of this system in 
Nigeria.   
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Part B 
 “If we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere. 
The law will stand still while the rest of the world goes on, and that will bad for both.” Lord 
Denning in Parker v Parker [1954] All ER 22. 
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Chapter Six 
The emergence of plea bargaining in Nigeria. 
6.0 Introduction 
In discussing the emergence of plea bargaining in Nigeria, this thesis contributes as an 
original work that for the first time looks at the concept of plea bargaining in nigeria from an 
empirical perspective. As will be seen in subsequent chapter, the effort made was to find 
and discuss and analyse data from primary sources on the emergence, development and 
application of plea bargaining in Nigeria. It is also the first indepth study that looks at the 
provisions of the new ACJA 2015 as they relate to the procedure of plea bargaining in 
Nigeria.   
 
Throughout the first part of this thesis, a wide range of factors that led to the introduction 
plea bargaining in different jurisdictions around the world have been identified. In 
subsequent chapters, it will be shown  that  one of the major arguments for plea bargaining 
in Nigeria was the inability of conventional trials to deal with cases of corruption and other 
financial crimes. In particular, it was the establishment of the two prominent special anti-
graft commissions, i.e., the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) in 2000 and 2003 respectively that 
heralded the debate on plea bargaining in Nigeria. 
 
Over the last decade, these two anti-graft agencies have embarked on the relentless 
investigation and prosecution of financial crimes and have used both trials and plea 
bargaining to secure convictions.  Although there is no record to suggest that plea 
bargaining has occurred anywhere and at any time before the establishment of the two 
commissions, there is evidence to show that since the commissions came into existence, a 
number of cases involving high profile government officials were subjected to plea 
bargaining. There is also a strong argument among proponents that one of the motivations 
for using plea bargaining was the failure of conventional mechanisms (courts and 
prosecution) in dealing with these kinds of offences. (Okwori, 2010; Osipitan and Odusote, 
2014; Adebayor, 2014).  
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Since it first emerged within the Nigerian criminal justice practice, plea bargaining has 
continued to generate enormous criticism mainly on the basis that the system was illegal 
and completely incompatible with the objectives of fighting corruption (Osipitan and 
Odusote, 2014). Proponents, however, claimed that the system had proven to be effective, 
especially in the face of complex cases that were hard to prosecute and have historically 
been impossible to convict.78   
 
As the practice continued, scholars and commentators have attempted to discuss its 
legality, utility, nature, effect and significance to criminal justice administration. Often, the 
argument is premised on whether the system serves the general and legitimate interest of 
the society or whether it was a transplant meant to serve personal and institutional goals.  
What is obviously lacking in this debate was an empirical study on how the system emerged; 
how it operates, and the extent to which it breaches or compliment criminal law and 
criminal justice procedure and reforms in Nigeria. This is by far the major gap that this study 
intends to fill. 
 
6.1 Background to the emergence of plea bargaining in Nigeria 
There is a near consensus among both scholars and legal practitioners that the 
establishment of the EFCC and the ICPC at the turn of the millennium was the beginning of 
plea bargaining in Nigeria (Adebayor, 2014, Okwori, 2010).79 As was the case in Germany 
after its unification, discussed in Chapter four of this study, the motivation to use 
negotiation instead of the full trial was augmented by the determination to ensure 
expedited conviction and the recovery of the proceeds of corruption in both the public and 
private sectors (Adebayor, 2014). Yet, a comprehensive study tracing the genesis of plea 
bargaining in Nigeria must also involve an understanding not only of the motivation for plea 
bargaining, but also the policy choices that resulted in the establishment of the two anti-
graft commissions as well as the trajectories of Nigeria’s political transition since 
independence in 1960.  
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The period immediately after independence was essentially a formative stage for most 
institutions, including criminal justice. Six years into its new found independence and 
democracy, there was military coup which culminated in a civil war (Panter-Brick, 1970; 
Diamond et al., 1997, Joseph, 2014). Subsequently, Nigeria remained under military rule 
until 1979 (ibid). This was again interrupted by another coup in 1983 (ibid).  One military 
coup followed after another, and the country continued to survive under dictatorships and 
authoritarianism until the elections of 1999 (Joseph, 2014).  
 
The implication of these series of military interventions was that constitutionalism, and 
essentially the rule of law were weakened, substituted essentially with authoritarian military 
Decrees and Edicts. This affected most democratic and civil institutions and created 
inefficiency in constitutional criminal justice (Ojo, 1987; Nwabueze, 1992). Because of the 
way the lack of the rule of law creates a power imbalance, most courts, and their decisions 
became ineffective in the face of an overriding military dictatorship. With a weak legal 
system and little adherence to the rule of law, corruption, embezzlement, and abuse of 
power became prevalent.  
 
The return of democracy in 1999 came with the challenges of reinvigorating the political and 
economic status of the country, which also entailed restoring the strength and efficacy of 
the justice system. This was arguably a task that is not achievable within a short term (Jega, 
2007). Another policy decision of the new democratic government was to develop a radical 
approach towards the fight against systemic corruption and other economic crimes that 
were the hallmark of most of the previous military dictatorships (Fagbadebo, 2007: 29). At 
the inauguration conference of the Ibadan School of Government and Policy, former 
president Obasanjo told the crowd that, identifying corruption as the greatest single threat 
to society was the reason he established the ICPC and the EFCC.80  
 
It is, however, important to state that there are long-existing laws within the Nigerian 
criminal statute that deal with the investigation and prosecution of crimes of public 
corruption,81 breach of trust, criminal misappropriation, fraud, etc. (Obilade, 1979). Yet, it 
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 Section 98 of the CCA for examples deals with matters to do with corruption by public officers. 
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was obvious that the previous approach to prosecution needed restructuring. Hence, policy 
makers were compelled to make sweeping reforms by establishing new and dedicated 
commissions. This development was welcomed both in Nigeria and internationally.82 Most 
scholars and commentators agree that economic crimes were endemic in Nigeria and were 
having a colossal effect on the development and integrity of the country (Obayelu, 2007; 
Kate, 2010; Ogbodo and Mieseigha, 2013). Hence, the establishment of these commissions 
opened a new page in Nigerian criminal justice strategies. For the first time, serial 
fraudsters, senior government officials and leading captains of industries were investigated, 
indicted and successfully convicted for different financial crimes (Obuah, 2010; Adebanwi 
and Obadare, 2011). A number of these cases were however, disposed using some elements 
of plea bargaining, often charge bargain i.e., the case of Cecilia Ibru (Iwuchukwu, 2014: 201) 
and the earlier case of DSP Alamieyeseigha (Akinola, 2012: 21-22). Despite the success in 
securing convictions, this unorthodox approach to criminal cases ignited new questions as 
to why a justice system that was purely adversarial should resort to a procedure of dropping 
charges and penal discount, especially since this was not a procedure known to Nigeria’s 
criminal law. 
 
Yet, there was a silent resolve among policy makers that to successfully prosecute cases of 
corruption, it is necessary to reform the workings of the criminal justice system and also 
give other constitutional bodies the powers to enable them to work effectively.83 Added to 
this was the concern and pressure of the International Community to make the Nigerian 
criminal justice system effective enough in dealing with the cases of corruption and financial 
crimes.84 As a result, a number of reforms were proposed, one of these was the 
establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) in 2000, as a body 
dedicated to combating corruption and guiding transparency and integrity in public service. 
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The ICPC did not achieve the anticipated success, especially in areas of prosecution of cases 
of corruption. As a result, the government, in 2003 decided to create a sister commission 
i.e., the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which was then given more 
powers and jurisdiction including some form of strategic partnership with international 
agencies like the Interpol.85 
 
6.1.1. Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) 
The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) was established under the Corrupt 
Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000, No. 5 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
(henceforth, ICPC Act). The commission was tasked under Section 5 (1), ICPC Act, to receive, 
investigate and prosecute allegations of corruption and other related offences. The 
commission also has powers to search properties and seize items if suspected to be the 
proceeds of crime (ibid).  Other provisions of the Act also authorise the Commission to 
examine, direct and supervise a review of the practices, systems, and procedures of public 
bodies, particularly in situations where the Commission is of the opinion that such practices 
will aid or facilitate fraud or corruption.86  
 
In relation to what constituted criminal offence by a public official, the Act created a 
number of crimes, including what in tort law may only qualify as strict liability. Section 8 of 
the Act, for example, stated that agreeing or even attempting to receive or obtain any 
property by corrupt means was a punishable offence. Other offences under this provision 
included an official asking or obtaining any form of benefit for themselves or on behalf of 
others. This also included involvement in receiving any kind of favour for duty done in the 
discharge of official conduct. While these crimes may be different both in degree and 
context, i.e., the attempt to receive any benefit consensually and the  crime of compelling 
any party to give favour e.g., to threaten a party that unless he or she pays money then 
there would be consequence., In this kind of circumstance, the law prescribed a blanket 
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punishment of seven years imprisonment. Furthermore, Section 26 of the Act emphasises 
the idea of expediency in the prosecution and disposal of these cases.  
 
On the need for expedited prosecution, the Act provided that prosecution for an offence 
“shall be concluded and judgment delivered within ninety (90) working days of its 
commencement save that the jurisdiction of the court to continue to hear and determine 
the case shall not be affected where good grounds exist for a delay.” This clearly indicates 
how the law placed upon the prosecution an extra burden to dispose cases within the limit 
of specified period. Taking these provisions into context, one is bound to concede that the 
law did not distinguish the gravity of these offences by placing a uniform penalty on all of 
them and imposing upon the prosecution in all cases the task of securing conviction quickly. 
The nature of this law has also added to the pressure to subject cases to some form of 
summary procedure instead of pursuing the long path of a full trial. In this sense, both the 
prosecution and the defendant are likely to look towards a negotiated settlement because 
the defendant  is worried about the potential of a harsh sentence, and the prosecution is 
concerned about the time and resources needed to pursue a full trial. 
 
6.1.2. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established under the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2002, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria (henceforth EFCC Act). Unlike the ICPC, whose scope and jurisdiction were limited to 
matters regarding domestic institutional corruption and bad practices, the EFCC was granted 
broader responsibilities and wider powers to engage with international bodies in 
investigating, combating and prosecuting cases of corruption, money laundering, and 
organised crimes (Ayobami, 2011; Raimi et al., 2013). These wider powers are suggestive 
not only of the concern for financial and cross border crimes but also the feeling that earlier 
commitments i.e., the ICPC did not live to expectation. Moreover, evidence shows that 
around the period the Nigerian government submitted a proposal for the establishment of 
the EFCC, it was experiencing concerted pressure from the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF), requesting Nigeria and other countries to introduce reforms that 
would deal with money laundering and other financial crimes within its borders (Johnson, 
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2004). The FATF emphasised its commitment to helping the government implement 
effective reforms covering the criminal justice system, the financial sector, as well as 
building networks for international cooperation.87 As will be fully discussed  in later parts of 
this study, some commentators also suggested that the sense of inefficiency, especially in 
the way the notorious case of Nwude was handled was the major catalyst for the 
establishment of the EFCC (Abati and Osadolor, 2007; Glenny, 2008). 
 
Evidently, the wider mandate of the EFCC made it more proactive and outreaching than the 
ICPC. These powers are contained in various parts of the EFCC establishment law. For 
instance, Section 6 (2) of the EFCC Act states that the commission, has powers to enforce 
the provisions of other statutes that deal with different forms of white collar offences i.e., 
offences defined under several laws, which include the Money Laundering Act 1995, The 
Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act 1995 as well as The Failed Banks 
(Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994, as amended. 
Furthermore, the Act, in Section 5 (1) gave the Commission extended jurisdiction, which 
included the examination and investigation of all crimes mentioned under the laws above 
i.e., money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, 
fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, credit card fraud, contract scam, etc. It is 
also mandated to examine and investigate all reported cases with a view to identifying and 
prosecuting individuals and groups involved. The law also gave the Commission the powers 
to track, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from these crimes. 
 
One particular area that makes the EFCC different from other investigating and prosecuting 
bodies in Nigeria is the powers involving the exchange of scientific and technical information 
with other agencies across the world. It also involved the opportunity for joint operations 
with foreign governments and bodies outside as well as the maintenance of a system for 
monitoring international economic and financial crimes in order to identify suspicious 
transactions. These exercises are mainly carried out through the Special Control Unit Against 
Money Laundering (SCUML).88 The nature of these combined tasks is unprecedented in the 
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history of Nigeria’s criminal justice institutions. Essentially, the EFCC was given powers and 
responsibilities that are traditionally divided between State Security Services (SSS), The 
National Intelligence Service (NIA), the Prosecutor General of the Federation, the Police and 
the local branch of Interpol. This also signifies that the Commission was established with 
grander aims and also explains, partly, why they extended their approach to prosecution by 
adopting new measures and procedures such as plea bargaining, in order to deal with cases 
effectively and expeditiously. Other provisions of the Act, which are far reaching include 
Section 6 (1) (b), which gave the commission powers to investigate any person if it appears 
to the Commission that the person's lifestyle and extent of the properties are not justified 
by his source of income.  
 
As an examination and analysis of data will show in the next chapter, the EFCC has taken a 
leading role in utilising plea bargaining. What has rather been unclear, and consequently a 
crucial topic of this research, was how the practice was adopted and structured in the 
absence of clear legislation, and how widespread and successful the practice has been. 
 
6.2  Primary causes of plea bargaining in Nigeria. 
Apart from the general political and economic reasons that motivated the applications of 
plea bargaining, the system of plea bargaining was also a response to the existing 
procedural constraints on criminal litigation. Hence, alternative and more effective routes 
were unavailable to achieve the objective of successful prosecution and combating those 
categories of crimes that have become a major challenge to Nigeria’s political economy as 
well as point of concern to its relationship and stance in the wider community of nations.  
6.2.1 Contingencies of the traditional method of trial 
The argument that the conventional method of trial is increasingly giving way to other 
alternative procedures such as plea bargaining is true of many legal regimes around the 
world. Various studies have revealed how the nature of crimes had changed, making 
investigation and prosecution more complex and expensive (Rutherford, 1984; Stuntz, 1997; 
McLaughlin et al., 2001; Miller and Drake, 2006, Damshenas et al., 2012). The rise of plea 
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bargaining in Nigeria shares the same characteristic, but it also comes with its own 
peculiarity, since a considerable body of empirical evidence, as will be seen in subsequent 
chapters suggest that the system of negotiating with criminal offenders is mainly restricted 
to cases of corruption and economic crimes.89 Hence, the changes witnessed over the last 
decade did not affect the entire landscape of criminal justice procedure and criminal courts 
in the country. Instead, it was a system that was largely restricted to within the jurisdiction 
of anti-graft agencies, whose main objective was to find alternative to the inefficiency in the 
prosecution of some special kinds of crimes. In doing so, they subsequently resorted to plea 
bargaining as the most preferred or the most viable option. As proponents frequently argue, 
the constraints imposed by the daunting reality of ensuring an effective way of dealing with 
cases of corruption was the key factor that pushed for the adoption of new and sometimes 
unconventional alternatives. As one prosecutor states: 
 
“Plea bargaining is not really something we are so proud of, we want to ensure that 
justice is done thorugh conventional means, but in doing so, you also have to weigh 
the contingencies and device what is feasible and not to dwell on uncertainty and end 
up wasting resources and losing your case. Not all cases are concluded through plea 
bargaining; this is something people need to know. It is not like we hate trials, but 
you have to weigh the chances, be objective and realistic in understanding and 
deciding on what is reasonable and feasible in the circumstance.90  
 
To understand this from the context of Nigeria's legal system, one has to understand that 
the prosecutorial process in criminal trials is one influenced mainly by adversarial procedure 
borrowed from the common law system (Mwalimu, 2005: 4). As a result, the contingencies 
and technicalities of proving every case beyond reasonable doubt require a considerably 
high standard. This becomes further complicated by the slow and inefficient nature of 
prosecution, judicial corruption and lack of professionalism among investigators.91 As one 
judge lamented: 
 
“You know the situation with our justice system, sometimes with inexplicable issues 
of lack of diligent prosecution, and some degree of corruption on the bench, and even 
the bar. On many occasion, you see the prosecution having a  good case, but 
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somehow, witnesses begin to disappear from the court, the evidence starts taking 
another dimension, and before you know it, you are faced with a situation that it is 
no longer possible to convict."92  
 
The major challenge to plea bargaining, however, had been the lack of clear legal framework 
on how to substitute trial with a different system entirely. This has further expanded the 
debate among scholars, practitioners and other commentators. The argument by 
proponents is that, to achieve the goal of dealing with these crimes, the criminal justice 
system needs to be reviewed in ways that will give room for new procedural strategies such 
as plea negotiation.93  
 
Some referred the need for new criminal justice measures to developments in the last two 
decades of crime syndicates with ties to Nigeria (Buchanan and Grant, 2010).94 These 
criminal organisations, also known as Nigerian Crime Enterprises (NCE's) became a problem 
not only in Nigeria but internationally (ibid). Yet, effective investigation and prosecution 
were constantly hampered by the technicalities of the traditional adversarial prosecution 
procedures (Osipitan and Odusote, 2014). Compounding these challenges were bottlenecks 
such as ‘interlocutory appeals’ used to delay court process for decades until evidence or 
witnesses begin to either disappear or contradict themselves.95 Many cases, therefore, 
remain in court for years due to these adversarial technicalities.96  These problems therefore 
gave some degree of legitimacy and justification for the adoption of alternatives methods.  
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The argument for the efficacy of plea bargaining becomes even more persuasive following 
criticism of the way some notorious cases were previously mishandled e.g., the famous case 
of Nwude (Schuller, 2010: 97). Scholars described this case as one of the largest banking 
frauds in world history (ibid). The accused swindled 242 million Dollars from Banco Noroeste 
of Brazil,97 undermining the financial position of the bank so seriously that it collapsed in 
2001 (Oriola, 2007). An international investigation into the incident began across 
Switzerland, Nigeria, UK, the US and Brazil (Glenny, 2008). The accused persons were 
subsequently traced to Nigeria. But due to the ineffective nature of the investigation and 
lack of prosecutorial will, the trial was protracted and almost compromised (ibid). It was 
with the establishment of the EFCC that the matter was reopened and through plea 
bargaining, the EFCC concluded the case and the conviction of the offenders (Obuah, 2010: 
3).  
 
6.2.2 International influence 
Another explanation for the emergence of plea bargaining was the pressure by international 
bodies for legal reforms in Nigeria, especially as organised crimes continued to increase in 
the country. There is also evidence to suggests that the resolve by the ICPC and the EFCC to 
adopt plea bargaining was a reflection of the trend and the growing interchange of ideas 
and legal strategies happening across the world.98 Around the turn of the millennium for 
instance (shortly before the ICPC and the EFCC were established), institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) made the fight against money laundering, financing of 
terrorism and other related crimes a priority.99 The IMF claimed to be concerned about the 
grave consequence of these crimes on the integrity and stability of both domestic and 
international finance and economy (ibid).  
As seen earlier, there is also evidence to the suggest that in countries like the UK, who share 
close economic, legal and political ties with Nigeria, there was a shift from insistence on 
adversariality to some form of plea negotiations.  Similarly trend was evident in countries 
like the US, where Federal courts continued to witness a significant rise in the use of plea 
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bargaining (Wright and Miller, 2003: 1415).100 Hence, there is a reason to suggest that the 
two commissions in Nigeria were not isolated in their use of plea bargaining. In line with 
these developments, one respondent stated:  
“Part of the reason plea bargaining started in this country (Nigeria) has a lot to do 
with the developments in other partner nations where plea bargain was increasingly 
used for the purpose of dealing with most criminal cases.”101 
Apart from following the trend of other nations, Nigeria was also aware of the consequence 
of not dealing properly with the growing number of organised crime and financial 
corruption in the country. These crimes not only diminish the economic prospect of nations, 
they also hinder the prospect for foreign investment, affecting international capital flows 
necessary for development and employment, especially in developing economies (Bartlett, 
2002). In the end, the nation's economic stability may be severely affected, causing a 
diminished macroeconomic performance, welfare losses, draining of resources and likely 
spill-over effects on the economies of other countries (Sharman, 2008).102 Hence, policy 
makers were aware that Nigeria cannot afford the continues lack of efficiency in its  criminal 
justice system. They were also awae that traditional methods of investigation and 
prosecution have proven quite ineffective , particularly in combating these kinds of crimes. 
Therefore, the need to create more effective investigating and prosecuting institutions 
became an ultimate priority leading to the establishment of the ICPC and the EFCC; two 
agencies that subsequently resorted to the use of plea bargaining to ensure expeditious 
disposal of cases.  
Responding to this study, officials admitted that, from the onset, the commissions have 
placed emphasis on the possibilities of adopting alternative procedures that will make 
conviction easier.103 Moreover, Nigeria was at the forefront in the establishment of the 
Groupe Intergovernmental d'Action Contre le Blanchiment d'Argent en Afrique de l'Ouest 
(GIABA).104 Established in 2000, GIABA was modelled on the Financial Action Task Force 
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(FATF) to work with member states in the subcontinent to ensure compliance with 
International Anti Money Laundering and Countering Finance of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
standards. Nigeria again took centre stage in ratifying the objectives of this action plan and 
promoting the cause of fighting against organised crimes through its own domestic 
commissions, i.e., the ICPC and EFCC. Other affiliations to the GIABA concept were the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the European Union, Interpol, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the FATF, the Commonwealth Secretariat and other 
bodies that share a common interest in the fight against organised crime. The challenge for 
nigeria in keeping up with the fight agaist corruption is its history of cumbersome and slow 
legal process. Hence, plea bargaining, which is seen as an alternative used in other legal 
regimes was subsequently adopted to deal with cases of corruption and organised crimes. 
As will be seen in the later part of this research, a number of high profile cases of public 
corruption that will ordinary remain in court for decades were expeditiously dealt with 
through plea bargaining. 
The EFCC, by virtue of its establishment Act and extended role had since become part of a 
larger global network of countries committed to tracing and returning looted funds.105 In 
some instances, this includes extradition for cases of fraud and cybercrime. For example, as 
recently as 2015, six Nigerians were extradited to face justice in the US for offences ranging 
from conspiracy to commit mail fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, wire fraud, 
bank fraud, conspiracy to commit identity theft, use of unauthorized account access devices 
as well as theft of U.S. government funds (Oluwarotimi, 2015: 1).  
In the ensuing years since establishment, the mode of prosecution by these commissions, 
especially the EFCC began began shifting towards the use plea bargaining. In a statement 
released to the media in 2013, the EFCC disclosed that it has, in the last ten years, recovered 
N497.482 (Over 2billion US dollars) from fraudsters and money launderers, of which 
N476.367 billion had been released to the victims (Ronald, 2013: 1). These kinds of massive 
recovery entail not only trials but also negotiation, repatriation and plea deals. 
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6.3 Transition from trial to plea bargaining 
Prosecution of organised and institutional crimes everywhere in the world presents unique 
challenges. Often, it entails the investigation of complex transactions whose facts and 
evidences are difficult to decipher. The EFCC and the ICPC were established to manage this 
onerous task (Abati and Osadolor, 2007). Aware of the intricate structure and nature of 
these types of crimes, both commissions began looking towards unconventional options. 
This includes assurance of charge reduction or substitution of charges for guilty pleas.106 
Responding to this research, one of the legal officers of the EFCC narrated this gradual and 
inevitable shift, saying:  
 
"From (the) establishment of the commission, we knew our role was to prosecute 
proactively corruption and the organised crime that is bringing Nigeria a lot of bad 
names, but were also aware that the old ways are not feasible. No one is unaware of 
the weaknesses of our judicial system and the corruption that hinder diligent 
prosecution and conviction of criminals. But remember also that we are still 
mandated to prosecute matters before the very courts we deemed as weak and 
ineffective. We, therefore, made it a priority to deal with these crooks in a strategic 
way, by doing our investigation and putting every bit of indicting evidence right in 
front of them. It is then left for them to either demand for a negotiated settlement in 
which they know they will refund any stolen money, or go to trial and face the 
harshest of penalties. Other parts of the world were doing the same and getting 
results; and so were we."107 
 
Since matters began going through plea bargaining, a number of serious cases involving 
public corruption, money laundering, and fraud have been successfully convicted by the 
commissions. Foremost is the case involving the former Inspector-General of Police Mr. Tafa 
Balogun in 2005, and the former Governor of Bayelsa State, Mr. DSP Alamieyeseigha. In 
both cases, charges were dropped in exchange for a guilty plea.108 But most importantly is 
the fact that such high level convictions were uncommon in Nigeria’s legal history. 
Expressing broader view on this development, one lawyer states: 
  
“Several factors may have led to what is now plea bargaining. First, we must 
appreciate that many judges discourage prolonged trial process. It is in furtherance 
of this that we have this idea of alternative dispute resolution. But again, delayed 
                                                 
106
 In interviews No. 1, 9 and 22. 
107
 Interview No. 28. 
108
 In interviews No. 1,22 and 28. 
 135 
prosecution also means overcrowded prisons and a huge number of people awaiting 
trial, which in turn defeats the very essence of justice, equity and fairness. All these, 
among others, have encouraged the shift by EFCC from trial to plea bargain. 
Although we must also admit that plea bargaining is still a very controversial 
practice.”109  
 
Essentially, this response is suggestive of the problem of protracted trial in Nigeria where a 
large number of defendants spend a long time in prisons awaiting trial. With plea 
bargaining, there is the chance of finality in a case as well as the chance of defendants 
spending lesser sentence. In both of these scenarios, plea bargaining is seen as a way of 
lessening prison congestion. Moreover, this notion of expediency is also reflected in the 
provision of Section 26 (3) of the ICPC Act, which explicitly requires the commission to 
expedite the disposal of criminal cases. Hence, plea bargaining was energetically defended 
and justified as the best option to fulfil this requirement of the law. Therefore, argued some 
respondents, plea bargaining should be seen as an essential reform towards dealing with 
some of the challenges that necessitated the establishment of the commissions.110 Other 
claims include the fact that traditional criminal justice processes and the delays of 
prosecution have necessitated gravitation from an orthodox to a more liberal approach.111 
Some respondents showed reservation, pointing out that even if Nigeria’s criminal justice 
system needed reform, plea bargaining is untimely and is not the best option.112 Yet, there is 
also an opposite notion that suggests,  when properly administered, plea bargaining has the 
potential of adding to the efficiency of the criminal justice system.113 For the commissions, 
especially the EFCC, there is growing confidence and optimism that plea bargaining is a 
viable alternative for securing convictions.114 For example, the first Chairman of the EFCC, in 
a speech delivered at an Academic Staff Union of Universities Seminar at the University of 
Ibadan in February 2007, expressed the resolve of his commission:  
Let us not mince words today, my friends, our country sways at the edge of a 
fundamental ethical turning point in which the unspeakable level of grand corruption 
runs the risk of cancelling our democratic future, the foundations of our economy 
and the indeed the social fabric of our nation. From the direct experience of the data 
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I have at my disposal I have no doubt in mind that this is a ticking time bomb 
situation, and we have a monumental emergency with severe, tragic proportions on 
our hands (Abati and Osadolor, 2007: 2). 
These statements are indicative of the enthusiasm and activism with which the 
Commissions pursued their cases. Yet, there is a common knowledge among officials of the 
Commission of the legal challenges to the application of plea bargaining, especially the lack 
of clear statutory provisions. Hence, prosecutors continued to demand legality for the 
system through inferences to certain provisions of some existing laws. The most commonly 
refered provisions were Section 14 (2) of the EFCC Act 2004, and  Section 180 (1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act (CPA). Although these provisions generally allow prosecutor, with 
the consent of the court, to withdraw some charges, the controversy of interpretation and 
application was clear. This important area of statutes and conflict of laws will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters. 
Other respondents to this study proposed different reasons for the growth of plea 
bargaining in Nigeria, which include the expediency and finality of this system as against the 
technicalities that often make traditional adversarial processes slow and cumbersome.115 
The claim of expediency and finality is suggestive of the fact that in most of the cases of plea 
bargaining, one can hardly find situations where the defendant appeals his or her 
conviction. While the two anti-graft Commissions benefit from the quick disposal of cases, it 
was also suggested that other stakeholders in the criminal justice system also benefit from 
this process. As one prosecutor points out:  
"Judges are well aware of our plea bargaining system. They see us withdrawing and 
substituting charges. It is, I will say, to their advantage as much as it is to us. A very 
easy way of disposing a case without the nuances of a witness after witness and 
evidence after evidence.116  
Corroborating the above assertion, a judge admitted that the system of plea bargaining is 
well within the knowlegde of judges.117 Yet, they often desist from taking part in the process 
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for various reasons that include the legal constraints and the controversy that the system 
has generated over the years.118  
“When you find EFCC or ICPC prosecutors withdrawing or downgrading initial 
charges, it is clear they have reached some out of court agreement with the offender. 
What they do out of court is not the business of the court. Ours is to look at the 
charges before us and make our decision in line with the provisions of the law.119  
However, he went on to agree that, in most of these cases where EFCC or ICPC uses plea 
bargaining, “the court certainly finds its job easier with the expedited disposal of the case. 
No one is under any obligation to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt.120 These 
reasons, among others, had encouraged prosecutors to continue using plea bargaining 
whenever the opportunity to do so presents itself. As a result, the commissions have 
managed to secure convictions in some notable cases that ordinarily would have remained 
protracted in court beyond a decade. Some of these include the following:  
Name Offence Sentence 
awarded 
Date case was 
decided 
Court 
Tafa Balogun. 
Crimes 
committed 
while he was 
Inspector 
General of 
Police 2002 –
2005 
70 Counts of 
Money 
Laundering 
charges 
involving 
13billion Naira 
reduced to 50 
counts. 
Six Months 
Imprisonment 
November 
2005 
Federal High 
Court, Abuja 
Lucky 
Igbinedion. 
Crimes 
committed 
while he was 
191 counts 
reduced to 6 
for offences of 
money 
laundering and 
Six months 
imprisonment 
with the 
option of 
3.5million 
December 
2008 
Federal High 
Court, Enugu 
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Governor of 
Edo State 
1999 – 2007 
embezzlement 
of 24million 
Dollars  
Naira fine 
Bode George. 
Crimes 
committed 
while he was 
Chairman of 
the Nigerian 
Ports 
Authority 
1999-2003 
163 counts 
reduced to 63 
involving abuse 
of office and 
contract 
inflation worth 
84billion Naira 
30 months 
imprisonment 
October 2009 High Court, 
Lagos 
Cecelia Ibru. 
Crimes 
committed 
while she was 
the 
Managing 
Director and 
Chief 
Executive 
Officer of 
Oceanic Bank 
Nigeria 
25 counts of 
Bank and 
Securities fraud 
of about 
1billion Euros. 
Six months 
imprisonment 
and forfeiture 
of 150billion in 
assets and 
cash. 
October 2010. Federal High 
Court, Lagos. 
John Yusuf. 
Crimes 
committed 
while serving 
as a Director 
of the Police 
Pension 
Two counts of 
conversion of 
public funds 
worth 27billion 
Naira 
Two years 
imprisonment 
with an option 
of 750, 000 
Naira fine. 
January 2013. Federal High 
Court, Abuja. 
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Office. 
Source: Kehinde (2013) 
 
It is important to state here that, in all these cases, the defendants were required to return 
the looted fund and then pay a fine or serve prison term for their conviction. Where the 
defendant is given an option of a fine, they often pay instead of going to prison. Where the 
conviction is without an option of a fine, the defendant then serves the prison stipulated in 
the judgement of the court..  
 
Although these cases captured headlines because of their notoriety, many others that were 
negotiated did not. As it will be seen in later part of this study, the EFCC alone had more 
than a hundred cases, most of which were disposed through plea bargaining. However, this 
study will pose the argument that while the Commissions refer to these convictions as a 
great success, they are only a fraction of the enormous number of criminal cases tried daily 
in criminal courts across the country.121  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The various discussions in this chapter explain the emergence of plea bargaining as a 
phenomenon driven by different but interconnected factors. First, it is clear that the 
establishment of the two prominent anti-graft Commissions in the 2000s marked the 
beginning of a new chapter in criminal justice procedure. It is also evident that even as the 
ICPC predated the EFCC, (as it was established two years before the EFCC), overwhelming 
evidence suggests that the first cases of plea bargaining were those initiated by the EFCC, 
which according to some scholars relates directly to the wide statutory remit and 
jurisdictional powers granted the EFCC as against the limited ones given to the ICPC (Obuah, 
2010; Raimi et al., 2013). 
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 Various state attorney generals are involved in the prosecution of criminal misappropriation, breach of 
trust, cheating, fraud, etc.  Most of these are not prosecuted by the EFCC but by the office of the Director(s) of 
Public Prosecution (DPP) of all the 36 states of the federation. Each state has its own prosecuting body.  
 140 
Nigeria, whose economic progress is imperilled by widespread cases of corruption and 
financial crimes, was constrained to take the centre stage in reinvigorating its criminal 
justice institutions. The most important of which was the creation of the anti-graft 
commissions. It is, however, evident that the two commissions have similar responsibilities 
and the EFCC was partly a response to the inadequacy of the ICPC. Hence, an inference can 
be drawn as to how reforms can often be difficult and may not always achieve the projected 
objectives.  
This chapter also shows that the EFCC's expanded jurisdiction has paved the way for its 
collaboration with International agencies, and looking towards the reforms on the global 
stage, it was also swayed to adopt new measures, part of which appears to be the practice 
of plea bargaining. It is also evident that the convictions secured in cases that could have 
ordinarly been slow and protracted further re-energised the EFCC to continue exploring the 
poosibility of concluding cases through negotiations. Although, practitiotiones were 
constantly challenged by lack of clear legislations and guidelines, it was shown throughout 
Chapter four of this study plea bargaining does not often need a clear legislation or even a 
legal framework for it to emerge or be practiced. By far, it has mostly proven to be  product 
of  spontaneous routine practice among criminal justice practitioners.  
It is also evident that since the EFCC first started adopting this method ten years ago, 
Nigeria’s criminal justice has continued to experience a legal process that is a mixture of 
traditional adversarial process and one in which some cases are settled through plea 
negotiations. Although the number of plea deals is relatively small, evidence shows that plea 
bargaining is an option that had continuously been adopted, with the EFCC being the body 
that uses plea bargaining more than the ICPC, using it mainly as a means to expedite the 
conviction and sentencing of white-collar criminals and to recover proceeds of crime. 
Although there were long-existing laws on corruption and other financial crimes that could 
have been sufficient, it is also important to relate back to the evidence that shows how the 
history of Nigeria's criminal justice, especially in the prosecution of corruption and other 
high profile financial offences, exposes the inefficiency of the judicial system. This has 
generated several recommendations for legal reforms targeted at finding feasible ways of 
prosecuting and convicting financial offences and other related offences. These 
reccommendations were part of the driving force for the establishment of the two anti graft 
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agencies Hence, it is quite understandable that the establishment of the two Commissions; 
the mandate to prosecute effectively and aggressively, were all part of the same drive that 
is influenced by both internal and external factors. The idea that cases will remain in court 
for decades was increasingly becoming unacceptable. This is even more important when 
taking into account the political and economic objectives of using criminal justice as a means 
of bringing sanity scarce resources to meet the enormous demands of a developing nation 
like Nigeria. Hence, these alternative methods become justifiable.  
Another theory on the development of plea bargaining in Nigeria is based on the 
proposition that international influence reinvigorates the first two theories. At the turn of 
the millennium, there was a renewed call by international bodies for a strategic partnership 
amongst nations in fighting cross-border crimes and also the prosecution of domestic crimes 
especially those that have a serious negative impact on economic development.122 The 
establishment of EFCC, for example, is seen as part of the overarching reaction to these 
influences. This argument is further justified by the notorious case of Nwude and other 
subsequent cases of corruption in which billions were appropriated.  
Evidently, the establishment of these commissions and their enthusiastic embrace of plea 
bargaining has changed the face of prosecution, especially in the way organised crimes and 
crimes relating to institutional corruption were dealt with. For instance, it was with the 
coming of these agencies that Nigeria, for the first time in decades, witnessed instances 
where criminal cases against top government officials and captains of private industries 
were disposed within a reasonable time and by constitutional courts. Although there are 
criticisms as to the legality and suitability of adopting this new method, what is even more 
contentious is the introduction of a system that was seen as alien and that which substitutes 
adversariality with negotiation. As will be seen in subsequent chapters this has continued to 
generate enormous debate and controversy among practitioners and scholars alike. This, 
however, did not deter plea bargaining from growing into the system, mainly among 
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practitioners with the EFCC, who, over the years have made this practice a fitting 
alternative.  
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Chapter Seven 
General practice of plea bargaining in Nigeria. 
7.0 Introduction 
Empirical evidence fromprevious chapters has established thatin most jurisdictions around 
the world, plea bargaining is aproduct of routine criminal justice practices.123 All available 
evidence indicate that the practice often emanates from clear legislations but at a way of 
creating some convinience and efficiency in the disposition of cases. This is true of nigeria 
where plea bargaining began a decade ago in an atmosphere that lacks any legislation or 
guideline. What is evident however is that despite the criticism of illegality that greeted 
some of the earlier cases of plea bargaining, the practice continued unabated (Appendix A 
and B). In almost all the evidence gathered throughout this research, plea bargaining in 
Nigeria has continued as a practice exclusive tothe two anti graft Commissions.  
 
This chapter intends to rely on both primary and secondary data in analysing and explaining 
how the practice of plea bargaining was developed and structured. Essentially, the chapter 
will bring to light the methods used by practitioners prior to the enactment of an enabling 
law for the application of plea bargaining. This analysis will also explian how a system not 
sanctioned by law became possible in legal practice, and how significantly such 
circumstances affect parties and the entire justice system. The chapter will also identify and 
explain the individual role that parties play and their constraints in the process. The  chapter 
will then conclude with a discussion of the most recent developments in Nigeria's criminal 
justice system, particularly the enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 
(ACJA) 2015 and how it has controversially altered the debate on plea bargaining and indeed 
the question of reform in the entire criminal justice system. 
 
7.1 Initiating plea bargaining 
Since early 2000, when the two anti-graft commission came into existence and began using 
plea bargaining, the debate began on the lack of clear statutory provisions and procedural 
guidelines for this new an unfamiliar legal process. This has made the system of plea 
bargaining develop through an informal and unregulated manner, mostly without any 
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standard mode of application.124 Prosecutors wanting to apply plea bargaining were 
therefore constrained to formulate a kind of approach that would allow offenders to agree 
to plead guilty or return proceeds of crime in exchange for some terms, often in the form of 
reduced charges.125 Since the first recorded cases around 2005, prosecutors (in the EFCC) 
have continuously used plea bargaining, often by making an inference to the provisions of 
Section 14(2) of the EFCC Act, which allows for compounding of offences.126 This provision 
permits a prosecutor to compound any offence, by accepting such sums of money as it 
thinks fit, not exceeding the amount of the maximum fine to which that person would have 
been liable if he had been convicted of that offence.  
 
Although, none of the laws commonly referred to by proponents proves that plea 
bargaining is lawful, those willing to negotiate have kept expanding the meaning of these 
existing statutory provisions in order to accommodate and give some degree of legitimacy 
to the concept of negotiating and obtaining the plea of persons accused of criminal 
offences. As will be seen later, proponents have continued to make reference to some parts 
of the EFCC Act and the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).127  
 
According to findings of this research, the most common procedure that leads to plea 
bargaining in Nigeria begins with an investigation into the facts and circumstances of an 
alleged offence.128 This is done through the exercise of statutory powers of arrest and 
investigation vested on officials of the Commissions under Sections 27-28 of the ICPC Act 
(2000) and sections 6-7 of the EFCC Act (2002). Once a prima facie case is established, a case 
diary is then filed with the court.129 It is important to note here that, “whether with the 
prospect of a future negotiation or not, nothing starts until the prosecutor presents the case 
to a court of competent jurisdiction.”130 Technically, this process suggests that in Nigeria, 
filing of case before the courts come first before any discussion on plea bargaining. 
Therefore, the prosecution is also constrained to fulfil the legal requirement of filing all 
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relevant documents required for the initiation of a criminal case.131  The legal standards for 
initiating prosecution by the EFCC or the ICPC are the same as that of all other prosecuting 
bodies in the country.132 Every criminal matter begins with the mandatory court process 
provided under Sec 185 (b) of the Penal Code and also the Federal High Court Practice 
Direction, 2013.  
 
The legal standard for all prosecutions before higher courts in Nigeria (the courts where the 
EFCC and the ICPC file their cases) requires the prosecution to attach a document called an 
‘evidence diary,' which contains the charges, the evidence and the list of all witnesses that 
they intend to present during the trial. These documents are then served on the defence as 
well.133 One of the major implications of this legal requirement is that the prosecution is 
obliged to ensure that they have cogent and verifiable grounds for arraigning the accused, 
because the evidence diary has to contain all those evidence they intend to rely upon.  
 
Once a case had been filed, the court gives a date for the substantive matter to begin.134 
During the grace period between the service of these documents and the time scheduled for 
a trial to commence, the defence must have perused and digested the pre-trial disclosure, 
which will enable them to understand what they stand to gain or risk by going to trial.135 It is 
at this stage that most parties begin to contemplate the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement.  
 
Plea bargaining, therefore, starts after a case had been duly filed before a court through the 
process discussed above. It may begin before the start of hearing or after, but it has to be 
prior to the conclusion of evidence.136 Giving insight into some of the trajectories of this 
process, a  prosecutor of the EFCC claims that due to the nature and objectives of the EFCC, 
a lot was invested in terms of professionalism in investigation and prosecution so that there 
is always the capacity for thorough investigation and solid evidence that is strong both in 
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trial and in the event of plea bargaining.137 He further states, “our prime objective is to make 
sure we place on the table strong and solid evidence that the defence is aware of our 
capability of getting a conviction, this way an offer for plea bargain becomes very 
likely.”138This assertion gives further credence to the ‘functionalist theory’ perspective 
discussed in chapter three of this research, which suggests that professionalism on the side 
of state officials is among the key elements that compel offenders to seek plea bargaining.  
Furthermore, this disclosure also confirms that the practice is mainly centred around a 
‘charge bargain’ procedure, whose common pattern involves the dropping or substitution of 
the initial charges by the prosecution after a plea deal had been struck outside the court. 
The main difference with other models of charge bargaining is that in Nigeria, the matter is 
first presented to the court before the charges are subsequently replaced or substituted. 
 
Another distinct feature of the practice in Nigeria, as disclosed by prosecutors, is that the 
offer to negotiate was originally expected to come from the defence.139 There are important 
things to note here. The first is that lack of clear legal framework makes it unwarrantable for 
the prosecution, being the representatives of the state, to ask for a negotiated settlement. 
But then, the second aspect is that, after filing the process before the court with all the 
evidence, the defence will have the opportunity to peruse the evidence diary, assess its 
strength and decide on whether to offer to negotiate or go to trial. In both instances, the 
prosecution, to whom the offer is made has the upper hand because it gives him the 
influence to place conditions for his or her acceptance of the offer.140 As stated by 
respondents to this research, the defence’s knowledge of a strong case against them is the 
prosecutor’s most potent tool to guide the negotiation process.141 Explaining how this often 
occurs, a prosecutors state: 
  
“In all of the cases where I participated in plea bargaining, it is usually a case file with 
as many charges as we can prove, and of course, many others that may not 
necessarily be proved beyond doubt. With these before the court, and with the 
knowledge that we really mean business in our pursuance of conviction on all the 
charges regardless of the enormity of the stipulated maximum sentence under the 
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law, the defence almost certainly runs back to us seeking for what they usually call 
an ‘advice’ or ‘way forward’. But ‘advice’ or ‘way forward’ in this context means 
whether there is any room for concession that we are ready to give. It is an implied 
way of saying they want to negotiate.”142  
 
While this notion by a prosecutor suggests the utility of plea bargaining as an efficient mode 
of disposing cases, it also confirms how the idea of negotiating may not necessarily be about 
the substance of a case. Instead, it could simply be a means to achieve a particular objective 
i.e., securing conviction as expeditiously as possible even if it means compromising some of 
the genuine charges against the defendant. This kind of attitude certainly infringes on the 
principle of fairness to the victim and the values of ensuring that justice is duly served. 
 
Another aspect relevant to the approach by prosecutors is how imposing plea bargaining is 
on the defendant because of the punitive nature of Nigeria’s criminal legislations. This is 
evident from the response of prosecutors who confirmed that “when the strength of 
evidence becomes clear to the defence, they end up pleading with us for negotiation on the 
charges because they know the implication of a full sentence.”143 He gave an instance 
relating to punishment under the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act (2006) 
in which the least is seven years imprisonment without the option of fine.144 Hence, when 
defendants are faced with this impending long-term jail time, there is often the likelihood 
that they will seek for a concession to substitute the charges in exchange for a guilty plea.145 
The way a charge bargaining is achieved as found during this study is e.g.,  the offence of 
‘obtaining money by false pretence’ as defined under the Advance Fee Fraud and other 
Related Offences Act (2006) attracts a sentence of seven years imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.146 The same kind of offence ‘Obtaining money by trick’ defined under the 
Criminal Code Act (1990) attracts a maximum sentence of three years with no minimum147 
(here the judge has the discretion to award term below three years). From available records, 
these are offences and charges often interchanged by the EFCC to fulfil plea 
                                                 
142
 interview No. 9. 
143
 Interview No. 1. 
144
 Section 1 (3), Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act 2006. 
145
 Interview No. 1. 
146
 Section 1 (3) Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act 2006. 
147
 Section 419 Criminal Code Act, Laws of the Federation 1990. 
 148 
arrangements.148 It is important to state here that in the records contained in Appendix A 
and B, these kinds of substitutions of charges were evident. This is discussed in detail in 
chapter eight of this research. 
 
The question however is, how do the parties whose case is already before a court end up 
substituting charges. To answer this question, respondents clarified that when prosecutors 
are approached by the defence for some kind of concessional arrangement over the 
impending charges, the prosecutors then seek for an adjournment from the court to delay 
the continuation of the matter and give room for the defence to make their offer.149 If 
successful, the prosecution returns to court and applies for the withdrawal or substitution of 
the initial charges.150 Evidence from the interviews, however, suggests that some judges 
may infer, at this stage that the parties have struck some kind of negotiated settlement and 
may even question the prosecution about the withdrawal or substitution of the charges.151 
This scrutiny by judges is driven by two major concerns. The first is that there has been no 
clear legal provision for plea bargaining,152 and the second is the way plea bargaining has 
resulted in enormous controversy which will be fully discussed in the next part of this study. 
However, because of the prevailing laws that grant the prosecution the prerogative to 
withdraw charges, the court is left with fewer options other than to allow the application.153 
The charge sheet and the evidence diary is then amended to reflect the new charges.  
 
There are many examples of this practice of withdrawing and substituting charges since the 
earliest cases of plea bargaining emerged in Nigeria.154  For example, in the notorious case 
of Cecilia Ibru,155 in August 2009, the EFCC brought twenty-five counts against the 
accused.156 Pending the substantive court hearing of the matter, the defence, and the 
prosecution entered into a negotiation on the terms that the defendant would forfeit the 
proceeds of the crime amounting to 191 billion Naira (approximately 1 billion US Dollars) in 
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return for lesser charges and also the dropping of most of the other charges. On those 
terms, the accused pleaded guilty and was convicted on only three counts, attracting a six 
months’ custodial sentence and the forfeiture of the agreed assets and monies. A similar 
scenario ensued in the famous case of Alamieyeseigha,157 where thirty-three counts of 
money laundering, illegal acquisition of property, corruption, and false declaration of assets, 
etc., were reduced to six counts in exchange for a guilty plea, a lighter sentence and the 
forfeiture of assets.158 It is important to note here that, the law allowing substitution of 
charges is a common characteristic of the adversarial trial, which on its own does not 
necessarily suggest that such substitution is a question of negotiation. Rather, it is a normal 
procedural aspect of the adversarial system where every aspect of fact, evidence and 
charges are decided by the prosecution before they are presented to the court for trial. 
What is different here is that, the substitutions in both of these cases were not done 
because the prosecution could not prove the charges but because of the negotiation to 
plead guilty without contest. 
 
Taking into account the powers of the prosecution as disclosed by many respondents, 
especially the situation where the defence is expected to be the one that offers to 
negotiate, along with the punitive nature of sentence on trial, the system in Nigeria 
undoubtedly puts the defence in a weaker position. The effect of the prosecutor’s far-
reaching powers and near absence of disincentives in plea bargaining is well covered in 
scholarship as a phenomenon that creates negotiating environments that are unfair and 
domineering. This is because the defendant has to deal with a system in which the 
prosecution is not constrained by any legal guidelines or limitations, and can therefore use 
different tactics including threat of punitive sentence to secure a guilty plea. This type of 
situation has consistently generated broad criticism from scholars, commentators, and even 
judges.159  
 
Further compounding this problem is the evidence which suggests that almost all 
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negotiations are concluded privately,160 making it even more convenient for the prosecution 
to exert more pressure and take advantage of the defence susceptibility. Some proponents 
who responded to this study, however claimed that, despite the privacy, plea bargaining in 
Nigeria is mostly a consensual and credible process.161 Their argument is that “all 
arrangements are coordinated in a manner that allows the defence to make a willing and 
informed offer through an application to either the head of operations or that of the legal  
department of the Commissions.”162 If accepted, this application is then processed and 
discussed in a conference with the defence, the investigators and the legal team of the ICPC 
or the EFCC, in order to agree to the terms and conditions of the negotiation.163 The process 
also entails a system where “if individual victims are to be restored, the victims or their 
representatives are also called upon to participate in the conference.164 While this sounds 
like quite a formal and fair bureaucratic process, it is coming from respondents that are all 
prosecutors. Moreover, the process still does not give sufficient guarantees about what 
exactly occurs behind closed doors, as the fear of punitive sentence and the lack of legal 
safeguards for the defendant are factors that leave the defendant vulnerable to a judicial 
process that is not transparent165. 
Another approach by the Commissions is the use of accomplices to acquire evidence against 
co-accused. This is especially common when a crime is so deeply embedded in institutional 
routines that evidence is hard to acquire or to prove.166 Usually, where offences are 
admitted by some respondents, a negotiation of this nature ends up with extensive 
compromises and assurances because, if the negotiation fails, the chances of convicting the 
accused become highly unlikely.167 Where the accomplice agrees to testify, his particulars 
are also included in the evidence diary as a potential witness.168 An example of this is the 
case of Tochukwu,169 a Nigerian drug trafficker who, through a deal for charge concession, 
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cooperated to give details about leaders and the nature of their operation.170 It is important 
to note that also that the idea of engaging accomplices as potential witnesses is not isolated 
to Nigeria; rather, it is a familiar practice around the world (Katz, 1979; Bibas, 2005; Hansen, 
2009). This kind of approach has been criticised on the basis that it leads to induced perjury 
or the investigation of an unrelated set of transactions in order to create some ‘exposure’ 
that will give the prosecutor effective ‘leverage’ (Katz: 1979: 446-447).  
 
7.2 The concurrency of trial and negotiations  
Although parties might begin negotiation before the commencement of the substantive trial 
in court, evidence suggests that both negotiation and trial sometimes do occur 
concurrently.171  
 
“We do not withdraw a case even when there is a negotiation going on. Instead, we 
keep our adjournments and wait to finalise the agreement before deciding whether 
to withdraw or substitute whatever charge we might have originally presented to the 
court.172  
 
Confirming how this process works, a prosecutor disclosed that from the moment a matter 
is brought before the court, “we have to make the defence understand we are not bluffing 
and must maintain the tempo of our case even if we think an offer for negotiation is feasible. 
This is the best strategy to get the defendant to throw in the towel and seek for plea 
bargaining.”173 What this suggests is that unless the offer to negotiate comes at the 
beginning of the hearing, the case continues through a full adversarial process. Evidence 
also shows that in some cases, a matter goes as far as the calling of series of witnesses.174 A 
prosecutor stressed that prosecutors do not stop or delay a case in anticipation of a 
defendant's offer, such delay or adjournment comes when the defence has shown interest 
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in offering to negotiate.175 What prosecutors do he says, is to keep their case open and 
continue with the presentation of evidence until “defendants become convinced that we 
really mean business and that we are ready and willing to pursue a conviction and seek the 
maximum sentence.”176 
 
Another important finding is the explanation given by a prosecutor on how charges are 
substituted:  
 
“There are ways we deal with the substitution of charges without necessarily 
offending the law... Assuming a man was charged under Sec 1 (1) of the Advance Fee 
Fraud Act for an offence of obtaining money by pretence, which attracts a minimum 
of seven years without option of fine and the accused decides to plead guilty, the 
charge is usually substituted by for instance, section 516 of the Criminal Code Act, 
which says, obtaining money by trick. These two offences have similar ingredients but 
different punishments. Another way is to decline to tender some of the evidence 
during the trial and the court will therefore not consider those charges for which you 
refuse to tender enough evidence. That technically reduces the potential for large 
sentence.177 
  
From this explanation, one can deduce how the presence of different statutes with similar 
offences have created the possibility to fulfil the agreements in plea bargaining, even when 
there were no clear laws to support these substitutions. Essentially, the practice was framed 
in a way that, without going outside the statutes, prosecutors have devised techniques to 
fulfil their end of the bargain. Although this does not necessarily save the defendant from 
punishment, it technically confines the judge to the new charges and the sentence limit 
provided under the law. Another example given by respondents is that for a plea deal for 
the offence of forgery under the Criminal Code Act Cap 38 LFN, 2004, for which the 
sentence is life imprisonment without an option of fine, prosecutors substitute the charge 
to what is provided under the Penal Code Laws or the Criminal Code Laws, both of which 
have offences of forgery with a sentence limit below fourteen years imprisonment.178 This 
clearly contradicts the familiar argument that sentence concessions are made outside the 
framework of the law. In the real sense, the sentences awarded are within the limit of the 
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charges against the accused. What is rather contentious is that the original offences were 
sometimes not the ones for which the accused is sentenced.179 In some situations, some 
charges are dropped even as it is evident that the accused has committed those offences. 
This some proponents say is necessary in order to allow for the “a smooth negotiation 
where there are several charges against the accused, and he or she is ready to accept the 
remaining charges.”180 
 
Essentially, the criminal law in Nigeria gives the prosecutor the legitimate powers to choose 
and to substitute charges from a range of legislations where the nature of the offence did 
not fit the original charge or charges. What the law did not allow is for such substitution to 
be defined by some form of negotiation with the offender in exchange for his guilty plea. 
Again, when the courts sentence an accused based on the new charges and in accordance 
with the sentence limits provided for the new charges, the court is also not doing anything 
outside what the law prescribes. But again, the law does not allow judges to exonerate an 
offender of some charges because he has agreed to plead guilty to others. 
 
This practice of choosing different legislations to enable a negotiation, which has similarities 
with what occurs in some jurisdictions in the US, has been criticised by some scholars as a 
form of selective enforcement of the law (Ma, 2002: 26). One of the foremost criticisms 
relates to the prosecutor’s discretion to choose from overlapping criminal statutes to fit the 
same kinds of charges to different types of conducts, or to fit similar conduct into different 
kinds of charges. These are seen as discretionary powers relating to how and what laws to 
uphold or disregard, which effectively turns the prosecutor into a legislator. The major 
problem with this common setting in plea bargaining is the way power is concentrated in 
the hands of the prosecution that in the end may be abused. As evidence continuous to 
show, this enormous powers that the prosecution has is what leads to threat and coercion 
that is now centre stage in the debate about plea bargaining. Hence, there is the need to 
revisit this familiar flaw of plea bargaining by ensuring that procedural mechanisms are put 
in place to check the excesses of prosecutor. One of such recommendations was to make 
the system open and transparent and to also allow judges to scrutinise every case of plea 
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bargaining. A further option is the need to allow every case of plea bargaining to be open to 
appeal where parties become unsatisfied with the outcome. 
 
At the end of all sorts of negotiations and substitutions, the court is then presented with an 
offender ready to plead guilty. Findings also suggest that, where there are individual victims 
to be compensated by the defence, the issue is clearly raised before conviction, and 
application is made by the prosecution for the court to consider restitution in its verdict.181 
Records of conviction from both the EFCC and the ICPC show that in numerous cases where 
the parties ended of plea bargaining, the courts in addition to the sentence also give 
monetary restitution or compensation (Appendix A and B). It is not clear whether in all of 
these circumstances; the prosecution needs to apply for such compensation or restitution. 
What is evident, however, is that in instances where such application is made, the court 
often considers them.182  
 
7.3 Judicial participation and sentencing practices 
In most adversarial systems, the involvement of judges in plea bargaining is minimal, 
compared to civil law systems. Yet, both judicial participation and non-participation have 
been subjects of contention amongst scholars and commentators (Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 
2004: 45; Hessick and Saujani, 2009: 226). Evidently, the judges influence over sentencing 
creates an atmosphere of disproportionate pressure on defendants capable of breaching 
the standards of fair adjudication.  
From this study, there is no evidence to suggest that judges in Nigeria were called upon to 
participate in the negotiation process.183 On the contrary, what evidence shows is that some 
judges show disapproval for any act by the prosecution that suggests a plea bargain would 
or has taken place.184 On numerous cases, especially those involving the EFCC, judges have 
been found to question attempts by the prosecution to amend charges, often under the 
suspicion that the prosecution is trying to strike a plea bargain with the defendants. “I have 
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witnessed situations where judges openly challenge prosecutors on plea bargaining” said 
one prosecutor.185 He further confirmed, “A judge once said to me, ‘I do not know this thing 
you are trying to do, and I am not part of it’.” But then, even if judges are not willing to see a 
negotiated settlement,  they cannot withhold from the prosecutor the power of amending 
charges. A prosecutor can at any time before the defence opens its case, amend a charge. 
What evidence shows is the open discontent that some judges show when they suspect that 
the prosecutors act was an outcome of a plea deal.186  
 
An enquiry into the reasons why judges are not involved or why they often tend to stay 
away from plea arrangements revealed various motivations. Foremost is that no legal 
provision has granted them any participatory role in plea bargaining, and this allows the 
prosecution to exclude them.187 In the words of one prosecutor, involving judges is an 
exercise that risks the potential to ruin a plea bargain as that may “end up in unnecessary 
inquiries that will eventually turn into a trial. They may ask the prosecution to present some 
kind of evidence and even request the accused to make submissions.”188  
 
Another reason judges are wary of plea bargaining is the concern about the consequences 
of engaging in such procedure.189 Evidence has shown that courts have been subjected to  
accusations of complicity following the outcome of some notorious cases of plea bargaining 
in Nigeria. For example, when the famous case of John Yakubu190 was decided by the Abuja 
High Court in 2013 and the accused was given a two years jail term with an option of 
750,000 Naira (approximately 2000 British pounds) fine for the offence of embezzling over 
20 billion Naira (approximately 5 million British pounds) (Nnochiri, 2013), almost all the 
major newspapers and blogs in the country carried the news with accusations of complicity 
of the court.191 Public reaction was equally a mixture of fury and disbelief. One popular 
news blog captioned the story as “Pension Thief, Go Home and Enjoy Your Loot”, quoting at 
the beginning of the article “A nation can thrive under disbelief but not on injustice ~ Sheikh 
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Usman Dan Fodio” (Jimoh, 2013). Similar reactions were seen in previous cases of plea 
bargaining involving high profile offenders, often with blame being attributed to judges for 
blatantly engaging in compromise and flagrant violation of the morality and standards of 
law. Affirming the difficulty that judges face in these kinds of situations, respondents 
admitted that plea bargaining has resulted in serious controversy and accusations of judicial 
corruption. As a result said one prosecutor, judges do often show disapproval for plea 
bargaining:  
 
“If you are to inform the court that you are withdrawing the charges in order to do 
some plea bargain with the offender, then certainly you are in for an encounter with 
some of these judges. Not many of them will be willing to be seen openly supporting 
such proposition. They are aware and concerned about the public reaction and 
accusations. Perhaps they know plea bargaining occurs outside the court, and they 
also know we withdraw and substitute charges mostly, for this reason, but they do 
not want to be seen or perceived as part of the deal. They are very careful.”192   
 
Despite their reservations, some judges conceded that plea bargaining offers certain 
advantages to the courts: 
 
“Most of us are aware that prosecutors do plea bargaining. Even though we often do 
not support the idea, but one must admit that prosecutors and defence are not the 
only beneficiaries of a successfully bargained outcome. Remember, any case settled 
without the intrigues of calling too much witness and perusing through the vast 
amount of evidence, day and night, is a smooth path that adds to every judges’ 
record of performance. After all, every conviction reflects simply as a case heard and 
concluded.”193 
 
A clear example of ways in which judges benefit from plea bargaining is the criteria laid 
down by the National Judicial Council (NJC) in appraising and reviewing the performance of 
judges across Nigeria.194 The NJC has certain conditions that are mainly based on a quarterly 
return of every judge’s record of cases succesfully disposed. Hence, every concluded plea 
bargain gives the judge the advantage to dispose of a case within a very short time. Not only 
does this reduce their workload, but it also adds to their records of concluded cases, 
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thereby improving their record of performance and potentially accelerating their 
promotion. 
 
Further evidence suggests that where cases are not publicised or do not involve persons of 
interest, some judges advise the parties to have a discussion out of court pending the final 
determination of the cases, particularly where restitution or compensation is involved.195 
There is, however, no evidence to suggest that judges out rightly advice parties to engage in 
plea bargaining. The empirical evidence from the study overwhelmingly suggests that the 
system of plea bargaining in Nigeria is based mainly on ‘Charge Bargain’. 
 
Essentially, the absence of judges in the process of plea bargaining did not alter their 
powers over sentencing. This is even more so because no law allows any other party to 
engage in sentencing decisions in any way, including through recommendations.196 Judges in 
Nigeria are therefore not bound by anything contained in any plea bargain on either the 
extent or limit of the sentence. What ties them essentially is the limit of sentence prescribed 
by law. Aware of this reality, prosecutors refrain from interfering with judges on issues of 
sentencing.197 In fact, findings suggest that not doing so is the way to avoid the suspicion of 
any plea bargaining or even a confrontation with the judge.198 Attempt to pursued the judge 
may also result in a suspicion of illicit arrangements between the prosecution and the 
defence, “which in the end may affect the outcome of the sentence, even prompting the 
judge to give the full sentence when he has the discretion to be lenient.199  
 
While prosecutors and defence attorneys are bound by ethical standards to guide the court 
on the nature of punishment prescribed by the law,200 this process cannot be construed as a 
sentence recommendation; it is rather a reminder to the court on what the law says about a 
particular offence and its limit of sentence. The defence, for its part, has the right to plead 
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with the court for a lesser punishment and apply for an allocutus, which is often not 
objected to by the prosecution, especially when there was a plea agreement reached.201 
Regarding the idea of judicial participation, it is again important to bring into context some 
recent developments that have far-reaching effects on how judges in Nigeria approach 
issues of plea bargaining. One of these was the reaction that followed the famous Pension 
Fraud case of John Yakubu (discussed eralier),202 where the accused was arraigned on two 
counts under Sec 27 of the EFCC Act.203 The ingredients of the offence involve 
misappropriating of billions of Naira. After the plea deal, the charges were substituted and 
brought under Sec 309 of the Criminal Procedure Act, (CPA). Unlike the first charges under 
the EFCC Act, which attract a compulsory minimum jail term of fourteen years jail term 
without fine, the new charge under the CPA comes with an option of fine, granting the 
judge the choice of either awarding a custodial sentence or an option of fine. The judge 
awarded a fine of 750,000 Naira fine (approximately 2000 British pounds) (Nnochiri, 2013). 
This was perceived as uniquely disproportionate owing to the gravity of the offence and the 
amount involved. Hence, the decision was followed by enormous public condemnation from 
activists, civil society groups, and the public. To exonerate itself from the barrage of blame 
and accusations, the EFCC hastily issued a statement expressing reservations about the 
decision of the court:  
The EFCC has expressed reservation about the ruling of an FCT High Court, Abuja, 
which handed a six-year-jail term with the option of N750, 000 fine to John Yakubu 
Yusufu, one of the persons standing trial in the police pension scam. The commission 
is of the view that the option of fine runs contrary to the understanding between the 
prosecution and the defence wherein the convict consented to a custodial sentence 
with the forfeiture of all assets and money that are proceeds of the crime.” 
Although this may seem like an exceptional case that ignited a new kind of debate on the 
morality and justification for plea bargaining, it no doubt reveals how the system is 
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vulnerable to abuse and is far less than the kind of reform that a political system like Nigeria 
expects, especially with public corruption been the leading cause of economic and 
institutional decay. The kind of disproportionate sentence given in this case can only be 
possible because of plea bargaining.  
Moreover, the irony of the statement issued by the EFCC is how an agreement between the 
prosecution and the defence would be binding upon a judge who was not engaged in the 
process of the negotiation? Most significant however is the petition filed against the 
presiding judge, Justice Talba, by the Anti-Corruption Network (a coalition of civil society 
groups) to the National Judicial Council (NJC) accusing him of complicity and receiving a 
bribe in exchange for a ridiculously lighter penalty. In reaction to these allegations, the NJC, 
in a meeting held on the 24th and 25th of April 2013 under the Chairmanship of the Hon. 
Chief Justice of Nigeria, suspended Justice Talba from office for twelve months without pay 
(ibid).  
While the decision by the NJC was welcomed by many, it no doubt has far reaching 
implication on the future of plea bargaining, as it sets a warning precedent for judges to stay 
away from making decisions on matters that have a semblance of any kind of plea 
bargaining. In reference to this incident, one prosecutor laments:  
“Weeks after the suspension of Justice Talba by the NJC, I was in an Abuja high court 
for a matter, and even though the judge would ordinarily give an option of fine to 
such crimes since the accused pleaded guilty after we have resolved on a negotiated 
agreement, she awarded both fine and custodial sentence. All of us in the legal team 
were shocked and surprised, but we were also aware her choice has a lot to do with 
the events of the previous month that saw the suspension of her colleague [Justice 
Talba+.”204 
A similar incident that again reveals the extent to which plea bargaining has suffered a 
judicial setback is the ongoing prosecution where a Justice of the Federal Capital Territory 
High Court, sitting on the 14th of December 2015, said in open court to the prosecution, 
“Don’t mention plea bargain here. I don’t want to hear about it’’.205 Although the ACJA 2015 
Section 396 (3) and (4), stipulates speedy trial in any criminal matters, counsel for the 
accused had here demanded the court to consider grounds for plea bargaining, the judge 
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was clear and adamant in his response, insisting only on full trial of the four accused person 
brought by the EFCC on a 29-count charge of conspiracy and collecting money by false 
pretence (ibid). 
Considering the implications of these incidents on judicial participation, there is now a 
growing tendency for cases of plea bargaining to fail, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
ACJA 2015. Clearly, judges are becoming increasingly reluctant to allow a process that may 
end up in recrimination, accusations, and even suspension. But judicial participation itself is 
problematic. For example, studies have shown that when judges insist that parties should 
negotiate, it may be perceived as an administrative strategy for convenience, meant to 
alleviate the burden of full trial, as against the best interest of justice (Baldwin and 
Mcconville, 1979: 300), and where this becomes the prevailing perception of the public, it 
compromises the sentiment of fairness and justice. In general, judicial participation may not 
necessarily affect individual parties who might have consented to the outcome of the 
negotiation, but may affect the community’s perception of justice. There is also the problem 
which arises where a negotiation begins with the judge deeply involved, and it fails, thereby 
risking the possibility of damaging the defendant’s chances for a fair trial.  
 
7.4 Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 
One of the most significant reforms in Nigeria’s criminal justice administration was the 
recent enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 (henceforth ACJA). This 
law, which came into effect on the 15th of May 2015, is the only legislation that ever 
mentioned ‘plea bargaining’. It is important to state that this law, which brought in some 
important and far-reaching changes to criminal justice administration was deliberated and 
passed without proper publicity and without appropriate consultations with the public. It 
was, like many other legislations, done by the national assembly without subjecting it to 
public debate. Hence, it has now become a subject of controversy. The first time the case of 
the ACJA became a subject of national debate was on April 16th 2016, the senate introduced 
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another controversial bill to amend the Act,206 arguing that some provisions of the Act are 
fatal to Nigeria’s judicial system.  
 
In relation to the provisions of the Act on plea bargaining, it provides clear procedural rules 
on how and when the state can negotiate with a criminal offender. This is covered in Part 28 
of the Act. The provision did not put limitations as to the type of offences that can be 
negotiated. Instead, it implies that all types of offences vcan be subjected to plea 
bargaining. The opening sections of this part of the statute, i.e., Sec 270 (1) and (2) gives 
prosecutors the powers to “receive or offer” a plea bargain to a defendant charged with a 
criminal offence. The section went further to state that, the prosecution may enter into plea 
bargaining with the defendant, with the consent of the victim or his representative during or 
after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution, but before the presentation of 
the evidence of the defence. This is a replica of the old practice where a matter had to be 
filed before a court for any negotiations to begin. The implication of this process in the new 
Act will be discussed in the later part of this chapter. 
 
The preamble to the Act states that the purpose of the Act is to ensure that criminal justice 
administration in Nigeria becomes more efficient in the speedy dispensation of justice, 
protection of the society from crime and protection of the rights and interests of the 
suspect, the defendant, and also the victim.207  The Act states that it, “shall apply to criminal 
trials for offences established by an Act of the National Assembly and other crimes 
punishable in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.”208  This opening provision appears to 
have far-reaching implication regarding the concepts of both justice and jurisprudence. 
Although it is still too early to have any empirical evidence of the extent of its application 
and impact, it is evident that some of the exceptions and clauses contained in this Act are 
already raising some controversial jurisprudential questions that necessitate critical 
appraisal, especially as it creates a somewhat hybrid criminal justice process. 
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This research has already established that lower courts, i.e., magistrate’s courts across the 
country, do not engage in plea bargaining. All judges and attorneys interviewed in 
connection with this study confirmed that lower courts across Nigeria do not have laws that 
permit plea bargaining and it is hardly seen anywhere in their system of adjudication (with 
the exception of Lagos state that will be discussed later in this research). This suggests that 
simple offences and misdemeanour cases that often occur in magistrates courts are 
technically exempted from this new legislation.209 Furthermore, the Act clearly states that it 
applies only to offences established under the Act of the National Assembly, i.e., offences 
within exclusive Federal legislations such as money laundering, treasonable felony, crimes 
against national security or economy, human trafficking, and other related offences. 
Although these crimes are within the category of the gravest criminal offences in legislation, 
the new Act gives prosecutors unlimited discretion to negotiate in respect of any and all of 
these crimes.  
 
It is also noteworthy that many crimes defined under Nigeria’s Federal laws are white collar 
crimes that can be committed only by people with access to resources while most of the 
simple crimes that are heard by the magistrates courts are perpetrated by those in the 
lower class i.e. shoplifting, street fighting, and other similar offences. These simple crimes 
sometimes attract up to two years jail term, and magistrates do not hesitate in awarding 
such sentences.210 This can be compared to cases of plea bargaining i.e. the John Yakubu 
case or the Cecilia Ibru case, which are grave in nature and degree, but have attracted 
lighter sentences due to plea bargaining. Hence, some respondents referred to this and 
other cases, where they expressed severe concerns about the inconsistencies in 
sentencing.211  
 
With the idea of offering or receiving an offer to negotiate at the centre of the new 
provision included in the ACJA, the Act opened the way for federal offences to be subjected 
to plea bargaining. However, because the ACJA is a statute that does not operate in lower 
courts across the various states (with the exception of Lagos state), it technically creates a 
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hybrid system of criminal justice in which some courts can entertain plea bargaining while 
others lack the mandate to do so. What is even more contentious is that there are offences 
for which state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. This means that the same 
offence can be negotiated if it is prosecuted in a federal court and where the offender 
happens to be arraigned by a state prosecutor, then a full trial is the only option. Hence, 
punitive sentencing continues in states and negotiations emerge in federal courts.  This is an 
issue that would raise a number of criticisms as the courts begin to use plea bargaining 
frequently. Essentially, any system that treats the same kinds of offences with different 
sentencing procedure and outcomes is bound to attract criticism.  
 
Taking into account the social and economic inequality in Nigeria, the legal inconsistencies 
and sentencing differential arising from plea bargaining can easily be interpreted through 
the lenses of ‘conflict theory’, and attributed to power relations, where the weak get 
punished, and the strong get acquitted. Scholars such as Chambliss and Seidman (1971), 
Wacquant (2000) and Burke (2012) have all raised this challenge in criminal justice where 
the most severe sanctions are often imposed on persons in the lowest social class.  
 
It could be argued that the new Act has created a very fluid and jurisprudentially biased 
understanding of justice. As Felekens has pointed out, as long as plea bargaining continues 
to be a process with the potential of dealing with accused persons unequally, it will not be 
regarded as a procedure for ensuring justice (1976: 134). Although some scholars maintain 
that differential sentences cannot be labelled as unethical or unjust procedure (Scott and 
Stuntz, 1992; Turner, 2006), none of these scholars envisage an outcome where the 
inconsistency would be about punishing small crimes with a heavy sentence and serious 
crimes with a  lighter sentence. 
 
The procedure laid down under Sec 270 (2) of the Act states that the prosecution may enter 
into plea bargaining with the consent of the victim or his representative, during or after the 
presentation of the prosecution’s evidence but before the defence opens his case. This is a 
clear departure from the previous procedure in which the victim consent is irrelavant. Also, 
in conventional trials, the victim only serves as a witness and where necessary be 
compensated for any loss. Another important comparative aspect of this provision is that it 
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resembles the requirement under in civil law systems such as Germany and Italy, despite the 
fact that Nigeria is traditionally a common law regime. In relation to when the parties may 
enter a plea bargain, the ACJA in Sec 270 (2) laid down a precondition that the evidence of 
the prosecution must be sufficient to prove the offence charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The implication of this provision is that the prosecution must provide the court with 
a case diary containing sufficient evidence capable of securing a conviction before they 
embark on any negotiation. It is, however, important to stress here that, in contrast to what 
the drafters of this legislation may have imagined, the strength or weakness of any evidence 
remains a mere assumption until it is fully tested through rigours adversarial cross-
examination. Therefore the question of whether the evidence is capable of securing a 
conviction or not cannot be fully ascertained where the matter is not fully heard and 
evidence not fully challenged. The prosecution and the court may assume that the evidence 
is sufficient, but only after a rigorous trial can it be concluded that the accused is guilty or 
not. The fact that a case diary had been submitted to the court and a plea deal was struck 
prior to a full trial still leaves the question on whether a full trial could have acquitted the 
defendant. Where the accused on his or her own volition decides to plead guilty, then it 
could be strongly assumed that guilt has been duly established. But where the matter goes 
through some form of negotiation outside the court in which some charges were likely to be 
dropped in exchange for concession, then the truth of what transpired that led to the 
finality of the negotiation still remains only known to the parties that negotiated. 
 
Another implication of Sec 270 (2) is that the court must see all the contents of the indicting 
evidence contained in the prosecution’s evidence diary and in some cases listen to the 
prosecution as it presents its case against the accused. But because negotiations start 
before the defence opens its case, the judge is told only one side of the story, without 
hearing the other. This situation poses an inherent problem for the defence whose part of 
the story remains unheard, but also whose guilt had already been canvassed before the 
court. This is likely to put some defendants in a very disadvantaged situation because the 
provision of Sec 270 (4) goes further to state that after the conclusion of the negotiation, 
the judge or magistrate can convict the accused for his plea of guilty and impose the 
appropriate sentence. This clearly suggests that the judge is expected to sentence the 
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accused after he may have heard the prosecutor’s side of evidence and not that of the 
defence.   
 
The Act also provides certain clauses and exceptions that are relatively vague and subject to 
multiple interpretations. For example, Sec 270 (3) states that “for a prosecutor to offer or 
accept any plea bargaining, he must be of the view that the negotiation is in the interest of 
justice, the public interest, public policy and the need to prevent abuse of legal process.” 
The Act goes further to lay down certain criteria by which what public interest can be 
assessed. In Sec 270 (5) (b) (i) to (ix) enumerate public interest to mean a situation where 
the prosecution weighs all relevant factors, including:   
(i) The defendant’s willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of 
others.  
(ii) The defendant’s history with respect to criminal activity.  
(iii) The defendant’s remorse or contrition and his willingness to assume 
responsibility for his conduct.  
(iv) The desirability of prompt and certain disposition of the case. 
(v) The likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial and the probable effect on 
witnesses.  
(vi) The probable sentence or other consequences if the defendant is convicted.  
(vii) The need to avoid delay in the disposition of other pending cases; and  
(viii) The expense of trial and appeal.  
(ix) The defendant’s willingness to make restitution or pay compensation to the 
victim where appropriate.   
 
Although the list above suggests the importance of remorse and restitution or 
compensation where necessary, it also shows that the state has an interest in the 
cooperative ethos of managerialism which requires the defendant to cooperate, and to be 
willing to plead guilty in order not to waste the time and resources of the state public 
interest. This insistence on the defendant plead guilty for reduced sentence has been 
discussed extensively in scholarship as an aspect that sends a symbolic message to the 
public that the system’s prevailing priority is to obtain a conviction and not pursue justice 
based on facts and evidence (Wright and Miller, 2002: 33). It also affects the victims’ and 
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the public’s perception of justice, especially when unexplained leniency is awarded that 
apparently suggests that the primary goal is processing a case rapidly while justice is only a 
secondary objective (ibid). 
 
Concerning the extent of and limits on judges’ activities, the Act in Sec 270 (8) states 
that the presiding judge should not participate in the discussion. However, Subsections (9) 
to (10) state that the prosecution and defence must inform the judge of a completed 
negotiation, and the judge is then expected to make inquiries and to seek confirmation from 
the defence about the voluntariness or the plea. Sec 270 (9) (b) gives an extended power to 
the judge to rescind the plea agreement if in his opinion, the defendant cannot be convicted 
of the offence in respect of which the agreement was reached and to which the defendant 
has pleaded guilty or that the agreement is in conflict with the defendant’s right. If this 
becomes the case, a plea of not guilty shall be recorded, and the matter is tried fully. This 
provision raises a new kind of problem on whether the defendant will have his or her trial 
under an atmosphere where he or she will be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
However, the strength of this safeguard lies in the hope that the trial judge is the person 
that declines to accept such plea because he or she thinks the substance of the case and the 
negotiation is not sufficient to convict the defendant. By this, the prosecution is put under 
the obligation of proving the case in an open court and every piece of evidence is 
henceforth bound to be subjected to scrutiny. 
 
With regard to sentence limits in a plea bargain, the Act in Sec 270 (11) stipulates that in the 
event of a successful bargain the judge should consider the penalty as agreed upon and (a) 
satisfied that such sentence is an appropriate sentence, it shall be imposed, or impose a 
lesser sentence if that is the most suitable in the circumstance. This is a departure from the 
old unregulated practice where judges do not receive any information on the agreement 
between the parties. Earlier, empirical evidence from this research has shown that 
prosecutors do not engage in any form sentence recommendation to judges. It is, however, 
important to stress that by the provisions of the Act, the judge is not under obligation to 
accept any sentence agreed upon by the parties. Sec 270 (11-15) states that where the 
judge is of the view that the offence requires a heavier sentence than the sentence agreed 
upon, he shall inform the defendant of such heavier sentence he considers to be 
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appropriate, in which case the defendant may abide by his plea of guilty as agreed upon and 
agree that, subject to the defendant’s right to lead evidence and to present argument 
relevant to sentencing, the presiding judge or magistrate proceed with the sentencing.  
 
Sec 270 (18) also provides that any judgement reached after a negotiated plea is final and 
cannot be appealed, except where fraud is alleged. This is clearly a major issue for the new 
Act. The idea that matters are closed against any judicial review, affects the right of parties 
to raise the case before a superior court even where there is a legitimate cause to do so. 
Yet, the significance of appeals and judicial review in criminal justice cannot be over 
emphasised. It has historically been the most important means through which parties can 
challenge the decision of the lower court and seek redress. Where the law, such as the one 
contained in this new Act, clearly prohibits appeals, then parties have to accept any verdict 
irrespective of how bad or unjustified it turns out to be.  
 
Apart from what was already discussed, there are other implications of the model as set out 
in this Act. First is that all parties are involved. Although one may argue that the provisions 
of Sec 270 (8) prevent the judge from participating, but the fact that the prosecution 
evidence is first presented and argued before him, along with the requirement for the judge 
to inquire into the contents of the negotiation, technically makes him or her a party to the 
process. Secondly, the victim whose permission should be sought is also a principal party in 
the negotiation, because without his or her consent, the negotiation cannot be valid. 
Although this system is at its formative stage and has not yet revealed sufficient insight into 
the intricacies of how all these parties work in ensuring a negotiated settlements, critique of 
plea bargaining in other regimes have discussed how bringing all the parties including the 
judge and the victim into the process, often makes bargaining impossible (Batra, 2015: 582).  
 
Other important aspects of the new Act that are worthy of note includes the fact that it 
makes no limitation as to the type or degree of offences to be negotiated. While this 
resembles the system in the US, it also differs in the sense that, victims in Nigeria have 
powers to reject a proposal for a plea bargaining proposal.212 In this case, the prosecution is 
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left with only the option of pursuing a full trial. The Act also gives judges powers of inquiry 
into the negotiation.213 This tilts the system to resemble models in civil law such as 
Germany, Italy and Russia where the victim and the judge are all principal parties in the 
negotiation. However, it is different from civil law models from the context of the kinds of 
offences that are allowed to be negotiated and on issues of appeal. The ACJA 2015 permits 
prosecutors in Nigeria to negotiate all classes of offence but limits the powers of appeal.214 
The Nigerian model under the new Act is, therefore, unique in its own right. First, it does not 
follow the US model as it gives powers to the victim to accept or reject plea bargaining. It 
also does not follow most continental European models because it limits most negotiations 
to serious rather than simple offences.  
 
The Italian Model also set clear limits to plea bargaining, especially in a ‘Party Agreed 
Sentence’ (Pattegiamento della pena) which only allows for plea ‘bargaining in minor 
categories of offences involving pecuniary fines or where the statutory sentence reduction 
of up to one-third, would not exceed two years imprisonment (Gifford, 1983: 80).  If one 
takes the Russian model into account, the CPC 2001 restricts plea bargaining to only those 
offences whose original punishment does not exceed 10 years.215  
 
Although the new Act appears to be limited in scope, it no doubt covers most of the 
offences within the statutory jurisdiction of the EFCC and the ICPC. The question, however, 
remains as to how the two commissions will cope with a newly modelled practice that 
requires all parties to be involved in the process. It is too early to reach any firm conclusion 
as to how the Act will operate since it is yet to undergo a rigorous test in both conventional 
courts and the court of public opinion. 
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7.5 Conclusion  
Whether in the context of the old unregulated practice or the new modelled introduced via 
the ACJA 2015, evidence shows that the system of plea bargaining in Nigeria is mainly driven 
by the ‘charge bargain’ procedure that entails a common pattern of dropping or substitution 
of charges solely by the prosecution. Although the old practice appears to be entirely a 
matter between the prosecution and the defence, there are now new players in the process 
who include the judge and the victim. What evidence shows also is that in the new model, 
the standard practice begins with investigation and prosecution where prosecutors present 
to the court the accusation and the evidence diary. This process is the same for all criminal 
cases initiated before any high court of the land. All available evidence suggests that plea 
bargaining is discussed after the case has been duly filed with the court. 
 
The development of plea bargaining in Nigeria also suggests that when a system grant 
attractive incentives to parties, it is likely to continue among parties even if it is criticised 
from the outside. Data from this research has, for example, shown that in order to benefit 
from the expediency and finality that plea bargaining offers, practitioners have been able to 
devise an informal design of deliberate arraignment of accused person and then seeking for 
constant adjournments until a negotiated settlement becomes possible. Once that goal is 
reached, the prosecution then returns to court to begin the process of  withdrawing and 
substituting charges, which is allowed under the law. This subsequent process which is legal 
now shields the previous technic which is not legal. Moreover, what the parties do not say 
to the court is their motivation to withdraw or substitute charges were based on a 
negotiated settlement. The practice has also developed to include a system of delaying 
cases through adjournments, where the parties need to resolve matters of compensation 
for victims. As will be discussed at length in the following chapters, prosecutors have the 
advantage of withdrawing or substituting charges with similar ones under different statutes 
because the criminal legislation allows a choice of alternative statutes in formulating 
charges. Even though this method has come under criticism, it does not necessarily offend 
against the existing law. Instead, it is an old custom of the adversarial system, which grants 
the prosecution the powers to decide on the charges to present before a judge.  
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The success of prosecutors and defence counsels in inventing a method of plea negotiation 
at a time when there was no law to that effect can be attributed to many factors. Although 
earlier discussions have pointed to the relevance and influence of bigger conceptions such 
as the globalisation of plea bargaining and the pressure of the international community for 
Nigeria to reform the way it deals with the growing cases of corruption and cross-border 
organized crimes, there is also the internal institutional perspective which has been 
demonstrated in this chapter. Evidently, the initiative that brought the EFCC and the ICPC 
also came with a new approach to professionalism and the regulation of work in terms of 
investigation and prosecution. This relates to back to the ‘functionalist theory’ perspective 
discussed earlier in this research, which suggests that professionalism is on the side of state 
officials, and the ability to obtain strong and irrefutable evidence is key in persuading a 
negotiated plea. Respondents to this research have also confirmed the extent of investment 
made to empower the commissions and enhance their capacity for investigation and 
prosecution. Another important factor is that most of the cases under the jurisdiction of the 
commissions carry punitive penalties. That, along with the possibility of a negotiated 
settlement for a lesser sentence is no doubt an incentive for both the prosecution and the 
defence to come to terms of the gravity of charges and to seek a plea bargain.  
 
However, as evidence shows, there is a peculiar implication with the old practice that is 
unregulated and designed in a way that the offer to negotiate is expected to come from the 
defence. This has put the defence in a very weak position and ensured that the prosecution 
has the strongest influence on the outcome. However, it is also important to stress that, in 
all the cases of plea bargaining contained in Appendix A and B, the prosecution have shown 
a tendency to award large sentence concessions for guilty pleas. What this demonstrates is 
that both the prosecution and the defence could be beneficiaries of a successful plea 
bargain. Some proponents went further to argue that plea bargaining in Nigeria is mostly a 
consensual process that allows the defence to make “willing and informed decision capable 
of reducing their sentence.”216  
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In terms of judicial participation and sentencing, there is clear evidence to suggest that 
judges do not engage in the process of any negotiation but maintain an absolute prerogative 
over sentencing, irrespective of what the negotiation contains. It is, however, important to 
state that where charges are withdrawn or downgraded, the judges’ powers to award 
punitive sentence are drastically reduced because he cannot award beyond what the law 
stipulates for the new offence. Hence, they are constrained to give a sentence with 
particular legal limits. Keeping judges entirely outside plea bargaining has to a greater 
extent proved effective, but it was also shown how this has also fueled controversies in the 
criminal justice system.  
 
While plea bargaining has over the years developed as part of the prosecution system, the 
introduction of the ACJA is bound to affect the future of these negotiations. The provisions 
of the new Act clearly create a controversial new regime of criminal justice because the 
chance to negotiate is reserved to Federal offences, and mostly to offences that are serious 
in nature. Another characteristic introduced by the new Act resembles the problematic 
model often found in civil law regimes where all parties including the victim have a stake in 
the negotiation process. Other areas of difficulty include the clauses that disallow appeal, 
which has the potential of creating dispute and negative perception where a case happens 
to be controversially decided. It is, however, early to make strong claims about the how the 
Act will operate in practice and the kinds of polemics it will generate.  
 
For many reasons including jurisprudential, historical, political and economic, a large 
proportion of the public and professionals alike do not endorse plea bargaining as a system 
that promotes the legitimate objectives of the criminal justice system not to mention the 
priorities for which the EFCC and the ICPC were established. What is evident, however, is 
that both commissions have unceasingly used this system to successfully secure convictions 
conviction of a number of notorious cases that would ordinarily have been protracted in 
courts for decades.  
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Chapter Eight 
Practical dynamics of charges and sentencing: an examination of records and 
the hierarchy of courts. 
8.0 Introduction 
Previous chapters have shown that the controversy on plea bargaining in Nigeria were often 
due to either the notoriety of the cases been negotiated or the lack of empirical knowledge 
about the nature and extent of the operation of plea bargaining in the criminal justice 
system. Hence, it safe to argue that the character of the defendants, the gravity of the 
offence as well as in the lack of transparency, rather than the amount of cases involving 
negotiation have been the major sources of contention and confusion. Another aspect that 
often adds to the controversy is the degree of unexplained sentence concession awarded 
for negotiated cases. These aspects of plea bargaining have significantly affected public 
perceptions. 
Having demonstrated in earlier chapters the low rate of plea bargaining in Nigeria in 
comparison to full trials; it is important also to distinguish the extent of the application of 
plea bargaining as this differs between the two prominent prosecuting agencies, i.e., the 
EFCC and the ICPC. The aim is to explore the prosecutorial activities of these agencies in the 
cause of of plea bargaining. To do this, the chapter will examine the records of the EFCC and 
the ICPC regarding the various cases prosecuted in various courts in order to understand the 
variables that define the processes and outcomes. This will include the legal and procedural 
technicalities, as well as the way convictions are obtained, and sentences passed.  
As a background to this chapter, it is relevant to note that prosecutors responding to this 
research maintained that cases of plea bargaining are often treated in the simplest way i.e., 
through the technicality of withdrawal and substitution of charges, “which happens quickly 
and often very quietly.”217 Evidence also shows that neither inside the court nor the records 
of prosecution or conviction was the phrase ‘plea bargaining’ often mentioned.218 Instead, 
one can detect its existence from the expedited mode the cases were disposed, the 
disclosure by prosecutors of the EFCC and the ICPC that these are evidence of plea 
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bargaining, and indeed the evidence that the degree of sentence awarded to a particular 
case is in contrast to the compulsory sentencing limit for the original charge contained in 
the document. (As will be seen later, the final sentence for these cases is often greatly 
discounted when compared to the mandatory sentence for the original charges contained in 
the records). Relying on these records of charges and conviction as well as the responses of 
interviewees, this chapter analyses the issues raised previously. It also examines the 
technics used in securing a guilty plea.  
8.1 Analysis of records of Conviction by the EFCC and the ICPC 
The records contained in Appendix A, B and C were the only accurate and public records 
obtained and they are arranged in this research in the following order: 
a. Appendix A and B contain the records of prosecution and conviction from 2006 
to 2014.  
b. Appendix C is the record of conviction and sentencing by the ICPC from 2009 to 
2014. 
8.1.1 Analysis of Appendix A: EFCC Records of Conviction, 2013 
First, the data in Appendix A and B gives credence to earlier claims that prosecution and 
convictions by the EFCC are almost all the time pursued in High courts, with no record to 
show that any of the cases was heard in a lower court. Hence, the history of the application 
of plea bargaining is one that currently excludes lower courts, i.e., magistrates’ court. In 
addition, analysis of the nature of offences and the sentenced awarded (in Appendix A, B, 
and C), it is evident that about 40 per cent of the sentences were lighter than those which 
could have been imposed in respect of the original charges. Although the substitutions of 
charges were not clearly reflected in the document, it is evident from the levels of the final 
sentence that the defendants were not sentenced for the original charges on the 
documents. Shedding light on the relative leniency of the final sentences as compared to 
the original charges, prosecutors admit that they are often as a result of negotiation, 
substitution, and concession.219 As one prosecutor states, “in cases that involve crimes 
relating to fraud, cheating or misappropriation of public  fund, which are the most common 
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in our diary, the Commission, after a successful negotiation, substitute(s) the charges with 
those that give the room for a shorter sentence.”220  
Records from Appendix A and B (EFCC records of conviction) clearly shows  the prevalence 
of charges for the offence of ‘Obtaining Money by False Pretence’, which is an offence 
defined under Section 1 of the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences Act, 
2006 (henceforth, AFFA).221 The provision of this section holds that it is a crime for any 
person by themselves or through accessories to use false pretence to defraud and obtains 
money or property.222 The punishment as provided in the same section is imprisonment for 
a term of not less than seven years without the option of a fine. What often happens here is 
that since the ingredients of this offence cover an array of criminal acts often prosecuted by 
the Commission; it becomes a convenient and an all-encompassing provision to use in 
framing charges.223 The reason this charge is frequently used according to prosecutors is 
because the ingredients of this offence cover the characteristics of many other related 
offences, like fraud, cheating, cyber scam, using false documents or some form of false 
representation to obtain money or any valuable item, or using all sorts of tricks to defraud 
and take money from unsuspecting individuals.224 Remember, said one respondent:  
“Whenever a person wants to defraud others, he must either pretend he is someone 
he is not, or use a false document, make false claims, misrepresent facts or pretend 
that what is illegitimate is legitimate. So the offence of obtaining money or any 
valuable under false pretence can easily accommodate the elements (of) many 
financial crimes.”225 
Most importantly, the harsh sentence provided for this offence makes it an obvious way of 
encouraging the defendant to accept a guilty plea. Prosecutors of the EFCC admit that this 
provision is commonly used, and defendants often agree to negotiate if the charge will be 
substituted with one that has a lighter sentence or one that carries an option of fine. 
Prosecutors226 admit that when parties agree to negotiate, the charge under the AFFA is 
often substituted with its counterpart under the Criminal Code Act, 2004 (henceforth, 
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CCA),227 particularly the section that defines the offence of ‘Obtaining Property by false 
pretences; Cheating’,228 or the Penal Codes Act, 2004 (henceforth, PCA),229 which define 
similar offence as ‘Obtaining money or property by false or cheating’.230 Both laws far lesser 
sentence that the AFFA. The CCA, for instance, carries a prison term of two years while the 
PCA carries a sentence of fewer than five years with an option of a fine.231 
In trying to further analyse the above situations in light of the sentence outcome of a 
negotiated case and those which went through full trial, , the research took examples from 
cases No. 7,232 105233 and 110,234 where the charges were for the offence of ‘obtaining 
money under false pretence’, which is an offence provided under the AFFA. The AFFA was 
clear that for this kind of offence, the mandatory conviction is a minimum prison term of 
seven years without the option of a fine. And in all the three cases mentioned above, the 
accused persons were given sentences as prescribed under the AFFA. However, when one 
looks at the same charges in cases No. 61235 and 69,236 the defendants were given a 
proportionally smaller sentence of six months imprisonment. This clearly shows that, 
despite the original charge under the AFFA, the later defendants (No. 61 and 69) were not 
sentenced under this law. Instead, their charges were substituted, which allowed the court 
to give a disproportionately shorter sentence of 6 months for each of the accused. This 
pattern can be seen throughout the table of cases in both appendices A and B.  
The above examples are evidence of the extent of concession enjoyed by those who resort 
to plea bargaining as against those who go to trial. It, however, raises a significant question 
regarding discrepancies in sentencing similar offences and raises questions as to how 
prosecutors compromise on charges in order to obtain guilty pleas. A typical example of this 
kind of significant compromise is case No. 95, in which the accused was charged with five 
counts including impersonation, forgery, conspiracy, money laundering and obtaining 
money by false pretence. Records of conviction for this case shows that the offender was 
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given a mere four months’ imprisonment while others convicted of similar combined 
charges received more than 10 years in jail. Paradoxically, in the case mentioned above, i.e., 
case No. 105,237 the accused was convicted for only one of the charges here and was 
sentenced to a 14 years prison term.  
Evidence of harsh penalties after trial are also seen throughout the appendixes. In cases No. 
12,238 31,239 34240, and 41241 of appendix A, and others in appendix B, common feature can 
be discerned i.e., these cases were in court for between 4 to six years before conviction, 
suggesting that they went through full trial, the outcome of which were punitive jail terms 
for each of the defendants in these case. Beyond the sentences, it also confirms how cases 
that did not go through plea bargaining can last for years even with the EFCC.  
Another important question addressed by this research relates to the few cases where the 
final sentence shows evidence of plea bargaining, yet they appear to have been in court for 
a long period. Explaining this paradox, prosecutors suggest that some cases take a longer 
time to arrive at an agreed settlement because of certain contingencies such as the 
identification and confiscation of assets, or restoration of victims.242 To arrive at an agreed 
compensation for victims or the repatriation of public funds concealed in other places, 
investigations may well continue for a long time while the case is pending in court.243 This 
situation is evident for example in cases No. 58,244 which began in 2009 and ended in 2013. 
In this case, the defendant was sentenced to pay restitution of 7.2million Naira. Similarly, 
case No. 65,245 which began in 2010 until 2013 involved the recovery of a large amount of 
property.  
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8.1.2 Appendix B, EFCC Records of Conviction, 2014 
A further examination of the contents of Appendix B shows that the character of the 
charges and sentencing has not changed from the previous year. What is important to note, 
however, is that the rate of plea bargaining has increased compared to what was found in 
the previous record, i.e., appendix A. About 50 per cent of the convictions in 2014 show that 
the final sentence is a reduction from what could have been awarded if the defendants 
were convicted on the original charges, as against 40 per cent in 2013. A similar pattern of 
significant concessions can be seen in this Appendix. For example, in case No. 23,246 the 
accused was convicted and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment in addition to 220,000 
Nigerian Naira restitution for the offences of fraud and obtaining money by false 
pretences.247 Similarly, situations were found in cases No. 26,248 and 27249 of the same 
appendix. These are clear examples of convictions without plea bargaining. But in case No. 
30,250 another person was convicted of the same kind of offence. Yet, in what is clearly a 
case of substituted charge due to plea bargaining, a proportionately lenient sentence of 6 
months imprisonment with an option of fine was granted by the court.251 This is noticeable 
because the minimum sentence for the original charges is above 6 months imprisonment 
and only a substitution of charges will bring the sentence to 6 months.  
Another detail evident in this Appendix is that 73 cases were in state high courts and 53 in 
federal high courts. This shows that 63 per cent of all the cases in 2013 were in state high 
courts, suggesting a drop from 71 per cent in 2013 record. This evidence shows that the 
EFCC is resorting more to the Federal high courts for convictions rather than state high 
courts as in previous years. There is, however, more to this than just seeking for conviction. 
As one respondent stated, “depending on the nature of the case and the jurisdiction of the 
courts, we decided either to prosecute in a federal court or a state high court.”252 The 
explanation here is that there is a rise in the prosecution of certain cases that are under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of federal high courts, i.e., cases of cyber-crime, bunkering of a 
petroleum pipeline or illegal dealing in petroleum products and currency counterfeiting, 
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which is also evident in the contents of the Appendix. It is, however, important to stress that 
this change is not substantial, and it was virtually unnoticed by the respondents until they 
were confronted with the details during this research. 
 
8.1.3 Analysis of Appendix C, ICPC Records of Conviction 2013-2014 
The records of conviction of criminal cases obtained from the ICPC from 2013 to 2014 show 
the extent of application of plea bargaining as well the manner in which the Commission 
pursues its cases in various courts across the country.  
Unlike the EFCC, the ICPC had only undertaken a few criminal prosecutions and obtained 
even fewer convictions. The records contained in Appendix C to this chapter record only 93 
criminal cases spanning from 2001 to 2014. Contrary to what was found in the records of 
the EFCC, the ICPC has a number of civil cases. Most significant is that the record from the 
ICPC scarcely indicate any form of plea bargaining, which further confirms the views of 
prosecutors of the Commission that the ICPC application of plea bargaining is small 
compared to that of the EFCC.253 “Even when we do plea bargaining, we tend to be discreet 
about it,” reported a prosecutor of the ICPC.254  
The records in Appendix C show that of the 54 criminal cases still pending in 2013, there 
were only four successful convictions, three others were on appeal in the Court of Appeals, 
while six were pending at the Supreme Court. 2014 saw even fewer convictions; only 3 cases 
were successfully convicted, six were pending in the Court of Appeals and one in the 
Supreme Court. In all, in the span of two years, the ICPC obtained only seven convictions, 
while over 90 per cent of their criminal cases were still pending in various courts across the 
country, with some still at early stages of prosecution after more than 2 years before the 
court.255 Another aspect of prosecution by the ICPC is found to be slowness and inefficiency. 
For example in cases No. 4256 and 7257 and 14,258 the cases were dated 2013 but scheduled 
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to be mentioned in court in 2015. Similar to the criminal cases mentioned, records of the 
civil cases show the same pattern. Of the 39 civil cases contained in their records, the 
majority are still pending in courts.  
In all, the approach of the ICPC to prosecution has shown a clear departure from the 
principle of expediency and efficiency, which the Commissions agenda emphasises. This can 
be seen in the many instances mentioned. Especially, it can be seen in records where the 
courts were constrained to strike out cases because the only reason the Commission could 
give was that accused person has disappeared, and all efforts to trace them had proved 
abortive.259 There are also cases in the document that were struck out due to a lack of 
diligent prosecution.260 These different scenarios reveal lucidly that the ICPC, for the most 
part, is slow and ineffective, lacking the kind of proactive approach of the EFCC.  
The records in Appendix B is conclusive evidence of the fact that, even if the ICPC is discreet 
about the way it applies plea bargaining, as claimed by a prosecutor of the Commission,261 
the low number of successful convictions shows a pattern that reveals even fewer cases of 
plea bargaining.262 This further confirms the overall state of plea bargaining as put by one 
respondent: 
“The system of plea bargaining is not so pervasive, and opinions on whether it is 
justified or not are sharply divided even among senior officials of the Commission. For 
the few that are disposed to apply(ing) (sic) plea bargain, they mostly do it in a 
careful and inconspicuous manner. It is not as common as many people assume. So 
far, I can say even the bosses in our office (ICPC) sometimes avoid it.”263 
Concerning the choice of court, records in Appendix B reveal that most of the cases by the 
ICPC were instituted in state high courts and very few in federal high courts. This choice of 
jurisdiction is not unrelated to the fact that, unlike the EFCC which was mandated by law to 
apply a number of Federal statutes such as the Money Laundering Act 1995, the Advance 
Fee Fraud and other Related Offences act, 2006, the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and 
the Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994 (as amended), and the Banks and other 
                                                 
259
 See for example FRN v Emmanuel Okeke, ID/414C/2013; FRN v Hon. Philip Shaibu, HC/ICPC/1/2013. 
260
 See for example FRN v Hon. Victor Bamidele and 2 others, HCL/77C/2013; Also FRN v Hon. Basil Ganagana 
and 2 others A/ICPC/1C/2014. 
261
 Interview No. 9. 
262
 In interviews No. 9 and 12 
263
 Interview No. 9. 
 180 
Financial Institutions Act 1991 (as amended), Miscellaneous Offences Act,264 the ICPC, for 
the most part, applies only the ICPC Act or the provisions of the CCA. Another factor is that 
the ICPC has a divided role, which involves bureaucratic oversight over governmental 
institutions and well as public awareness campaigns on anti-corruption initiatives. These are 
not prosecutorial roles. Putting this into context, one of the prosecutors of the Commission 
argued, “We are involved in more than prosecution. The Commission also review issues of 
due process and ethical standards among governmental and private institutions.”265 It is 
evident that the Commission places great weight on these oversight functions and in its 
2013 official bulletin it proudly claimed success in addressing some of the growing bad 
practices in institutions of learning and dealing with situations of colleges that have not met 
licencing standards.266 Hence, the earlier assumption that the ICPC also engages in 
numerous cases of plea bargaining lacks empirical foundation. From the entire records 
contained in Appendix C, there was only one case to suggest that plea bargaining took 
place.267  
8.2 Dynamics of Charging and Sentencing 
There are a number of dynamics in the Nigerian criminal justice system that make plea 
bargaining possible notwithstanding the legislative framework. Most important is the power 
of prosecutors to apply different laws to frame charges. To understand how this operates, 
one has to understand that Nigeria’s criminal system is determined by a complex web of 
legislation designed for different prosecutorial bodies. Furthermore, these laws are often 
very punitive, particularly when it comes to the use of custodial sentences.268  As seen in the 
Appendixes, they are even harsher when punishing the types of crimes that often end up on 
the negotiating table of the EFCC. Hence, there is always the potential that those 
prosecuted by the EFCC face the daunting reality of either offering to negotiate or risking a 
very punitive outcome. The techniques used for choosing and applying the provisions of 
different laws have become a successful methodology by which the EFCC can bargain. The 
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case of Cecilia Ibru, the former CEO of Oceanic Bank Nigeria is a typical example of this. 
After negotiation, she pleaded guilty to three of the 25 initial charges of fraud and 
mismanagement and was sentenced to six months in jail. The offences, if not negotiated 
could have attracted up to 14 years in jail. Discussing this, a prosecutor noted:  
“To fulfil the terms of a negotiation, parties explore this legal diversity and come to 
terms on what charges to uphold and which to substitute or drop. Where the 
ingredients for the alleged crime are similar under different legislations, one may 
choose from the one that has the most lenient sentence. This serves as the reward for 
the accused person’s willingness to plead guilty.”269 
Others instances found in the records reveal the dynamics of charging and sentencing 
techniques. A case in point is the offence of forging a document contrary to Section 465 of 
the CCA and described as the altering of any genuine document or writing in any material 
part, either by erasure, obliteration, changing or removal of any part, or making any 
material addition to the body of a genuine document.270 This offence, if convicted under the 
CCA, attracts a penalty of up to life imprisonment as against the same offence under the 
PCA, described as ‘making a false document’, which attracts a punishment not exceeding 
fourteen years jail term. What the records in Appendix A and B show that the EFCC places its 
initial charges based on these punitive legislations and when it is time to negotiate, they 
then substitute the harsh charges under the CCA, which attracts life imprisonment with 
others that are lenient e.g., the PCA or the AFFA, both of which result in a significantly 
reduced sentence.271  
Another obvious technique used, which is evident in both Appendix A and B is that charges 
are first framed using the harshest legislation, which technically is a way of either ensuring 
the toughest penalty or encouraging the alleged offender to seek for plea bargaining. 
Despite the evidence that negotiations, substitution of charges and concessions exist, 
nowhere in the documents obtained was there any mention of ‘plea bargaining’. It is, 
however, important to state that no evidence suggests that excessively punitive legislation 
was amongst the key factors that gave rise to plea bargaining in Nigeria, what the data 
explains is that the existence of harsher sentences, side by side with lighter ones has 
created the opportunity for parties to have different choices. But it is also important to note 
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that this situation is an incentive, especially for prosecutors. 
8.3 Effects of hierarchy, division of courts and jurisdictional boundaries  
One of the most important aspects affecting the application of laws is in Nigeria is the 
nature of the country’s constitutional federalism that allows each of the 36 states to have 
their high courts and magistrates’ courts. The jurisdictional powers of these courts, 
particularly the magistrates’ courts are set out by individual states legislation. Although 
some respondents claimed that the EFCC and the ICPC have wide jurisdictions over different 
offences, including misdemeanours that they also prosecuted before magistrates,272 there is 
no evidence in all of this research to suggest that any of the Commissions used these 
powers.273 Moreover, the ICPC Act clearly states that the Attorney General of the Federation 
can delegate his authority in a proceeding before any superior court of record so designated 
by the Chief Judge of a State, or the Chief Judge of the Federal Capital Territory.274 This 
provision made clear reference to ‘Superior courts’ i.e. high courts. Because prosecutors of 
both the ICPC and EFCC are regarded in law as serving under the Attorney General of the 
Federation, reference can easily be made to this provision as a way of avoiding magistrates’ 
courts.  
Prosecutors of the EFCC, however, maintained that because the Commission is concerned 
with major offences, there is no need to become embroiled in the heavy workload of minor 
offences. Hence, they allow other prosecuting bodies, i.e., staff at the various state offices 
of public prosecution as well as police prosecutors, to deal with offences in lower courts.275 
Another reason why lower courts are sometimes avoided by the EFCC was articulated by 
one of the respondents who pointed out, “since offences such as breach of trust can also be 
tried at High Courts, we prefer to deal with those courts than go to magistrates’ courts. It is 
actually not about legal restriction; it is just a custom developed over time.”276 This claim is 
verifiable, for example from the records in appendix A, particularly cases No. 9,277 19278 and 
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83,279 where the accused persons were charged with offences ranging from an attempt to 
steal, conspiracy to criminal breach of trust. These are offences that fall within the 
jurisdiction of most magistrates, but also triable by High Courts. 
From the evidence gathered, it is clear that the two Commissions have made it customary to 
avoid magistrates’ courts for prosecutions even when the offence is within the jurisdiction 
of a magistrate.280 There is, however, an exception to this custom as pointed out by one 
prosecutor. He referred to situations where the High Court is on vacation, and the need 
arises for a remand warrant to be issued. If there is a need to keep the suspect longer for 
further investigation or where the scheduled date for the first arraignment is distant, then 
the Commission usually approaches a magistrate for an order to remand the accused or to 
move them to a prison facility.281 The argument that chasing simple offences will add to 
their workload is legitimate. However, it is important also to note that if they were to use 
Magistrates’ Courts more frequently, then the opportunity to use charges with punitive 
penalties, as a bargaining counter would be unavailable because most magistrates lack the 
jurisdiction to impose such harsh penalties.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Analysis of the records of prosecution and the sentencing shows that there are many 
variables that lead to a successful plea bargain. The major factor as was evident in the 
records examined so far was the choice that a prosecutor makes in framing charges and 
accepting a plea offer. These choices become possible because the law does not give rules 
of procedure on the application of plea bargaining. Hence, it becomes wholly a matter of 
discretion for the prosecution to use different means and technicalities that will ensure a 
negotiated settlement. The character of all the negotiated cases examined during this 
research reveal a clear pattern designed around the substitution and downgrading of 
charges by the prosecution.. Being that the system of plea bargaining in Nigeria is built 
around the charge bargaining procedure also permits the prosecution to “cherry pick” 
among different existing laws in order to fulfil the conditions for a negotiation. 
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Another important finding is that, unlike what was previously thought by other writers and 
commentators, empirical evidence shows only a limited number of plea bargained cases in 
Nigeria. The ICPC, in fact, has only one case that shows signs of a negotiated settlement. 
Although this does not mean that they have not had other cases settled through this 
procedure, there is not tangible evidence in that regard.  
Based on these findings, one can plausibly argue that the utility of plea bargaining in Nigeria 
is not related to the excessive workload or overcrowded docket theory as is the case in 
other jurisdictions around the world. What is evident is that through routine practice and 
the need for convenience, prosecutors have devised techniques, foremost of which is that 
of strategic overcharging to evoke fear in the defendant. By doing so, they are assured of 
the potential for the defence to seek a negotiated settlement. Prosecutors, especially at the 
EFCC claimed to be well trained and their capacity to gather strong evidence is a major 
factor that makes plea bargaining possible.282  
Although prosecutors were adamant to admit that overcharging is a coercive means of 
obtaining a plea, the practice of using punitive laws to frame initial charges and substituting 
them with lighter ones after a plea bargaining, qualifies as psychological coercion, especially 
since the defendant knows that the only means of obtaining a substantial penal discount is 
to plead guilty. This, however, does not undermine the fact that, through plea bargaining, a 
number of high profile cases were successfully resolved. The documents analysed have 
demonstrated this advantage that plea bargaining presents. Moreover, plea bargaining has 
proven to be a system that serves institutional demands as well the interest of parties, 
perhaps depending on the circumstances of the case. What is also clear from this chapter is 
that plea bargaining, as opposed to lengthy trials has proven to be a highly suitable 
alternative for cases of corruption, particularly those handled by the EFCC.  
The major problem is that the quest for efficiency is allowed to take the place of procedural 
justice, since most cases of plea bargaining are about how much the prosecution is willing to 
trade-off and what kind of offer the defendant is willing to accept. Unlike conventional 
trials, the system of negotiation is like a trade with an offer and an offeree, the outcome of 
which is based on the consensus of the two parties and is often not known to the public 
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how the process was carried out. Hence, plea bargaining has continued to breed suspicion 
among the public whose legitimate interest in criminal justice is to see an open process 
where facts and evidence will be transparently argued and resolved. But as seen throughout 
the development of plea bargaining, negotiations are not done in open space, which has 
resulted in negative sentiment on legality, procedural justice and fairness of the entire 
process. While the prosecution may be interested in the expeditious disposal of cases, it is 
notable that such attitude presents the danger of dismantling the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system by compromising its core values of tar5nsparency and accountability, 
especially in jurisdictions like Nigeria where the justice system has remained under 
enormous public scrutiny and accusation of bias and corruption.  
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Chapter Nine 
Legality and Legitimacy: statute, precedent, and sentiment. 
 
9.0 Introduction 
Against the backdrop of the controversies that greeted some of the cases settled through 
plea bargaining, Nigerians have expressed a variety of opinions on the utility and legality of 
plea bargaining. Some of these are strong opinions that touch on some important issues 
surrounding both legal procedure, conflict of laws, and even the principles of the rule of law. 
As we saw in the previous chapters, the criticism to plea bargaining has led to other 
extended challenges, including the pressure on practitioners to avoid negotiation. Even the 
introduction of the ACJA 2015, which might have been expected to have resolved the issue 
has, in fact, ignited new controversies. 
In a recent debate organized by the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) regarding the inclusion of 
plea bargaining in the ACJA 2015, it was evident how divergent opinions are even amongst 
legal experts. Two senior lawyers among the participants argued that plea bargaining in 
Nigeria raises serious issues relating to equality before the law. This they said is because the 
system applies exclusively to defendants who are accused of corruption.283 Stealing public 
money said another, and “returning part of it and walking away is like encouraging us to 
steal more” (ibid). He further stated that, despite the advantages of plea bargaining, it is not 
the best mechanisms if the scourge of public corruption is to be addressed (ibid). Others 
raised similar concerns, “the most dangerous crimes are those committed by public officers 
whose actions affect the generality of the public, but the most punitive sentences are often 
given to those involved in cases of minor thefts” (ibid).  
Reflecting on the opinions of various respondents, this chapter will examine the criticism of 
plea bargaining in Nigeria. The chapter will also relate these responses to the broader topics 
of law reform, the economics of criminal justice as well as the issues of morality and 
jurisprudence as they relate to the idea of plea bargaining in Nigeria.    
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9.1 Legality 
Some proponents of plea bargaining have continued to argue that the process had existed 
as part of Nigeria’s criminal justice procedure for decades. They refute any claim that it is a 
new importation by prosecutors and officials of the two anti-graft Commissions. Often 
referring to section 180 and 181 of the CPA, they contend that these provisions have existed 
since 1990, allowing for some form of negotiation with a criminal offender.284 Odinkalu, for 
instance, argues in support of this opinion, saying plea bargaining is not a new concept in 
Nigeria’s criminal law, but also went on to caution, “this is not to say that plea bargain is or 
has been used properly in Nigeria” (cited in Kehinde, 2013: 13). One of the respondents to 
this research also claimed that plea bargaining did not begin with the two anti-graft 
Commissions: 
 “I have argued this timeously at seminars and conferences” he claims. “and a lot of 
criminal law experts including Kevin Nwosu agreed with me. The argument on the 
origin of plea bargaining should instead be done hypothetically. A prosecutor need 
not mention the word or phrase plea bargaining; it may simply be called a deal, 
agreement, an understanding; whatever you want to call it. In the end, it is all plea 
bargaining.285  
This group of proponents often refer to Sections 13 (2) and 14(2) of the EFCC Act. Section 13 
(2), which allows prosecutors to withdraw charges against the accused. However, a contrary 
view suggests that negotiation with offenders was actually a construction of convenience 
that was conducted unlawfully before it was adopted into the new CJA 2015.286 
A closer analysis of the contents of the CPA and the EFCC Act is, therefore, important at this 
juncture. The provisions of sections 180 to 181 CPA states only that when more than one 
charge is brought against a person “and conviction has been had on one or more of them, 
the prosecutor may, with the consent of the court, withdraw the remaining charge or 
charges or the court on its own motion, may stay trial of such charge or charges.”287 It goes 
on to further clarify, “at any time after the completion of the inquiry and before the 
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commencement of the trial in the High Court, the Attorney-General may, by notice to the 
High Court, amend the charge as framed at the inquiry or substitute for that charge such 
other charge or charges as he may see fit.”288 Unless misinterpreted to accommodate plea 
bargaining, these provisions do not in any way refer to any kind of negotiation of a plea in 
return for penal concession, which is what plea bargaining entails. The provisions only 
capture what prosecutors can do in any adversarial trial, i.e., to withdraw any charges they 
deem fit and pursue others without any condition. Moreover, the provisions clearly include 
the phrase ‘with the consent of the court’. In many plea bargains, the consent of the court is 
not necessary for the prosecution to strike a deal with the offender.  
Similarly, Section 13 (2) of the EFCC Act reads: 
Without prejudice to section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999 (which relates to the power of the Attorney-General of the Federation 
to institute, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings against any persons in any 
court of law), the Commission may compound any offence punishable under this Act 
by accepting such sums of money as it thinks fit, not exceeding the amount of the 
maximum fine to which that person would have been liable if he had been convicted 
of that offence. 
 
And section 14 (2) reads:  
The Commission may compound any offence punishable under this Act by accepting 
such sums of money as it thinks fit exceeding the maximum amount to which that 
person would have been liable if he had been convicted of that offence.289 
Referring to these provisions and those of the CPA, a prosecutor with the EFCC claimed that 
section 180 of the CPA and sections 13 and 14 of the EFCC Act are provisions that made plea 
bargaining lawful because they allow the prosecution to either drop charges or compound 
them.”290 This is also quite possibly a mistake in understanding the nature of plea 
bargaining. Compounding offences or dropping charges on their own do not qualify as plea 
bargaining. As the words literally express it, there has to be a ‘bargain’ and a ‘plea’. 
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The contents of both Section 13 (2) and 14(2) of the EFCC Act hinge primarily on withdrawal 
or stay of a count, especially in situations where the accused is standing trial on numerous 
counts. It is also clear that the sections are referring to such stay or withdrawal after the 
defendant had been convicted for the rest. This is at variance with the standard procedure 
of plea bargaining because plea bargaining presupposes agreements struck before 
conviction and not afterwards. None of the definitions or descriptions of plea bargaining 
point to an agreement reached after conviction. This, however, is not the only problem, 
Reading section 180 (1) of the CPA without a further reading of Section 180 (2) of the same 
law would be more of a statutory ‘cherry-picking’ exercise. Subsection 2 essentially states: 
Such withdrawal shall have the effect of an acquittal on such charge or charges 
unless the conviction which has been had is set aside, in which case, subject to any 
order of the court setting aside such conviction, the court before which the 
withdrawal was made may, on the request of the prosecutor, proceed upon the 
charge or charges so withdrawn (Inyang, 2012: 2). 
Inyang further argues that subsection (1) technically contains two scenarios; a withdrawal 
by the prosecutor and a stay by the court while the provisions of subsection (2) cover only 
the withdrawal and the grant of what he describes as “a temporary or subjective acquittal” 
(ibid).  The ambiguity arises as to whether these provisions clearly permit negotiation or not 
and this is an issue that continues to be unresolved among scholars and practitioners. Much 
clearly depends on the definition of plea bargaining which is adopted.  
For critics, the last decade of the application of plea bargaining in Nigeria has been 
characterised by routine use with no legal basis.291 They for instance argue, “a clear and 
unambiguous reading of the provisions of the CPA and the EFCC Act, both of which have 
been the strongest point for justifying plea bargaining are not referring to negotiation with a 
criminal offender.”292 Yekini contends that the EFCC Act allows the prosecution only to 
weigh the option of recovering any amount which might have been squandered in lieu of 
prosecution or otherwise (2008:9). Interpreted unambiguously, this provision is mainly 
about the discontinuation of other charges (ibid). But as the practice becomes a convenient 
routine, “some lawyers and a few judges started misinterpreting certain sections of the law 
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and turning them to mean plea bargaining. But the truth is, no part of our laws mentions 
anything (about) plea bargaining.”293  
A recent decision of the court of appeal raised an important question on whether plea 
bargaining had been operated illegally since 2005. In this important judgment in 2014, 
Justice Ogunwumiju, gave clear guidance, stating “Plea bargain is as at now generally 
unknown to our criminal justice administration and indeed our criminal jurisprudence.”294 
This decision further makes it difficult to argue that the system operated legally.  Despite 
the knowledge of the provisions cited by proponents to justify plea bargaining, the court did 
not contemplate the verdict that plea bargaining was a nullity. As one responded added: 
 
“Perhaps when they want to do plea bargaining, some lawyers parade and construe 
some provisions of the law to give it legal support. The truth is, it was indeed the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission armed with Section 13(2) of the EFCC Act 
that recently brought it into the public purview in their escapades towards tackling 
white collar crimes and engaging in asset recovery from corrupt politicians and their 
partners in crime within the private sector in the country. Short of that, the system 
never had clear legal basis until the coming of this new law for federal offences in 
2015.”295  
 
Similarly, one judge said that the amount of controversy it has generated is enough 
evidence that the system was not defined under the Nigerian law when it first began, 
“remember, it took ten years of legal experts asking whether plea bargaining is legal or not. 
This alone means that it had a questionable and unclear position under the law.”296  
 
Referring to the recent development in the ACJA 2015, another respondent claimed that 
“the efforts and vigour with which the EFCC and other advocates pursue the inclusion of 
plea bargaining in the ACJA 2015 clearly affirms that there was no legal basis for its 
application all this while, and this raised questions about past convictions done on the basis 
of Plea bargaining.”297  
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Except for the prosecutors of the EFCC and the ICPC, there was near consensus that the 
system operated without any clear legal authority or procedural guidelines. Instead, 
respondents believed that it is merely the desperation on the part of those who support 
plea bargaining in Nigeria that led to the misinterpretation of the law in order to 
accommodate the practice.”298 He further insisted that legal practitioners should adhere to 
the concept of legality, which requires that issues of the administration of justice actually 
deliver justice.299  Most importantly he said, “when such issues relate to criminal matters, 
“they should not be products of implication, inherence and or abstraction. There is going to 
be a new battle against this selective provision that only serves selected few.”300  
 
Clearly, the enactment of the new ACJA in May 2015 has changed the whole perspective 
regarding the criticism of the institution of plea bargaining, particularly with regards to 
Federal offences. For offences under State laws, the position remains the same, as plea 
bargaining is still not expressly stated or permitted in most of the states in Nigeria, with the 
exception of Lagos state which has express provisions for plea bargaining since 2011. As will 
be discussed subsequently, the presence of plea bargaining in the new ACJA 2015 generates 
new procedural dilemma in the area of conflicts with other existing criminal procedure laws 
and judicial precedents. Moreover, since the ACJA 2015 applies only to some courts in the 
country, this makes it technically restricted to those offences within the jurisdictions of 
those courts. These inherent divergences and lack of uniformity in the application and 
practice are already raising new contentions among scholars and practitioners. Those who 
approve of the new developments offered optimistic opinions that the new Act, may in 
some way, “cure some of the injustices done through plea bargaining, that is if it is applied 
logically and judiciously.”301  
 
All the discussions in this research point to the conclusion that prior to the promulgation of 
the ACJA 2015, plea bargaining was not legally sanctioned in any of the legislations in 
Nigeria.  Despite the few claims of legality, nowhere in any of the laws on criminal justice in 
nigeria was the idea of negotiating with an offender mentioned or even implied. The only 
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provisions, that which some scholars pointed to and which were discussed in this chapter 
were Sec 180-181 of the CPA and Sec 13-14 of the EFCC Act both of which allowed for 
‘compounding charges’, which is distinct from plea bargaining.  
 
9.2 Conflict of laws 
In the context of some of the principal statutes governing criminal procedure in Nigeria, plea 
bargaining is faced with major challenges. The first is that it does not uphold the 
conventional principle that culpability must be established by way of clear evidence. This is 
seen by some respondents as an affront to the legal standards of proof and evidence that 
are guided by the provisions of the Evidence Act, Cap 40, 1990, now Evidence Act, Cap E14, 
2011 (henceforth Evidence Act).302 This law is binding in all criminal proceedings across the 
country.303 The only exceptions are proceedings before an Arbitrator; or to a Field General 
Court Martial; or to judicial proceedings in any civil cause or matter in or before any Sharia 
Court of Appeal, Customary Court of Appeal, Area Court or Customary Courts. Section 141 
of the Evidence Act further provides that nothing should “prejudice or diminish in any 
respect the obligation to establish by evidence according to law any acts, omissions or 
intentions which are legally necessary to constitute the offence with which the person 
accused is charged.” The construction of this law is, therefore, clear, as no matter the 
amount of guilt in the eyes of the prosecution, there is a legal obligation to present 
sufficient proof and to provide evidence in support before a court. There is a clear insistence 
on the adversarial procedure, which puts any kind of negotiation to question. 
 
The Supreme Court has also handed down clear rulings on aspects of evidence and the onus 
of proof. The position of the Apex court is that, in criminal cases, the onus is entirely on the 
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.304 Furthermore, 
the Nigerian Constitution (1999 as amended) legitimises any judicial process that leads to 
self-incrimination. Specifically, Section 36 (11) states, “No person who is tried for a criminal 
offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial.” This also includes any compulsion 
to plead guilty. Although the admission of guilt in plea bargaining may not necessarily be the 
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result of pressure or threat, it is well established in scholarship that prosecutors use all sorts 
of coercive ways to secure guilty pleas (Standen, 1993; Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar; 2004; 
O’Hear, 2007; Caldwell, 2011). This technique was also found to be common among 
prosecutors of the EFCC. What is also concerning is the provision of the ACJA 2015 that bars 
the defendant from appealing a decision reached through plea bargaining. These are very 
serious issues that touch on the fabric procedural justice. This also means that any error in 
the process cannot be reversed even if such error breaches the fundamental values of 
procedural justice or any of the rights of the parties. This provision therefore touches on 
one of the core values that define the legitimacy of the institution of criminal justice, which 
is the principle that the law must ensure that only the guilty is penalised and no innocent 
person should suffer. 
Other legal challenges to the application of plea bargaining are the provisions of Section 245 
of the CPA as well as Section 268 (1) and 269 (1) of the CPC. These laws states categorically 
that for a court judgment to be valid, it must be written; must contain the points for 
determination and; must also contain the decision on each point.305 The importance of 
these requirements was also laid down by a Supreme Court, which stated that that failure of 
any trial court to abide by these provisions and to give recorded reasons for its decision is 
liable to lead to the judgment being quashed on appeal.306 One respondent gave an analogy 
of how these different and contradicting legal provisions create disconcerting problems to 
the coherent application of law. He said, “you know the law is a coherent whole. It is like a 
net for fishing; each of the segments of the net is useful and contributes in covering a 
particular part of the whole.”307 He further argued that in Nigeria, the constitution is the 
principal document governing procedure, and there are also general and specific laws, all 
which should exist in harmony with one another. However, plea bargaining, he argued does 
not seem to be in conform to this requirement.308 What evidence also shows is how any 
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such lack of conformity can be protected from public scrutiny by keeping the process quiet 
and quick.309  
Another respondent claimed that these problems would continue to affect legal processes. 
He argues that criminal justice risks controversy whenever the original intent of the statute 
is distorted or misinterpreted in order to accommodate the application of plea bargaining, 
or when plea bargaining is given preference over conventional trials.310  
 
In the effort to accommodate plea bargaining Inyang (2012: 1) argues, prosecutors have 
disregarded the implication of stretching and expanding the meaning and intentions of the 
law. Any controversy that arises from such distortion sends a symbolic message to the wider 
public that the entire criminal justice system is being compromised to serve other interests 
aside from those of law and justice.311 
 
As plea bargaining is introduced into a system traditionally wedded to the principles of 
adversariality, it is expected that many issues may arise in respect of the conflict of laws 
because many provisions of the law that emphasis on adversarilty is still existent. But not 
only that, there is considerable concern about the morality and jurisprudential justification 
for choosing a particular class of offenders; offences and courts for the application of the 
consensual criminal procedure. This new controversy is now apparent both inside and 
outside the courts.  
  
Beyond the questions of legality and the conflict of laws, there are other key dividing lines 
between different groups of experts and commentators. These arguments represent 
effectiveness, economy and even the timeliness of using plea bargaining in Nigeria. As one 
respondent argues, “if the goal is to do justice through the use of summary procedures, plea 
bargaining is absolutely not the way to go. We should instead focus on summary trials 
before an open court not some agreements behind the scene.”312  While these opinions are 
familiar in everyday discourse, there is a lack of empirical data on the strength or 
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weaknesses of the different claims that people often make. For instance, one of the 
respondents to this research states:   
 
“Plea bargaining is a system that still raises questions in Nigeria and around the 
world. It must, therefore, be carefully examined before been applied in Nigeria. There 
are a lot of things to be understood and a lot more at stake.”313  
 
9.3 Judicial compromise 
While the two anti-graft Commissions see themselves as institutions for combating 
corruption, there is an overwhelming narrative that including plea bargaining in their 
prosecutorial routine only aids corrupt officials to escape justice.  The unfamiliar incidents 
that involved substantial penal concessions for people convicted of massive corruption have 
become a point of reference in every debate over plea bargaining. It is evident that the 
concessions have assisted in achieving a faster conviction, but it is also true that there was a 
disproportionately large penal discount involved in most of the notorious cases of plea 
bargaining. This was shown in the previous chapters where offenders that would ordinarily 
spend up to fourteen years in jail were given six months or less.  Hence, in a conference 
presentation in 2012, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria described the system of plea 
bargaining as “a novel concept of dubious origin invented to provide a soft landing to high 
profile criminals who loot the treasury entrusted to them.”314 He went further to accuse the 
system of a “flagrant subordination of the public’s interest to the interest of criminal justice 
administration, but worst of all, the concept generally promotes a cynical view of the entire 
legal system”.315 It is, he concluded, an obstacle to the fight against corruption and that it 
should never be mentioned in Nigeria’s jurisprudence. 
 
This vigorous condemnation of plea bargaining by the most senior judge in the country has 
appeared in almost every discussion about plea bargaining in Nigeria. In a similar response 
by one the respondents to this research, it was argued that, even with the overwhelming 
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changes in criminal justice across the world, plea bargaining in Nigeria is not predicated on 
good faith:  
 
It is a burdensome conundrum and hydra-headed monster that serves only the 
corrupt tendencies of few public officials and white-collar thieves. I concur with the 
former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Hon. Justice Dahiru Musdapher, when he dismissed 
the system as one with a sneaky motive and its evident fraudulent application, which 
is a triumph of administrative and organizational interest over Justice.316  
 
The legitimacy of these criticisms is premised on the understanding that plea bargaining was 
used as a means to grant notorious criminals a means of avoiding penalties. While most 
people admit that the system is common in other regimes and has helped in improving the 
administration of justice, they criticize how in Nigeria, it operates outside the objectives and 
principles of justice. A lawyer for instance argued:  
 
“I am aware that plea bargain has worked and still working in other countries of the 
world with noticeable progress, I would say here that Nigeria is not like any other 
country, we must, therefore, borrow and apply these procedures with a sense of 
caution, taking into account the peculiarities of our justice system and of plea 
bargaining. So far, it has continued to serve only the interest of a few.”317 
  
Other respondents have adopted a more conciliatory approach, arguing that the system, if 
reformed, has the potential of making the criminal justice system become more efficient, 
but as it stands now, it shows little tendency of ensuring that corrupt officials are punished 
appropriately.318 An important aspect of all these criticisms is that, because the system lacks 
transparency, most respondents believe that plea bargaining is very selective and applies 
only to cases of corruption. However, evidence from this research shows clearly that it is not 
as pervasive as many people think, and it has been used for as simple as cases involving 
minor breaches of trust as well as others such as pipeline vandalisation (Appendix A and B).  
The reaction that followed the recent case of John Yakubu 319 reveals how plea bargaining is 
viewed with such hostility by many critics that it culminated in a protest by civil society 
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groups, leading to the suspension of the Presiding judge. Commentators on and off the 
media also expressed outrage over the decision to plea bargain in a case which was seen to 
have affected the lives of thousands of pensioners whose entitlement of over $203 million 
dollars was siphoned off by the accused.  The level of this outrage was exemplified by the 
series of comments that followed when the news of the conviction and sentence was first 
reported. For example, one editorial sought to show, “How Judge Tricked EFCC to Free $203 
Million Pension Fund Thief.”320 
“The Nigerian judiciary if they ever had any credibility have now been shown to be a 
bunch of fraudsters and armed robbers, yes they are armed with their pens and the 
power of their bogus judgments.” Easy. 321 
“The best thing today in Nigeria is to open all the prison gates because the inmates 
have committed no offence.” Uzodimms.322 
“In conclusion, every criminal brought by the EFCC can bargain their way out. WHAT 
A BUNCH OF JOKERS!!!.” (Anonymous).323  
“So criminal cases are decided after meetings between the accused, his counsel, 
prosecutor and trial judge? Or is it because the amount involved in (sic) large and 
they have to agree on the sharing formula?”324 
“The people need Justice! Why are you plea bargaining! We need justice! This is the 
beginning of our country imploding” (Anonymous).325  
Other criminal cases with similar characteristics and outcome have also provoked very 
similar outrage from members of the public.326 The wider impact of using plea bargaining on 
the public’s understanding of justice is noticeable. One of the respondents suggested: 
 
“There is a general sentiment that it is designed to serve the rich and powerful. Look 
at how corruption has battered this country, and then you hear the culprits 
negotiating with public prosecutors. That is the irony. You cannot sell plea bargaining 
to the Nigerian public in its present shape and form…I think a plea bargain is for 
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countries whose Justice system has reached a reasonable level of transparency and 
accountability. What we need in Nigeria is stiffer sanction for corrupt officials to 
serve as retribution and deterrence.”327  
 
A prominent Professor of political science also criticised the system saying: 
 
“Plea bargaining in Nigeria has become an aspect of corruption. When someone 
steals from the public treasury and is allowed to use a part of it to bail himself out, 
how do you justify that? It is highly incomprehensible.”328  
 
The above respondent went further to give an instance of another notorious case of a 
prominent State governor Mr. Igbinedion, who was accused of embezzling 25 billion Naira, 
but due to the substitution and downgrading of charges, he ended paying a fine of 3.5 
million Naira.329 It is a system he argues, with the “potential to let criminals off the hook”.330 
 
In other instances, respondents vehemently questioned the morality of granting 
concessions to criminals whose acts or omissions have affected the lives of millions of 
people. Stressing this, one respondent pointed out: 
 
“The purpose of criminal justice is to secure the society and maintain public order 
through protecting the citizens and holding criminals liable for their acts. What plea 
bargaining did in many cases, was to defend corruption thereby creating unnecessary 
tension and dragging criminal justice further into the mud. Why are we bargaining 
with big criminals and jailing petty thieves? Punishment cannot be substituted 
because someone says he is guilty. Offenders are simply allowed to go and then 
commit or aid the Commission of similar offence again. What the court simply does is 
to endorse every good or bad deal that the parties bring. How can this be a mark of 
justice?”331 
Another important implication of these negative perceptions is the extent to which it is 
affecting criminal practice, especially the way even judges are reluctant to accept processes 
that appear to have elements of plea bargaining. This wariness on the part of judges was 
further exacerbated by the suspension of the judge who accepted the plea negotiation in 
the earlier mentioned case involving John Yakubu. A prosecutor of the ICPC claimed that the 
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circumstance of that case was a phenomenal setback to the development of plea bargaining 
in Nigeria.332 This effect has extended to prosecutors who admitted that they are sometimes 
forced to drop a potential offer for negotiation through fear of the public response, or they 
try to do it as quietly and as quickly as possible before the case receives any publicity.333 
Sharing his experience, one prosecutor admitted:  
“There are situations where our colleagues were petitioned for engaging in plea 
bargaining. We have also seen cases where judges were suspended because of the 
scandals of plea bargaining. Very small number of prosecutors are now confidently 
bargaining with defendants. In one of my cases, the judge perceived I have 
negotiated to drop some charges, and his attitude towards the case suddenly 
changed. He virtually shut all of us down and subsequently gave the defendant the 
maximum punishment even though I did not object to the defence’s plea for an 
option of fine. 334 
Opinions about the relationship between corruption and plea bargaining have become 
serious and popular topics of debate. What is however of great concern is the way the 
system is turning into a tool for political and judicial populism. Judges, prosecutors, and 
senior political office-holders have been distancing themselves from plea bargaining in order 
to appease the public and portray a kind of new resolve to deal with crimes retributively 
without giving the offender any room to negotiate. This is a recent and significant 
phenomenon that presents a new kind of dynamic in the criminal justice administration in 
Nigeria. A typical and important example of this was the statement of the Attorney General 
of the Federation on the 30th of December 2015, where he made a far-reaching 
announcement to a group of civil society activist that, henceforth, there would not be the 
option of plea bargaining for people accused of corruption or terrorism.335 Clearly, this 
statement contradicts the provisions contained in section 270 of the new ACJA 2015. More 
ironically still, this caveat comes from a person who is the chief prosecutor of the 
Federation, seven months after the introduction of Federal law that allows for plea 
bargaining for every offence. 
This also explains why, ten years since the system emerged, records of prosecution for both 
the EFCC and the ICPC contain only a small number of negotiated cases. Although this does 
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not suggest that the records obtained (Appendix A, B, and C) are the only cases of plea 
bargaining, but they are the only empirical evidence currently available.  
  
9.4 Lack of consistency in sentencing practices 
One of the distinct characters of plea bargaining in Nigeria, as seen in previous chapters is 
that minor offences had been systematically exempted from its ambit. This aspect, which 
touches on the concept of equality and the rule of law, has attracted legitimate criticism 
from the public, human rights groups, and practitioners. To critics “it is inappropriate, even 
illegitimate to have two opposite operations of the law where one court is allowed to 
negotiate with offenders and the other is not.”336 The risk posed by this is that punitive 
sentencing, which is common in Nigeria’s criminal justice system applies fully to offenders in 
lower courts, while cases in higher courts, especially federal offences prosecuted by the 
anti-graft Commissions, would continue to be negotiated. As one respondent further 
confirms, the system is generally not extended to ordinary crimes that are often brought 
before magistrates, “leaving many Nigerians wondering whether the country is now 
operating two distinct penal systems, one for the big and other for the small, poor 
criminal.”337 Hence, it is seen as a process where “the bigger your offence; the more likely 
you are to benefit from plea bargaining.”338 Describing his understanding of how the system 
operates, a commentator wrote, “A man stole a chicken, he was given nine years 
imprisonment, without an option of fine, and a rich man stole 32 billion, he is give (sic) two 
years imprisonment with an option of fine. What an injustice.”339  
Prosecutors of the two anti-graft agencies have attempted to justify this by arguing that 
plea bargaining is mainly for cases that are very technical and those involving the high 
profile offence of corruption, and organized crimes,340 evidence from Appendix A and B 
gives a different picture entirely. It shows that sometimes, cases that are not high profile are 
being negotiated. For example, there are a number of cases in Appendix A and B that 
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involved ‘issuance of dishonoured cheques’, ‘criminal breach of trust’ involving individual 
victims, ‘impersonation’ etc., that are not high profile offences. Hence, it further raises the 
question of equality and fairness and consistency of sentencing in the justice system, as 
other offenders that committed similar crimes and are prosecuted by different prosecuting 
bodies do not have the opportunity to negotiate, since other prosecuting bodies do not 
involve in plea bargaining. Moreover, the new ACJA 2015 did not solve this problem because 
it is still not applicable in all the courts across the country. Other critics stress that because 
plea bargaining is not based on verifiable facts and evidence fully examined before an 
independent judge, there will always be inconsistency in sentencing.341  If a system of plea 
bargaining is ever going to be legitimate and appealing” said one respondent, “it has to be a 
more holistic system that does not discriminate, not the present hoax which has only the rich 
and elites as beneficiaries.”342 He argued that consistency in sentencing is key to legitimate 
criminal justice.343 It is also important to stress that consistency and uniformity not only 
enhances the legitimacy of the system, it is also a way that will help the criminal justice 
system, at least within the utilitarian context of plea bargaining. For example, allowing the 
system to be applied uniformly across all the courts (including lower courts where the bulk 
of criminal cases are prosecuted) is capable of creating the kind of expediency and efficiency 
that plea bargaining often propagates. Yet, it also important to be clear on the type of cases 
to be negotiated and those that should be subjected to full trial. Although this research is 
capable of making recommendations as to whether certain offences should not subjected to 
plea bargaining, the most ideal thing in the circumstance is for legislators to open a 
comprehensive public debate on the issue where inputs will be made by both professionals 
and the general community on what the guideline for negotiation should be. The manner in 
which the ACJA 2015 was promulgated falls short of democratic values in establishing such 
far reaching legal reforms without subjecting the issues to public debate and scrutiny.  
The legitimacy of a criminal justice procedure that consents to the differential application of 
sentencing principles is one that had triggered a great deal of jurisprudential debate among 
legal theorists as well as scholars on plea bargaining (Langbein, 1978; Alschuler, 1983; Stitt 
and Chaires, 1992; Cooper, 1999; Tamanaha, 2004; O’Hear, 2007; Bingham, 2011). But 
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unlike the in-depth work in Western scholarship, the overwhelming point of contention in 
Nigeria is on how the system was imported as a way to ensure efficiency, only to be turned 
into a mechanism to exonerate the rich and powerful from the law. One lawyer vehemently 
accuses the system of promoting inequality in a long appraisal of what he called a travesty 
of justice:  
 
“There are few records of its application on other ordinary citizens. Plea bargaining 
only legitimizes our already double-edged Justice system. What played out in the 
case of John Yusuf is a typical example. He stole about twenty-three billion 23 Naira 
from Nigeria and every citizen expected him to go to jail, but plea bargaining was 
used to give him a warm handshake by just asking him to pay a paltry amount as 
fine. Pitifully, just 24 hours after this travesty of Justice, an Ibadan High court headed 
by one Justice Moshood Abass, sentenced the provost and bursar of the federal 
cooperative College to four years imprisonment without the option of fine for 
misappropriating three million Naira. In a similar development, another high court in 
Delta State sentenced a roadside mechanic to death by hanging for stealing a car 
stereo. In these cases, no options of plea bargain were opened to them because they 
are déclassé. This is the major reason I say strongly that the practice of plea bargain 
is ludicrous, selective and has compromised the fair administration of Justice in 
Nigeria.”344  
 
Similarly, even the proponents of plea bargaining have some reservations.345 One of them 
argued:  
 
“It is sometimes a compromise that is unwarranted. Even though we are the ones 
that represent these clients in negotiations, we also acknowledge that it has a serious 
effect on the general sense of fairness when, eventually, those that committed some 
of the worst crimes get the largest sentence relief.”346  
 
This argument reflects some of the concerns raised by others, such as the respondent who 
stated:  
 
“No doubt plea bargaining is a quick way of concluding whatever there is to be 
concluded. But when you have situations where the accused, expressly or impliedly 
chooses his own sentence and is rewarded instead of punished, then the essence of 
justice is completely defeated. Justice is the last hope of a society and must not be 
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traded in plea bargaining. I think there is the need to re-examine this system very 
well to stop this on-going ridicule of our justice system.”347  
 
9.5 Lack of procedural transparency 
The lack of transparency in plea bargaining has made it difficult for many people to accept 
the legitimacy of its outcome. Often, it is only the parties involved that know the process 
that gave birth to the final outcome. By all standards, for example, turning a 7-year 
mandatory sentence to an option of a fine for an offence that seriously undermines the 
nations desire for ensuring the rule of law and ensuring the values of equality and 
transparency in a political system that is struggling to embrace the values of constitutional 
democracy. Hence, plea bargaining has continued to generate controversy as much as it 
alters perception on both the utility and legitimacy of a process of criminal justice that 
punishes one offender in open and negotiates with another in secret.348 It is, according to 
one respondent ‘ridiculously secretive and self-serving’. He maintained further that plea 
bargaining in Nigeria is designed in a way that the sentence is technically decided even 
before going to court.”349  
Another lawyer cautioned: 
 
“We must also be wary of submitting to a judicial process that cannot be regulated. 
True, plea bargain may be applied successfully as a way of avoiding the nuances of 
trials, but that is not enough reason to turn the legal system into an informal 
conversation in offices where you go back and forth with an offender over his crime 
and sentence. Our system is not ready for that yet. Let the law remain a tool for 
sending a clear message that crimes and violations would be punished. We must 
avoid the opposite.”350   
A prosecutor of the ICPC also argued:  
“It is not always appropriate when you come across the kind of privacy involved in 
redrafting charges in order to fulfil some of these negotiations. In most occasions, 
serious charges are the ones dropped. Of course, there is also the influence of the 
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relationship between prosecutors and defence lawyers that often leads to these 
trade-offs to satisfy each other since there is no judge and no members of the public 
to object to any of these arrangements.”351  
This lack of transparency in the way prosecutors deal with, and discount charges have also 
added to judicial wariness about plea bargaining. As some prosecutors admit, judges are 
likely to show discontent when they sense that charges had been highly discounted from 
what was originally contained in the  ‘evidence diary’, when this happens, some judges may 
even go to the extent of discharging their infuriation on the defendant by imposing the 
maximum sentence possible.352 It is clearly a situation where the judge, having seen the first 
set of charges contained in the initial ‘evidence diary’ is subsequently required to ignore 
everything; forget all the previous charges and evidence and act only on the new ones. This 
situation has been a source of tension, especially because the system is characteristically 
based on ‘charge bargaining’. However, a prosecutor defended the idea, saying, “even if it is 
not judicious, it is still judicial.”353 Explaining what that means, he said, “When charges are 
substituted and replaced with new ones that come with lighter sentence, the courts award 
what is contained in the law based on the new charges. This is judicial, but it is not always 
judicious because the gravity of some of these offences and the available evidence do not 
deserve any alteration or substitution of charges.”354 
Highlighting this challenge, another prosecutor argued:  
“Not all of them (judges) say it out rightly, but the body language of a judge is 
enough to tell you how they feel when they suspect you are making applications to 
withdraw or substitute charges, or when you bring back the case, and they realize 
you have dropped most of the relevant charges. What they do is give the maximum 
sentence for all the remaining charges without any reduction even when the accused 
pleads for the leniency of the court.355 
Another respondent pointed out that lack of transparency, coupled with the knowledge of 
prosecutorial corruption are also among the elements that make some judges suspicious of, 
and resistant to plea bargaining. “It is known that there are some corrupt prosecutors who 
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may do plea bargaining as a disguise to achieve certain gains and also rob the courts of their 
traditional and constitutional role of deciding sentences, not all judges will take that.”356  
Yet, some respondents were optimistic that the system can be improved if significant fault 
lines such as transparency and accountability are addressed.357 The most common view is 
that the community deserved information about the way the system works and the 
reasoning behind any plea bargain.358 Taking into account the kinds of cases that are 
subjected to plea bargaining, it is no doubt that the community will be eager and to know 
how these cases were investigated, prosecuted and sentenced. “There is no other way to go 
about justice than be transparent and sincere,” said one respondent.359 Essentially, the 
administration of plea bargaining without explanation as to how and why agreements were 
reached “has caused the system a lot of bad name.”360 The silence with which plea 
bargaining occurs “is in itself an extension of corruption in the judicial system…in the end, it 
produces an exceptionally unequal treatment of offenders that no one really 
understands.”361 
In general, transparency is an issue that has always occupied a central position in the 
discourse on criminal justice administration. Where this culture of openness is excluded 
from criminal procedure, the community is highly likely to become suspicious and to 
question the entire process. However, one of the respondents gave a contrary view:   
“The rights of the community and even those of the victim in criminal justice are not 
always as simple as represented in public.  A close observation of the laws and the 
constitution would tell you most of these claims about lack of transparency in plea 
bargaining as trampling upon rights of parties are not accurate representations of 
what the statute contains. In the real sense, we have to understand and separate 
legal rights from moral rights. Take the victim for example. The law does not provide 
the victims with the right to details of an investigation or prosecution. They may be 
entitled to compensations or whatever the courts decide to award for damage. But 
any crime committed is a state concern. And if the victim cannot dictate how these 
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rights can be enforced, the community also cannot. Therefore, it is not a right; not in 
a legal sense anyway.”362  
Yet, in plea bargaining, the lack of transparency makes it often difficult to detect whether a 
guilty plea was secured through coercion or not. This research, for instance, has established 
how charges attracting the harshest sentence were among the common tools used to 
secure plea bargain. Unlike in regular court proceedings argued one respondent, plea 
bargaining has succeeded in annihilating the public from listening to cases and evidence, 
and even knowing the reason for the final verdict.363 The idea of plea bargaining in Nigeria is 
simply:  
“You hear of a person arraigned on twenty or thirty serious charges. Weeks later, you 
read on the pages of a newspaper that most of the charges had been dropped, and 
the criminal was given some petty sentence or some little fine. No trial; no witnesses; 
nothing. The worst part is that some of these cases are not even reported in our 
weekly or monthly law reports. No one can tell with certainty what happened. If we 
want plea bargaining, then we must tidy up these terrible issues.”364  
While these are legitimate concerns, it is important to state that both proponents and 
opponents alike, agree that the system is not going to disappear anytime soon.365 The 
logical approach would be to create transparency in the process, at least by modelling it the 
system in the German way by keeping record of the cases and making them public. What is 
to most people an affront to criminal justices’ best values is for the system to operate as an 
informal and secretive arrangement. As much as transparency denotes to the legitimacy of 
criminal justice, lack of it does the exact opposite. 
 9.6 Hybridisation of criminal justice 
One of the major findings of this research is the way plea bargaining has created a hybrid 
system of criminal justice both in terms of prosecution and in sentencing. This situation is 
not familiar in other legal regimes across the world. The peculiarity of this problem lies in 
the fact that offenders receive different kinds of sentencing choices not because of what the 
law says but solely because of which prosecuting agency is handling their case. For instance, 
we have seen throughout this study that the EFCC and the ICPC are the only agencies that 
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resort to plea bargaining. Technically this means that an offender only stands the chance of 
benefitting from plea bargaining if his or her case is handled by any of these two agencies. 
Moreover, some may raise the argument that these agencies only deal with financial crimes. 
What is evident however is that, over the years, they have prosecuted cases ranging from 
pipeline vandalisation to offences of ‘criminal breach of trust’ (Appendix A and B). In all of 
these kinds of cases, the offenders had the chance of negotiation and sentence discount. 
Similar offenders prosecuted by all other agencies across the country do not have this 
choice. Although legal systems like Russia and Italy have categorised offences to those that 
can be negotiated and those that should not be subjected to plea negotiation in a way that 
may simply be described as hybrid, the kind of hybridisation in Nigeria is unique and 
distinctive as it is often the result of where the prosecution takes place and who is 
responsible for the prosecution. For example, if two individuals Mr. A and Mr. B are accused 
of ‘cheating’ and Mr. A is prosecuted by the EFCC WHILE Mr. B is prosecuted by the 
Attorney General or the Police as the case may be; there is a strong likelihood that Mr. A will 
have a chance to negotiate with the EFCC while Mr. is sure of standing trial since neither the 
police nor the Attorney General engage in plea bargaining.   
 
What is even more problematic is the growing sentiment that plea bargaining is skewed to 
favour the rich and powerful. For the weak and poor whose legal representation is mostly 
inadequate, there is the ever present risk of being coerced to plead guilty. A kind of 
sentiment that is now dragging some judges towards penal populism, as they take pride in 
making public their disdain for plea bargaining.366 This type of populist rhetoric reached a 
new height when the Chief legal officer of the country, i.e., the Attorney General of the 
Federation announced that henceforth, people accused of corruption will not benefit from 
plea bargaining. Like with the disparity in sentencing, this statement also disregards the 
provisions of the ACJA 2015. Moreover, evidence also shows dishonesty on the part of 
prosecutors who, after reaching a bargain with offenders, they go ahead to lie to the court 
that there was nothing like plea bargaining been struck. All of these elements, i.e., 
dishonesty, populism, selective enforcement and disregard to the provisions of the law pose 
a colossal threat to the idea of justice and the rule of law. Despite these problems, it is also 
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evident that there are areas in which plea bargaining has proven to be of advantage to the 
administration of criminal justice. 
 
9.7 Efficiency and finality in prosecuting cases of corruption 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, a successful plea bargain is always a chance for an 
expedited sentence, reduced workload and reduced cost of criminal justice administration. 
Even those respondents who have reservations about the advantage of plea bargaining 
concede that properly administered; plea bargaining may help remedy the slow and 
resource-consuming character of trials.367 From an EFCC viewpoint, one of the common 
arguments for plea bargaining is that: 
“Players in the administration of criminal justice are aware that in many cases, 
especially when monies or property were misappropriated, negotiation is the most 
effective way to recover looted funds and to secure a fast conviction as the old 
culture of  a long and stressful trials without guarantee of conviction.”368   
This view was repeatedly echoed by other prosecutors of the two Commissions: 
“Our traditional judicial process has proven to be inefficient and bedevilled with so 
many problems. In one of the courts in Port Harcourt where I prosecute most of my 
cases, you have more than sixty cases been mentioned every day, and there is only 
one judge. There is also a huge number of defence lawyers. In this instance, you 
discover that the judges are overloaded and we feel not every case should go to full 
trial. What we mostly do when we know that we can recover money or property from 
the accused is to not insist on a full trial but any form of negotiation that will ensure 
the end objective.”369  
Hence, the foremost argument for plea bargaining in Nigeria is that the system serves the 
fight against corruption. It is seen mainly as an alternative intervention and a legal strategy 
against corruption. Making a historical argument on the entire criminal justice system, some 
argue that since plea bargaining was introduced, the prosecution of cases of corruption has 
become more effective.370 Without plea bargaining, one pointed, “I do not think any of the 
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high profile convictions could have been achieved. I think that is a great leap forward.”371 
But others have a more cautious view. Ordinarily said one:  
“On a case-to-case basis, I would not mind subscribing to plea bargain to the extent 
allowed by the law, but that should only be in exceptional cases where plea 
bargaining is the only option. In ordinary circumstance, the law should be allowed to 
take its natural cause. Seen from the second perspective, although still undergoing a 
baby-stepping process and has the potential to be abused, I am of the opinion the 
plea bargain has come to stay, and it can be made better for the sake of expediency 
and the cost of litigation.”372 
Taking into context the complexity and sophistication of some of the crimes that were dealt 
with through plea bargaining, one respondent argued:  
“It is apparent that traditional Penal and Criminal Codes procedures are grossly 
inadequate in dealing with some of the well-organized crimes we see every day. The 
evidence is hard to fetch; you need at least a fifth columnist to agree to open the can 
for you to be able to see the worms. That is the challenge; it is also the irony on 
modern day criminal justice. We cannot avoid plea bargain. The fact that plea 
bargain has been in Nigerian for years now suggest it is useful and important.”373  
Defending the utility of plea bargaining by reference to court and prison decongestion, 
another respondent argued about the familiar congested prisons in which a sizable 
percentage is awaiting trial. This he argues, “has for so long become a common problem 
across all jurisdictions in this country. If plea bargaining helps to alleviate this, then we 
should support it.”374 From this context, even if plea bargaining is not to be subscribed to, it 
is important to reform any criminal justice that keeps accused persons in excessively lengthy 
detention awaiting trial. The legitimacy of plea bargaining sometimes comes from the 
illegitimacy of unnecessary delays in trial. The technicalities of adversarial trial often affect 
the rights of “the defendant whose case is unnecessarily allowed to linger for a long time 
while he or she struggles with the chain of a criminal allegation hanging around their 
necks.”375 In a similar response, another respondent asserted: 
“Applied appropriately, plea bargaining can actually pass as a tempting incentive. It 
alleviates the inundating routine of scheduling more case for a trial in an already 
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overcrowded court. Many people, including judges and prosecutors, are aware of the 
injustice in remanding people for years without trial. This may be receptive to the 
processing out of offenders who are not likely to do much jail time anyway. If a trial 
will end up in injustice, then there is nothing wrong in trying plea bargaining.”376  
Similar support was voiced by those who believe that through plea bargaining; judges get 
less work, and the prosecutor’s burden is lightened; while the defendant ends up getting a 
lighter sentence.”377 However, most people agree that “victims remain victims. Many of 
them do not get what their own expectation of justice is because they see the criminals 
*have+ not been adequately punished.”378 This argument tends to ignore the fact that plea 
bargaining in Nigeria has actually helped to recover ill-gotten properties and to obtain 
compensation for victims, especially those defrauded of their monies or property. Yet, it is 
also important to note that unless they understand the jurisprudential reasoning for such 
process and how it advances justice, the victim, and the community are not likely to have 
confidence in the operation of plea bargaining.379 As with any other legal reform,   
“democracy requires that legal reforms be applied based on reasoning and consensus 
among the people.”380 
9.8 Dealing with the labour and cost of trials 
In all of their responses, prosecutors of the EFCC and the ICPC emphasise the issues of 
resource management as key to the success of the Commissions. The opportunity to 
negotiate, “has granted the Commission opportunities to use its limited resources in securing 
many convictions.”381 Another maintained, “it clears our table and gives us the chance to 
conclude our cases within a reasonable (time) without exhausting too much energy and the 
taxpayer’s money.”382 He went on to argue that the amount of resources needed if every 
case were to go through full trial would be enormous. Depending on the case, “you will 
agree with me that trials are very costly in this country, they go on indefinitely especially 
when corruption at the highest level is involved.”  
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Despite the argument that prosecutors can resort to plea bargaining to ensure a speedy and 
cost-effective disposal of cases, there is evidence to suggest that this is not always the case. 
For example, respondents gave instances where defence counsel allegedly had other 
motives such as earning more money from their clients and refusing to allow for a fast-
tracked negotiation. Others defence counsel may insist on trial until the time when the 
prosecution has presented all their evidence and are ready to close the case, before seeking 
to negotiate.”383 These are in fact tendencies recorded by other scholars, explaining how the 
self-interest of legal practitioners affects the process of plea bargaining (Rhodes, 1976: 336; 
Feeley, 1982: 3).384 
A deeply rooted utilitarian view of plea bargaining emphasises that for criminal justice to 
survive in the contemporary period, it must be open to pragmatic procedures that are not 
based exclusively on traditional forms of adversarial and retributive justice procedure. As 
one respondent argues: 
“There are obvious challenges to the administration of criminal justice all over the 
world. As the nature and number of crimes change, evolve so should the approach to 
dealing with them. Look at the way people do money laundering, kidnapping, human 
trafficking, drug and all sorts of very sophisticated crimes that we have to deal with 
as they pile up including cyber-crimes. If we do not deal with the potential for more 
moribund cases, the system may collapse. Think about prison decongestion also. Plea 
bargaining may have a great impact on the future of criminal justice. It means less 
cost and more results.”385  
Supporting this line of argument, another respondent claimed:   
 
“No matter how strong the evidence may be, no case is a foregone conclusion. One 
may have a good case but still loose due to legal technicalities or other contingencies. 
That is especially why plea bargaining is the best idea to dealing with intricate cases. 
For other types of crimes, it is a good alternative to the problem of years in court. 
What is better than securing in six weeks what would instead go on for six years. This 
is a boost, and it saves lots of trauma for everyone.”386 
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This line of argument has its legitimacy in the economy of law. Beyond doubt, the shifting 
nature of crimes is making prosecution more expensive because of the need to sometimes 
involve sophisticated and resource consuming ways of investigation and evidence.  
 
“What do you do with a criminal offender that is part of a sophisticated network and 
who is willing to give you evidence and classified information on the transactions of 
the gang? Of course, there are forensic teams and expert investigators, but I tell you 
that is not enough. Sometimes you just have to compromise and allow some of these 
accomplices to have what they asked for, leniency or even immunity unless you want 
to bust the whole case and go empty handed.”387  
 
He further gave an instance with the famous case of Nwude, which led investigators to five 
countries to retrieve records of wire transactions and other means used to commit the 
crime. Evidently, this case is not only notorious but also one that tested the capacity of the 
EFCC to the limit. In the end, the EFCC still had to use some of the accomplices in order to 
build a strong case and to secure a conviction. Although these arguments are a reminder of 
the ever-present relationship between law and economics, it is also important said 
McConville, to be cautious of making cost an ethical consideration, the waste of which is 
deemed punishable (1998: 578). This indeed is one of the conflicts of plea bargaining as 
practitioners struggle to reconcile between institutional priorities and fundamental values of 
due process. In this fluid state of affairs, authorities have become susceptible to 
compromise.388  
 
9.9 Conclusion 
The dominant proposition for plea bargaining in Nigeria is one that is closely associated with 
the need to find an alternative but more effective criminal procedure to deal with cases of 
corruption and other financial crimes. This is the overwhelming argument from prosecutors 
of the EFCC and the ICPC, who were the first to apply plea bargaining. Paradoxically, there is 
strong opposition to this system by scholars and commentators who think the idea is itself 
an extension of corruption in the justice system. This is how polemical the debate on plea 
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bargaining had been since it first came to prominence a decade ago. What is also evident is 
that apart from the officials of the EFCC and the ICPC, plea bargaining in Nigeria has more 
critics than proponents. As evident from the data of this study, there are some legitimate 
reasons why plea bargaining is unpopular among many Nigerians. The main points of 
criticism are those that see plea bargaining as secretive, selective and full of compromises. 
 
Taking into account some of the notorious cases settled through plea bargaining, it is quite 
understandable that many people would suspect that the system is inconsistent with the 
objectives of criminal justice. First, evidence has shown how some of the most notorious 
cases of corruption were given extremely lighter sentence through plea bargain. Perhaps, 
this is the nature of plea bargaining, but it is also a situation that may not appeal to a 
population who see corruption as the main problem of the country. Another aspect that 
added to the criticism is the lack of legally defined parameters for plea bargaining. 
Professionals, especially those with knowledge of legal procedure were right to accuse the 
EFCC and the ICPC of introducing a system that is not sanctioned by law. Yet, this study has 
also found out that most people do not have a clear idea of the extent and limits of the 
application of plea bargain. As much as they think the system is pervasive, records from this 
study show otherwise. Evidence also shows that plea bargaining is not only applied to 
notorious cases but also in some lesser offences that the EFCC prosecutes. However, it is 
obvious that even those prosecutors keen on applying plea bargaining often do so 
discreetly, or at least, they do not disclose to the court or the public about the negotiation. 
Hence, both records of convictions obtained from the EFCC and the ICPC appear not to 
clearly state which case was negotiated and which underwent full trial.  
It is also evident that because the system existed for a long time without an enabling law, all 
effort to give it statutory legitimacy only generated more  controversy  and conflict of 
opinions on law and jurisprudence. This challenge not only provokes more debates over 
legality, but it also affected the way prosecutors undertake plea bargaining, and also 
affected the sentiment of judges who are sceptical about being part of a system so 
controversial and unpopular. This incidentally has resulted in some considerable levels of 
judicial populism, with judges sending clear signals that plea bargaining is not tolerated in 
their courts. Such evident judicial populism may well affect judicial reasoning. This was also 
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apparent in the views of senior legal officers, who have tried to dissociate themselves from 
the system. 
In relation to the workload theory which is amongst the most popular justifications for plea 
bargaining around the world. It is also evident that plea bargaining has served as a 
mechanism that helps prosecutors of the EFCC to deal with high profile cases of corruption 
that if allowed to go through conventional trial, these cases may likely longer time and 
enormous resource without the certainty of conviction. 
Another important aspect is the absence of any reliable evidence to suggest that plea 
bargaining in Nigeria is a regulated process, especially the manner in which charges are 
substituted or discounted. This is evident from the high degree of discretion exercised by 
prosecutors and the lack of transparency even in the records of conviction. Yet, because the 
law mandates the filing of an ‘evidence diary’ at the initiation of every prosecution, one can 
easily see how final sentences are legally inconsistent with the charges first filed. These 
inherent flaws have also created the possibility for prosecutors to use coercive measures to 
pursue guilty pleas. As in other jurisdictions around the world, evidence has shown that 
overcharging is among the common technics used by prosecutors in Nigeria to secure guilty 
pleas. It is, therefore, safe to argue that, with these critical elements still in place, and with 
the failure to have a clear and uniform application of plea throughout the courts in Nigeria, 
the system will remain under serious criticism. 
The new ACJA 2015 may be an opportunity to expand the application of plea bargaining to 
other courts across the country. But evidence has already emerged showing how the deep-
rooted public sentiment against plea bargaining is challenging this prospect. For example, 
this research has established how political and judicial populism against plea bargaining is 
becoming so widespread that influential legal figures such as the Attorney General of the 
Federation openly reject plea bargaining for some classes of offences even when he is aware 
that the ACJA 2015 allows it. Despite these challenges there appear to be a considerable 
sense of optimism among proponents and a sense of acceptance among some opponents 
that the system is not going to disappear 
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Another problem with the ACJA 2015, is that it has ignited new controversies relating to 
jurisprudence and the conflict of laws. For example, some of the provisions of the new 
legislation that support plea bargaining are in clear contrast with other important laws and 
judicial precedents that insist on strict adherence to adversarial procedure and open court 
trials such as the Evidence Act. Another point of contention is that the new ACJL 2015 is 
exclusively for Federal offences, meaning all state laws and courts across the country are 
not covered under this law. This further suggests how plea bargaining can only be selectively 
applied in courts covered by the ACJA 2015, a situation that touches on the rule of law and 
equity. It also segregates the way criminal charges and sanctions are applied, giving Federal 
courts and Federal offences the opportunity for negotiation and allowing all other courts to 
continue with the traditional model of a full trial and often a full sentence.  
Hence, it is evident that the ACJA 2015, along with other substantive laws operating side by 
side, have generated a new phase of controversy. From the period when there was no law 
to support plea bargaining to a new era where there is a law but an inconsistent one. 
However, this fluid and inconsistent transition towards the institution of plea bargaining 
may also be a reflection of the lack of confidence and the deficiencies of a system of trials 
that is slow and ineffective. The historical reality that a number of criminal cases remain in 
Nigerian courts for a long period without conviction and without acquittal has contributed 
to the overwhelming necessity to finds an alternative, even if it is unpopular. 
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Chapter Ten 
General conclusion. 
This study has shown that the institution of law, particularly criminal justice is one that is 
constantly affected by a range of social, political and economic trajectories.  Whether in 
legal drafting, the prosecutor’s decision-making, in court processes or in far-reaching 
legislative reforms, there are always contingencies that motivate the choices and objectives 
of the different players in criminal justice administration. This perhaps explains the 
multifactorial nature of the development of plea bargaining.  
In trying to trace the genesis of plea bargaining within the larger framework of legal 
practice, this study has shown evidence of a steady transformation of simple summary trials 
to a system where prosecutors, judges, and the defence agree on consensual terms to 
bargain on charges and sentencing, often influenced by the extent to which each party is 
ready to offer or what compromises he or she is ready to make.  While this process 
continuous to redefine the role and relevance of criminal justice practitioners, scholars have 
also attempted to contextualise the reasons for the emergence and indeed the proliferation 
of the idea of negotiating with a criminal offender. The majority of these scholarly 
explanations appear to revolve around workload and efficiency theories. However, it is also 
evident that there are extended variables, including the juxtaposition by the ‘functionalist 
theorists’, whose approach is closely related to the decision theory. A number of studies on 
plea bargaining also point to other specific elements such as ‘strength of evidence’ as key 
factors in persuading defendants and also motivating prosecutors to offer or accept a plea 
bargain.  
The theoretical approaches to plea bargaining contained in this research have also 
underscored the relevance of both individual and institutional priorities in the emergence 
and application of plea bargaining. What is common across all regimes is the strong 
utilitarian argument that plea bargaining generates as a system that enhances efficiency and 
finality in criminal justice. This sense of utility has led many legal regimes to legislate and 
integrate plea bargaining as part and parcel of criminal justice procedure. Evidence for this 
has been demonstrated for Nigeria, England and Wales, Italy, Germany, Russia, China, etc. 
Similarly, this study has shown how the economics of law in the context of ‘cost’ has 
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become a prevailing ideology that defines how police, prosecutors, courts, and prisons 
function. Added to the idea of economics is the influence of institutional bureaucracies 
embedded in what scholar’s term as ‘new managerialism’. The convergence of these 
multifaceted elements marks a new transition from the traditional ideas of retributive 
justice to one that carries an econo-legal construct.  
The aspects of efficiency, economy and managerialism have also proven to be significant in 
tracing the genesis of plea bargaining in Nigeria. This study has, for instance shown, that the 
establishment of the two anti-graft Commissions, i.e., the EFCC and the ICPC in early 2000, 
was not only a response to the growing cases of corruption that are causing colossal 
damage to the economy and reputation of the country but also because the traditional 
methods of criminal justice have proven less effective in prosecution and conviction, 
especially of organised financial. This sense of urgency was found to be a key factor that 
prompted the resort to alternative routes. Further evidence also shows that the 
development of plea bargaining in Nigeria was not originally through clear legal provisions, 
but through the kind of routine practice common with internal institutional priorities. The 
notable objective was to ensure the presence of an alternative procedure that will 
guarantee finality, even as the system entails certain unavoidable compromises.  
While these institutional aspects are relevant to the development of plea bargaining in 
Nigeria, this research has also gone further to explore other important issues that touch on 
the politics of criminal justice. It has drawn from the works of scholars such Garland (2001) 
and Burke (2009) on the contemporary idea of a ‘risk society’ and growing penal populism 
on the need to exert harsh punishment on offenders that pose a risk to the society; a 
rhetoric that is increasingly becoming relevant in penal legislations. These socio-political 
components have resulted in diluting the orthodox philosophy of criminal justice and 
ushered in a new kind of jurisprudence. As seen in the first part of this study, some 
jurisdictions e.g., In England and Wales, offences that were previously considered as civil 
violations are now been redefined to form part of criminal responsibility, resulting in over-
criminalisation and thereby adding further workload to criminal justice systems.  
One of the key paradox in this fluid transition is the upsurge of punitive justice on one hand, 
and the rise of plea bargaining on the other. Although this inconsistency is not a general 
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phenomenon across all legal regimes, they are particularly common in some jurisdictions, 
e.g., the US, which has historically been at the forefront of promoting plea bargaining. 
Furthermore, this research has demonstrated that the debate about plea bargaining in 
Nigeria had always had political undertones. Many respondents believe the idea has more 
to do with shielding the rich and powerful than the advancement of criminal justice’s 
primary ideals. What is also evident is the way this sentiment of partiality and inconsistency 
has generated strong criticism across board. There is now a growing attitude even among 
judges to reject any signs of negotiated settlement, which is leading to some form of judicial 
activism. For instance, evidence has shown that in some cases, judges have openly question 
a prosecutor’s motives when the sense that there was some kind of bargain between the 
parties.389 This has led to some judges giving the harshest penalty even when they could 
otherwise grant leniency. Similar, this populism has extended even to the judicial 
disciplinary committee, where judges suspected of accepting the outcome of a plea bargain 
were criticised, questioned and sanctioned.  
It is important, however, to note that there are voices that are championing the return of a 
right based approach which insists on the principles that “no end justifies taking away 
human rights” (Pollock, 2014: 402). Although this does not necessarily mean that all forms 
of plea bargaining should be abolished, the principle of process rights promoted by many 
bodies including the United Nations, the Council of Europe and others around the world. 
This to some degree appears to be in contrast to the argument of some proponents of plea 
bargaining, especially those who maintain that the advantages of negotiation justify certain 
compromises; a line of argument that seemed to legitimise the prioritisation of 
organizational above procedural rights.  One of the findings of this research that raises 
concern is the evidence that suggest prosecutors of the EFCC and even the ICPC engaged in 
plea bargaining do sometimes circumvent what the statutes contain in order to fulfil the 
terms of the negotiation. Defence counsel, on their part also tended to offer negotiated 
settlement as a means of securing the most lenient penal option for their clients, often 
through private agreements, the terms of which are not known to any other person. 
This lack of transparency is so acute in Nigeria that even the records of prosecution and 
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conviction obtained from the EFCC and the ICPC do not reveal clearly what the substituted 
charges were or why. They also do not even state clearly that a plea was negotiated. 
Instead, the only thing available to the public is the record of the original charges and the 
amount of the final sentence. A close analysis of the documents, as was done throughout 
this research reveals that the final sentence does not reflect the statutory sentence limit for 
the charges on those records. Hence, it not only proves the presence of plea bargaining and 
the substitution of charges, but it also shows that charges with higher sentences are used as 
a bargaining chip to be later substituted with ones that carry lighter sentence. Therefore, 
even if the defendants benefit from sentence discount, which is the hallmark of plea 
bargaining, it subverts the principles of justice and fairness because, in most cases, it lacks 
transparency. It is also acutely inconsistence as it sends a clear message of rewarding guilty 
pleas and punishing those who insist on their constitutional rights to an open trial.  This 
irrational tendency in crime and penology cannot be equated with the morality of law and 
the sense of justice, as it turns cost and time into ethical aspects of justice, the waste of 
which should be punished with a harsher sentence. It is important to state here that the 
enactment of the new ACJA in Nigeria in 2015 has included certain clauses in order to 
safeguard some of the undesirable conducts of prosecutors. However, empirical studies on 
plea bargaining have shown that even when such anti-duress measures are put in place, 
they do very little to deter prosecutors obnoxious conduct (Gazal and Ben-Shahar 2004: 
1401). Moreover, plea bargaining has altered the rights and legitimate interest of other 
parties in criminal justice process. For example, the community had been alienated from 
participating either as witnesses to a crime or as observers of the judicial process. 
Despite these problems, the comparative perspective of this research has shown that plea 
bargaining has since become a global concept, essentially breaking out of its traditional 
adversarial frontiers to even those jurisdictions that have a history of socialist criminal 
justice system i.e., China and Russia. In all of these territories, the notion of efficiency and a 
cost-effective process is at the centre of the debate. In its traditional jurisdictions like the 
US, plea bargaining had since become a norm in dealing with a large number of criminal 
cases. This perhaps is similar to the antecedents in places lice China where the increase in 
criminal cases was claimed to be the main reason that prompted the need for an alternative 
system to ease the burden of the courts.  
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It is important to note that, because of the deep-rooted culture of inquisitoriality, legal 
regimes like China were among those least expected to adopt plea bargaining. This further 
confirms the expansion and globalisation of the system of plea bargaining. The paradox in all 
this is that, while countries like the US and the China defend the application of plea 
bargaining often from the workload theory, this may not be true of other regimes such as 
Germany or even the Netherlands (Brants-Langeraar, 2007). In the later jurisdictions, crime 
rates are not as high, and the judicial system has the capacity to try most cases without 
necessarily resorting to plea bargaining. This also explains the theoretical arguments raised 
in this research that plea bargaining may not necessarily be driven by workload. Instead, it 
may be a product of factors including occupational routine and proceduarl convinience. 
This study further shows that the guidelines for the application of plea bargaining often 
depend on the legal culture and the legal priorities of a society. Hence, these modes of 
application differ from one society to another. A closer look at the different jurisdictions 
reviewed in this study reveals that common law systems have a stronger tendency of 
augmenting the existing powers of the prosecution, thereby making judges even more 
passive. These powers have often given the prosecution the opportunity not only to 
negotiate based on their own terms, but to also to threaten and coerce defendants into 
submission. Civil law regimes on the other hand have given the defendant more relevance 
and an opportunity to take part in their case as against the previous culture of the all-
powerful prosecutors and judges. Although plea bargaining has affected the powers of 
judges in both civil and common law, judges in civil law still have more stake in plea 
bargaining than their counterparts in most common law jurisdictions.  
In relation to limitations, evidence shows that in most civil law regimes, plea bargaining is 
allowed only for certain types of cases, especially misdemeanours and simple offences. The 
study also shows that the consent of the judge as well as the victim is often essential for a 
successful plea bargain. Similarly, even the extent of sentence discount is acutely regulated 
e.g., in Russia and Italy. Again, depending on whether the country follows the ‘legality 
principle’ or the ‘expediency principle,' most civil law regimes have set limits to the 
discretionary powers of the prosecution. In jurisdictions where the expediency principle 
applies, for example, issues such as public interest are expected to be taken into account 
during negotiation. In relation to these similarities and dissimilarities, this research has also 
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discovered that similarities in legal tradition do not necessarily suggest that regimes will 
have similar procedural guidelines on plea bargaining. For example, the US system allows 
the prosecution to recommend a sentence to the judge, while England and Wales do not 
allow for such recommendation. Similarly, Nigeria, which is traditionally a common law 
system has included the victim and the judge as part of the negotiation process as contained 
in the ACJA 2015. Nigeria also copied another element of civil law which is the question of 
public interest in the application of plea bargaining.  
Most critics see plea bargaining as a system that challenges the principles of procedural 
justice theory, as it places greater emphasis on the end rather than the means (Tyler, 2006b: 
227). Because it is often secretive and legitimises bureaucracy and informality above 
criminal justices best practices of judicial review/appeal, plea bargaining is capable of 
endangering the concept of judicial fairness. It is also a system that does not necessarily 
serve the goals of retribution or deterrence. At best, it still is more of a practice that mainly 
serves procedural economy, providing administrative convenience to attorneys and judges 
and alleviating the cost of criminal justice administration.  One of the consequences of this 
is the way similar offences are punished differently, depending on the accused person’s 
degree of cooperation. This has resulted in inconsistent and false pleas that result in lower 
rate of acquittals and a higher rate of guilty pleas (Baldwin and Mcconville, 1979; Wright, 
2005). Moreover, this familiar pattern of securing guilty pleas through processes that are 
not transparent, often with the promise of leniency or immunity has allowed prosecutors 
and even judges to be coercive that innocent people become susceptible to pleading guilty 
out of fear. Hence, the argument that plea bargaining is an anti-adversary process that 
promotes bureaucratic ethos of which the process and the outcome are defined by what the 
prosecutors present, not by the merits of the evidence duly heard and decided in open 
courts. This complex interplay of legal and economic priorities leads to the argument that 
criminal justice now operates in a paradigm that has produced some extraordinary conflicts 
between the desire to retain criminal justice’s traditional values on one hand, and the need 
to shift towards liberisation and consensual justice on the other.  
Irrespective of the flaws of plea bargaining, one thing that remain factual is that it is a 
system that ranks high in terms of providing an expeditious and effective alternative to the 
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rigours and cost of trials. This explains the development of plea bargaining in Nigeria, which 
was mainly a response to the inefficiency of traditional methods to deal with cases of 
corruption. As evidence shows, it was this problem that saw the establishment of the two 
anti-graft Commissions, leading to the introduction of plea bargaining into the criminal 
justice system in Nigeria. The main idea was to have alternative investigative and 
prosecuting agencies that will deal with financial crimes in a robust manner. Hence, one can 
safely place plea bargaining in Nigeria as a procedural transplant located within the wider 
political economy of the state. However, without the ability to ensure deterrence, it has also 
proven ineffective in combating the very corruption that it was meant to fight. Based on 
evidence compiled since plea bargaining was first introduced, Nigeria’s place in the 
corruption index has not improved until very recently,390 which was not due to plea 
bargaining but the emerging political commitment to investigate, prosecute and sentence 
without necessarily resorting to negotiated settlements. Evidence also shows that plea 
bargaining in Nigeria has not offered much solution to the caseload in various courts across 
the country. This is largely because it is not applied in lower courts where the bulk of 
criminal cases are prosecuted.  
Another important aspect of this study is the evidence that plea bargaining was not 
sanctioned under any statute in Nigeria until 2015. Despite arguments to the contrary, the 
overwhelming evidence is that plea bargaining was a system that, for over a decade, 
operated outside the law. This perhaps was the reason why, in order to justify plea 
bargaining, prosecutors continued to make inaccurate inference to the provisions of other 
laws that allow for offences to be compounded, misinterpreting the laws to mean plea 
bargaining. Analyses of those provisions have proven that ‘compounding’, in the sense of 
the law does not mean negotiation. Yet, it is also evident that through these inferences, the 
Commissions, particularly the EFCC, have succeeded in disposing cases that would ordinarily 
have remained in court for decades. Through the exclusive use of ‘Charge bargain’, 
prosecutors and defence have developed a way of ensuring guilty pleas.   
Another important evidence from this study is that the system of plea bargaining in Nigeria 
has never been endemic in Nigeria. This is contrary to what was in public discourse about 
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plea bargaining in Nigeria.. For example, evidence has shown that the number of criminal 
cases handled by the EFCC and the ICPC (Appendices A, B, and C) in comparison to the 
enormous amount of criminal trials across Nigeria, full trials are still the dominant 
procedure. To better understand the reasons for the low rate of plea bargaining, this 
research was able to analyse certain impediments/constraints within the general framework 
of Nigeria’s criminal justice system. First is the absence of a clear legal framework since the 
process first emerged in the early 2000s. As a result, no other prosecuting agencies across 
the country engage in any form of plea bargaining. The second reason is the amount of 
public outrage that continued to create wariness and reluctance among legal practitioners, 
especially judges. Third is the traditional culture of adversariality, which sees negotiation as 
an unfamiliar and often criticised as illegal and immoral. In their responses, even the 
prosecutors of the two Commissions admitted that plea bargaining occurs with a lot of 
compromises and it is always capable of generating enormous controversy, hence most of 
the negotiations are done quietly and quickly. Hence, the general response to plea 
bargaining in Nigeria has continued to be a mixture of legal and moral sentiments. There is 
an overwhelming sense of suspicion about the way in which the system was imported and 
how it is applied.  Most respondents and commentators are of the opinion that it is applied 
mainly as a lenient process upon selected cases involving senior officials found guilty of 
corruption. However, relying on the data contained in Appendix A and B, it can be seen that 
the notion that plea bargaining is exclusively applied on the rich and powerful is incorrect. 
Plea bargaining has also been applied more in cases that do not involve the rich and 
powerful, up to seventy per cent of the cases in Appendix A and B do not involve high profile 
crimes and they also do not suggest that the persons involved are among the category of 
the rich and powerful in Nigeria. 
Although prosecutors of the Commissions claim that they do not apply plea bargaining 
based on the class or position of the individual but rather on the opportunity that the 
prevailing circumstance presents, there is sufficient evidence to show that shows those who 
benefit from large sentence reduction are mostly among the people that committed the 
gravest offence, i.e., influential politicians and powerful captains of industries involved in 
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corruption.391 But since the aim is to ensure conviction and sometimes recover proceeds of 
crime, the Commission were compelled to compromise in order to avoid legal confrontation 
with some of these defendants that that have the resources to hire the best attorneys and 
to sustain a prolonged trial without the certainty of conviction. Evidence also shows that 
prosecutors are aware of the problematic nature of plea bargaining in terms of public 
perception and even the protection of the fundamental values of criminal justice. 
In general, the findings of this research show that: 
A. Plea bargaining has created an uncommon situation in Nigeria by creating an 
uncommon hybrid system of criminal justice. 
B. It is evident that plea bargaining in Nigeria is not as endemic as presumed by many 
commentators. Empirical evidence clearly shows that the practice is limited to 
prosecutors of the EFCC and the ICPC. Moreover, lower courts i.e., magistrates 
courts where most criminal cases are brought were completely exempted from plea 
bargaining.  These two major reasons suggest strongly that plea bargaining is not as 
widespread as previously thought. 
C. It is mostly restricted to superior courts. 
D. Apart from the EFCC, even the records of ICPC’s prosecution show little sign of plea 
bargaining. For other prosecutorial agencies in the State e.g., the Police, the 
Attorney Generals Chambers etc., have no record or evidence to suggest they use 
plea bargaining. 
E. Despite certain previous arguments as to whether plea bargaining was allowed prior 
to the promulgation of the ACJA 2015, reading through law, precedents and 
empirical evidence has shown clearly that plea bargaining was not sanctioned under 
any previous legislations. 
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F. The choice to negotiate is mostly supported by prosecutors of the EFCC, while other 
players in the criminal justice system show a great deal of reservation and concern, 
especially with regards to legality, suitability and other aspects such as lack of 
transparency and judicial corruption. 
G. Evidence also suggests that even after the promulgation of the ACJA 2014, some 
judges are still wary of accepting plea bargaining. This perhaps, as evidence shows is 
due to the numerous backlash that a number of cases of plea bargaining generated 
over the last decade. 
H. Plea bargaining in Nigeria as contained in the new ACJA 2015 closely resembles the 
American model. But in an unfamiliar turn, it also has an element of civil law system, 
being that the victim has a stake in whether the negotiation should take place or not. 
I. Lastly, the empirical evidence from this research found that plea bargaining is not 
popular among most legal practitioners and especially among the general public. 
What was further discovered is that most of the popular cases of plea bargaining in 
Nigeria are those involving high profile public corruption and the sentences awarded 
are far from what will reasonably be regarded as proportionate. Hence, it is  not out 
of place that in both the responses of interviewees and the various public comments 
and reactions especially in newspapers, one can see an obvious sense of dismissal as 
well as suspicion of the institution of plea bargaining as a system that covers the rich 
and powerful from the full wrath of the law. As a result, there now a growing 
attitude of political populism as seen in the comments of the Attorney General of the 
Federation and of judicial activism as seen in the attitude of judges who take pride in 
disclosing their dislike for plea bargaining. These emerging dimensions are posing a 
new challenge for the future development of plea bargaining in Nigeria. 
 
Although plea bargaining has been argued by some scholars as a cost effective and efficient 
way of criminal justice administration, it is also true that not every reform of this kind fits in 
every political setting. For countries like Nigeria, plethora of evidence has shown that 
corruption in every sector of the society is one of the major challenges that the country has 
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been dealing with. Hence, any reform that does not adequately deal with corruption cannot 
be regarded as one that appeals to the majority of the people who want to see transparency 
and accountability in the political and economic system. Paradoxically, plea bargaining, by 
its characteristic is not a system that promotes transparency, especially in the way criminal 
cases are negotiated and settled. It is by far, a system that, contrary to open and 
transparent trials in courts where all facts and evidence are clearly argued and decided, plea 
bargaining on the other hand condones a system of judicial bureaucracy where prosecutors 
and defense discuss, negotiate and agree on what to present before the court and in what 
way. Therefore, one will argue very strongly that for a young democracy like Nigeria where 
the populace demand and expect transparency, the rule of law and equality in the way 
cases are tried and settled, plea bargaining is the least of legal reforms that will appeal to 
the general population. Most importantly, this research has shown how people reacted to 
cases of corruption that were settled through plea bargaining, a mind of vehement 
accusation of the criminal justice system that is now causing judicial activism among some 
judges by their open and unreserved opposition to plea bargaining. The research also shows 
how leading legal officers, particularly the Attorney General of the Federation stating, in 
contrast to what the ACJA 2015  contains, that cases of corruption will no longer be settled 
through plea bargaining. These are contradictions that are mainly caused by the way plea 
bargaining was used, which lacks uniformity and often appears discriminatory. 
Finally, this research concludes that, all over the world, the concept of plea bargaining is 
mostly defined by prevailing contingencies that criminal justice faces (utilitarian 
perspective) on one hand, and the individual choices that parties and legal practitioners 
make (decision theory) on the other. Fisher’s notion that plea bargaining is the product of 
those who laboured in the criminal courts seemed closer to explaining the development of 
plea bargaining (2000: 904). In Nigeria, the system is about ensuring certainty in the 
expeditious conviction of cases involving corruption and other financial crimes. Yet, a new 
struggle seemed to be emerging due to the enormous criticism developing against plea 
bargaining in Nigeria. There is now an evidence of retreat among legal practitioners, judges, 
and even policy makers. There is also a lack of confidence in the system among the public. In 
order to address these problems, there is the need to look at the various problems that has 
for years generated negative sentiments against the application of plea bargaining. There 
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are also the challenges of lack of uniformity in application, lack of transparency and the fact 
that legislators did not place limits over the types of crimes that should be negotiated. So 
far, the practice appears to be constrained by many factors, foremost of which are the 
conflict of laws and public perception. 
 
Future research. 
The enactment of the ACJA 2015, which for the first time introduced plea bargaining is 
already raising enormous controversy. Yet, to have a credible understanding of how this will 
shape the future of criminal justice and the legal battles that will emanate, the Act has to be 
rigorously tested in and outside the court room over a period of time. This perhaps will 
subsequently open a new area of interest for scholarship. Some of the areas that presently 
create contentions include the fact that the application of the Act was restricted to Federal 
courts, thereby excluding lower courts spread all over the country and creating a hybrid 
system of criminal adjudication. Another challenge is that, even as it is still at an early stage, 
the ACJA 2015 has been the subject of populist criticisms, especially taking into account the 
statements of the Attorney General of the Federation who, contrary to what is provided in 
the Act, suggested that cases of corruption and terrorism would not be subjected to plea 
bargaining.  No doubt, the ACJA 2015 and its endorsement of plea bargaining has triggered a 
new phase of debate and controversy in Nigeria’s criminal justice system, a debate that 
would continue to resonate and which may require further research. 
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